The Hard Problem of Consciousness
Philosophers who favor a supernatural or dualistic view of mind have contrived an argument that they think poses a major obstacle to physicalism. It is the so-called hard problem of consciousness, that claims there is an unbridgable gap between physical substance and mental substance. It is basically the claim that the stuff of conscious experience - the qualia, or qualitative component of consciousness - the texture of our perceptions - cannot be explained in terms of physical substances and phenomena. But this is an unscientific argument. It amounts to an argument from ignorance. It is saying that because we don't yet know how to fully explain consciousness in terms of physical matter and its properties, then there must be something immaterial about it. This fallacy gives courage to those (especially theists) who choose to ignore the track record of naturalistic science, and instead posit the existence of things like the immaterial soul as the answer to the problem.
I say this argument is contrived because it hinges largely on a matter of perspective. Our experience of the world by means of sensations is first-person, or subjective. It is necessarily true that we have our own experience of sensations, but we don't share those experiences with another person. The subjective perceptions of qualia occur within our own mind, not someone else's, because they are uniquely our own experiences. Even if we wired another person's sense organs to our brain, we would still have our own subjective experience of his sensations. There's no way we could say that one person's subjective experience of qualia is the same as the other person's. If I see redness, is it the same as the redness another person sees, or could it be that he sees something that I would call blue? We can't describe redness in an objective manner. The best we can do is to compare it to other things that are similar. But we can't give a fundamental description of redness that would be comprehensible to another person, such that he understands it independent of any reference to something in his own experience.
This is the basis of Thomas Nagel's argument. His discussion of what it's like to be a bat focuses on subjective experience, and our inability to make an objective description of it. There are facts about the bat's experience that are unknown to the rest of us, he says. And without an objective description, the phenomenon of conscious experience eludes science, he claims. But that is simply the reality of subjective experience. There's no reason to suppose, based on the inability to objectively describe what is inherently subjective, that science could never explain the existence of these experiences as physical phenomena.
David Chalmers makes an argument for the immaterial aspect of mind based on the conceivability philosophical zombies. A zombie is said to be physically identical to a human, but without the conscious experience of qualia. The zombie can see and hear, and respond to conversation in a way that is indistinguishable from an ordinary person, but without the qualitative feeling of sensations that humans experience as the substance normal consciousness. According to Chalmers, there is no physical difference, but the zombie lacks something else that is supposed to be the immaterial substance of mind.
Chalmers maintains that the experience of qualia is non-functional, and plays no role in physical causation. So the zombie can have sensations and react to them without ever having conscious awareness of their quality. But the zombie that can't experience qualia couldn't possibly behave the way conscious people do, because our behavior is intimately related to the qualitative feel of things. We are attracted to the pleasant taste of sugar, and repulsed by the rotten smell of garbage. We recoil from the unpleasant feeling of pain. If a zombie didn't experience these things, he wouldn't behave the way we do. Imagine a zombie holding his hand in a fire and saying "I can feel the sensation of pain, but there's nothing unpleasant about it."
Chalmers' thought experiment postulates something that sounds logically possible, but is actually incoherent. A zombie couldn't possibly behave in a way that is indistinguishable from a conscious person. First, the zombie must be able to sense things the way we do, or he wouldn't know anything about his surroundings. He wouldn't be able to converse, or to see what is in front of him. Second, the zombie must be able to distinguish the difference between different colors, sounds, smells, etc. If you place a red block and a blue block in front of him, and ask him to pick up the red one, he will correctly discern which one is red. But that ability do discern one color from another can only exist if there is something qualitatively different between them. That's precisely what we call qualia.
The bottom line is that we have every reason to think that the experience of sensations, that we call qualia, is very much a physical phenomenon, and that it plays a vital role in our ability to survive. The simple fact that we can't make an objective description of subjective experience is no reason to conclude that mind must be immaterial. The "hard problem of consciousness" only provides a weak excuse for dualists to hang on to their belief in the existence of something else for which there is no real evidence.
Philosophers who favor a supernatural or dualistic view of mind have contrived an
ReplyDeletewrong, Chalmers and John "Searl are both atheists and both major critics of Dennett and the reductionist view. Secondly there is no such thing as 'supernatural view of mind."
It is the so-called hard problem of consciousness, that claims there is an unbridgable gap between physical substance and mental substance.
First the HP doesn't claim anything. It has a point vto it it's not a claim.
Secondly, that,s not it. It doesn't say there's a unbridgeable gap between physical and mental substance although I guess probably someone advancing the HP does say that, The real point is that consciousness is of a different quality from brain function. All the study of brain function will never tell us about consciousness, To drive home that point the hard problem illustrates aspects of consciousness that can't apart from exponential means.
It is basically the claim that the stuff of conscious experience - the qualia, or qualitative component of consciousness - the texture of our perceptions - cannot be explained in terms of physical substances and phenomena. But this is an unscientific argument. It amounts to an argument from ignorance.
apparently you think scientific material is judged by it's agreement with atheism rather than the employment of scientific method, nothing unscientific about it, it does transcend science s it is really an epistemological question, but it's beyond scinece5and yet it is of great import to scientific study.
it's argument from ignorance, yours,,
It is saying that because we don't yet know how to fully explain consciousness in terms of physical matter and its properties, then there must be something immaterial about it.
no it' not., it doesn't say anything ab out SN. that there is an immaterial aspect to mind is obvious. self evident.,we all know it., like we know the sun shines at noon. only a blind person would deny it. We don't need the hard problem to know that, If people the HP to justify their views on SN that is not the fault of the HP.
This fallacy gives courage to those (especially theists) who choose to ignore the track record of naturalistic science, and instead posit the existence of things like the immaterial soul as the answer to the problem.\
there is no track record of science in reducing mind to brain., switch using brain function in place of consciousness. that is not a track record.
I think it's fair to say that there are not usually, or perhaps never are debates about self evident facts. If some fact is self evident then why would there ever be people who fail to know said fact?
DeleteContrary to your assertion, I do not know there is something immaterial to the mind, and I do not see what is self evident about the claim. Further, as I'm alluding to above, a lot of scientists and philosophers argue for physicalism about the mind so that seems to be evidence that the mind having an immaterial element is not self evident.
Joe: wrong, Chalmers and John "Searl are both atheists and both major critics of Dennett and the reductionist view. Secondly there is no such thing as 'supernatural view of mind."
Delete- Chalmers is a dualist. There are atheists who believe in dualism. Searle is a biological naturalist, but I didn't mention him in my post. A supernatural view of mind is the soul as the seat of intellect.
First the HP doesn't claim anything. It has a point vto it it's not a claim.
- The "hard problem" essentially IS the claim that this gap exists.
The real point is that consciousness is of a different quality from brain function. All the study of brain function will never tell us about consciousness, To drive home that point the hard problem illustrates aspects of consciousness that can't apart from exponential means.
- What you are saying is consciousness is not physical. That's the claim of a gap I'm talking about.
apparently you think scientific material is judged by it's agreement with atheism rather than the employment of scientific method, nothing unscientific about it, it does transcend science s it is really an epistemological question, but it's beyond scinece5and yet it is of great import to scientific study.
- Science can and does study consciousness. It is very much a matter of scientific investigation. And the overwhelming majority of scientists who are involved in these fields agree that mind is purely physical.
that there is an immaterial aspect to mind is obvious. self evident.,we all know it.
- Sorry, that's absolutely not true.
there is no track record of science in reducing mind to brain., switch using brain function in place of consciousness. that is not a track record.
- There is work to be done, but the existing track record is far more extensive than you realize.
hey IMS I've put up a blog piece in response to your whole thing.
ReplyDeleteSoft sell on hard problem.
A few things:
ReplyDeleteFirst, the hard problem of consciousness is explaining why there is qualia rather than no qualia given our physical states. As Chalmers might say, the hard problem is actually reducible to explaining why we are not P-zombies if physicalism is true. As a result, you definitely do not capture the hard problem of consciousness initially in your post. You characterize it as "It is basically the claim that the stuff of conscious experience - the qualia, or qualitative component of consciousness - the texture of our perceptions - cannot be explained in terms of physical substances and phenomena". That is not the hard problem but rather that is a conclusion some philosophers arrive at when trying to find physicalist explanations for the hard problem.
Second, the argument from ignorance claim isn't correct. Chalmers and others do not make arguments which argue from there being no known scientific explanation for qualia to there being no possible scientific explanation for qualia.
Third, you don't quite understand Chalmer's argument, and your response to him might be question begging. Chalmer's does not say that P-zombies are physically identical to us yet lack some immaterial aspect necessary for consciousness. P-zombies are instead physically identical to us yet lack qualia. Chalmers and others argue something closer to this:
1. If P-zombies are metaphysically possible then physicalism is false.
2. If P-zombies are conceivable then P-zombies are metaphysically possible.
3. P-zombies are conceivable.
4. P-zombies are metaphysically possible.
5. Physicalism is false.
http://documents.routledge-interactive.s3.amazonaws.com/9781138793934/A22014/dualism/The%20zombie%20argument.pdf
http://www.personal.ceu.hu/students/03/Istvan_Aranyosi/Chapter%20IV.pdf
http://consc.net/zombies.html
Chalmer's argument, and arguments like his such as Kripke's, are usually attacked for their conceivability premise and the premise linking conceivability to metaphysical/logical possibility.
Fourth, dualism does not imply immaterialism. Chalmers is a dualist but does not believe in immaterial aspects of the world. You characterize dualists as believing that there are physical substances and mental substances. "Substances" has technical uses by philosophers so it's important not to get them confused. A property dualist for example thinks there are only one type of substance, physical substances, but that there different kinds of properties, physical and mental properties. Chalmers is actually a proponent of panpsychism, or at least he use to be.
Fifth, your response to Chalmers might be question begging. You need to define what senses of "possibility" you're using to say things such as "A zombie couldn't possibly...", and you need to defend conditionals such as "If a zombie didn't experience these things, he wouldn't behave the way we do". Why, for example, would zombies not behave like us if they do not have qualia? You need to defend that without begging the question.
http://www.iep.utm.edu/hard-con/
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness/
You should probably read a book on philosophical perspectives on consciousness. If you want a physicalist perspective then you should read books by Daniel Dennett, Paul/Patricia Churchland, or Andrew Melnyk.
http://en.bookfi.net/s/?q=Introduction+to+philosophy+of+mind&t=0
http://en.bookfi.net/s/?q=Physicalist+menifesto&t=0
I would also recommend anything by Peter van Inwagen regarding the mind. Peter van Inwagen is a theist but is a physicalist about consciousness and personal identity.
Ryan: ... you definitely do not capture the hard problem of consciousness initially in your post. ...
Delete- OK, Philosophers ask why there are qualia if mind is physical. According to IEP, "the challenge arises because it does not seem that the qualitative and subjective aspects of conscious experience—how consciousness “feels” and the fact that it is directly “for me”—fit into a physicalist ontology, one consisting of just the basic elements of physics plus structural, dynamical, and functional combinations of those basic elements." The question of "why" there are qualia stems directly from this. It's the assumption that qualia don't fit the physicalist ontology, or to but it another way, that qualia are not physical. This is not really a conclusion.
Second, the argument from ignorance claim isn't correct. Chalmers and others do not make arguments which argue from there being no known scientific explanation for qualia to there being no possible scientific explanation for qualia.
- Chalmers argues from his dualistic assumption that qualia are not physical.
Chalmer's does not say that P-zombies are physically identical to us yet lack some immaterial aspect necessary for consciousness. P-zombies are instead physically identical to us yet lack qualia
- Is there a difference? If they are physically identical, but the only difference is qualia, then qualia must be non-physical (or immaterial). This is Chalmers' assumption. If you say that qualia are some aspect (or property) of physical reality, then you can't say they are physically identical.
Chalmers is actually a proponent of panpsychism, or at least he use to be.
- You can call that materialist, but the notion that there is some additional conscious element in matter is just a form of spiritualism.
Why, for example, would zombies not behave like us if they do not have qualia? You need to defend that without begging the question.
- I thought I explained that. How does the zombie distinguish between red and blue without qualia? How does the zombie react to pain without qualia? If he doesn't have those experiences, then he can't behave like a human.
No, you're still confusing the the hard problem for motivations for the hard problem. The hard problem itself is explaining qualia on physicalist theories of consciousness. The motivations for asking the hard problem are distinct from the problem as both the IEP and Stanford page describe it.
ReplyDeleteChalmers does not argue from the assumption of dualism. You need to go read his arguments in either his papers or his books. Chalmer's argues something like what I have specified. Chalmer's essentially argues that it being metaphysically possible that there are P-zombies implies that the physical is not sufficient for qualia, so if qualia exists then something other than the physical is necessary for qualia. I cannot fully give justice to his argument(s) or similar ones by other philosophers, so I suggest you do some reading on your own if you can.
"If he doesn't have those experiences, then he can't behave like a human." You need to defend that conditional. It is the same conditional you asserted before. Your explanations don't work because they are actually just assertions of your conclusion. You need to explain, without question begging, why P-zombies could not act like us without actually having qualia.
The hard problem itself is explaining qualia on physicalist theories of consciousness.
Delete- I think that's what I said. I didn't use the exact same words, but that's what it amounts to.
Chalmers does not argue from the assumption of dualism.
- From Wikipedia: "He proposes an alternative dualistic view he calls naturalistic dualism (but which might also be characterized by more traditional formulations such as property dualism, neutral monism, or double-aspect theory)." I think Chalmers does argue from an assumption of dualism.
You need to defend that conditional.
- I don't understand why this is so hard for you to see. If you don't feel pain, you don't behave like a normal person. We know this, because we have examples of people who don't feel pain. If you can't distinguish the qualitative difference between two different colors, you can't correctly select one color the way a normal person would. we know this, because we have examples of people who are colorblind.
Now why don't you make the case that it is conceivable that a zombie could exhibit normal behavior without qualia, because I think it's absurd.
That is a better defense. However, what Chalmers and others want is a necessary connection between the qualia and the behavior.
DeleteI don't think the conceivability of P-zombies is very interesting since the notion of conceivability itself isn't that interesting. On one interpretation of some x being conceivable, x being conceivable means that the concept of x contains no self evident logical contradiction(s). On this notion, P-zombies are conceivable since there are no self evidence contradictions in the notion of a P-zombie. There is no way to deduce that "P-zombies would not behave like us", so P-zombies behaving like us contains no self evident contradiction and hence is conceivable. What is more important is the notion that conceivability implies logical or metaphysical possibility. You can grant that P-zombies are conceivable while denying that their conceivability implies their metaphysical possibility. As one popular example goes, it is conceivable that Goldbach's conjecture is false, and it is conceivable that it is true. If Goldbach's conjecture is false then it is necessarily so, and consequently is false in all possible worlds. And if Goldbach's conjecture is true then it is so in all possible worlds. So if the conceivability of Goldbach's conjecture being false implies it is false in some possible world, then it must be false in all possible worlds. But then the conceivability of Goldbach's conjecture being true implies it is true in all possible worlds, so it is both necessarily true and necessarily false. This seems to pose a problem of the notion that conceivability must be joined with logical/metaphysical possibility, and this is often where Chalmer's argument and ones like it are attacked.
Blogger Ex-Apologist has a relevant paper:
https://www.academia.edu/24791705/The_Modal-Knowno_Problem?auto=download
I don't concern myself much with metaphysical possibility. I do know that in this world, there are people who have sensory input that registers in the brain, but lacks conscious experience. And the lack of conscious experience certainly affects the way they respond to that input. Therefore, we can conclude that despite Chalmers' belief, qualia are functional, and play a significant role in our behavior.
DeleteIt's fine not to deal with metaphysical possibility, but in responding to arguments such as Chalmer's you must otherwise you attack a strawman.
Deleteexcellent arguments Ryan
ReplyDeleteWith respect to the necessary connection, our experience only gives us examples of people without the qualia of pain failing to behave like those with the qualia of pain. That is not enough to deduce that "If S does not experience pain then S would not exhibit a behavior of type T".
ReplyDeleteThe other examples have the same issue.
I think the connection is clear, and has been scientifically demonstrated, although not necessarily by the examples I gave, simply due to the fact that it may not known in these cases whether the sensory input is actually received and processed by the brain. But there are other cases where that is known.
DeleteI think it's pretty clear that people with Face Blindness and Colour Blindness have profoundly compromised experiences of qualia. Equally, those that are Tone Deaf have a serious impairment and deficiency in experiencing qualia. There are innumerable examples, physical and psychological, that qualia is indeed a functional response to one's environment. To pretend 'qualia' is some sort of inexplicable stand-alone ethereal, metaphysical element is simply barking.
DeleteAnd that's why I can't buy Chalmers' idea of the philosophical zombie. It is an absurdity, and so is his dualism.
DeleteTo pretend 'qualia' is some sort of inexplicable stand-alone ethereal, metaphysical element is simply barking
Deleteif you think that's what the hard problem says you don't get the HP.
The points IMS made about that actually prove the HP., color blind go all their lives without being known for it. sociopaths can fake emotion without being discovered. None of that is the point because the issue can zombies exist is totally off the point nt,
im-skepticalMay 9, 2016 at 11:22 AM
DeleteI think the connection is clear, and has been scientifically demonstrated, although not necessarily by the examples I gave, simply due to the fact that it may not known in these cases whether the sensory input is actually received and processed by the brain. But there are other cases where that is known.
you say such thing never back them up, who demonstrated it? the dean of neurology at UTD said Dennett is full of shit, that means nothing to you tell he doesn't know science, name your studies show me the sources,
The points IMS made about that actually prove the HP., color blind go all their lives without being known for it.
Delete- You just don't get it, Joe. Sure, it's possible for a person to go through life while missing some small subset of his conscious experience. But still, we know that he is functionally deficient in some way. If he was missing ALL of his conscious experience, he would be completely non-functional. THAT's the point.
the dean of neurology at UTD said Dennett is full of shit, that means nothing to you tell he doesn't know science, name your studies show me the sources
- Show me the paper this came from. How do I know that you are not taking it completely out of context? Or that what he said is intended to mean anything like what you claim?
Chalmer's papers are available here:
ReplyDeletehttp://consc.net/consc-papers.html
Of specific interest:
http://consc.net/papers/facing.pdf
As I read through this paper, I can't help but notice the outright denial even the possibility of any purely physical explanation for consciousness. This is because of Chalmers' dogmatic assumption that it is not physical. But he hasn't presented any analysis that shows this to be the case. He simply asserts it - over and over again. His postulation of experience as a fundamental aspect of nature is likened to electro-magnetism. But he ignores the fact that he is comparing something that can be detected and measured to something that unsupported by any empirical evidence. His theory seems much more similar to the postulation of God - I don't know how to explain this phenomenon scientifically, so I suppose the existence of something else that has no empirical basis as the explanation, and then deny that science can ever explain it.
DeleteCan you give examples from the paper where Chalmers assumes physicalism is false, or simply asserts it?
DeleteIf Chalmer's arguments are successful, then physicalism is false so he would be right to deny the possibility of any purely physical explanation for consciousness.
Can you give examples from the paper where Chalmers assumes physicalism is false, or simply asserts it?
DeleteSection 3 and 4 are dedicated to the ASSERTION that there is no functional explanation for experience.
"Why is the performance of these functions accompanied by experience? A simple explanation of the functions leaves this question open."
"As always, the bridging question is unanswered."
Section 5 is dedicated to the assertion that there is something beyond the physical.
"It follows that no mere account of the physical process will tell us why experience arises."
This logic is based on his assumption, not on fact.
Your quotes follow paragraphs from Chalmers where he defends them, so I don't see the issue.
Delete"It follows that no mere account of the physical process will tell us why experience arises"
Chalmers' logic here follows from his prior claims. Chalmers is essentially claiming this:
1. If it is conceptually possible that some physical process T is not accompanied by some experience E, then T does not explain E.
2. For any physical process T, it is conceptually possible that there is no E such that T is accompanied by E.
3. Therefore, no T explains any E.
The crucial premise is premise 1 and Chalmers defends it throughout the paper so I don't see what the issue is.
I think the best thing to do is to capture what Chalmers' argument(s) are and show why they are unsound. As a physicalist, I think they are unsound.
Consider the argument when applied to logical computation by mechanistic means. There can be any number of processes T that can be used to produce logically correct results E, but also many that don't.
DeleteStatement 1 is correct for some physical computational process.
Statement 2 is also correct, because it is conceivable that no computational process would produce a correct result.
Statement 3 is clearly false. We know that there is some T that produces E. Statement 3 does not follow from 1 and 2.
That is how I would dispute Chalmer's argument. Premise 2 is probably true, but premise 1 is false. Premise 1 is a universal generalization, so all you need is one counter example to refute it. On my mind, there are examples of where it is conceptually possible that some T is not accompanied by some E yet T does explain E.
ReplyDeleteNow while I think you're correct that statement 3 is false, you should note the difference between a proposition not following from another and a proposition being false. A conclusion not following from the premises means the argument is invalid. Chalmer's argument is technically valid, so 3 follows from 1 and 2. However, premise 1 is false, so the argument in unsound, and 3 is false anyway. Remember the difference between soundness and validity. Some theists will definitely try to impress you with very complicated arguments that are technically valid, but also unsound. The catch is that they focus on the validity of their arguments to throw people off of the soundness aspect.
I see what you're saying. I interpreted statement 1 in a different way (the referent of T is ambiguous).
DeletePersonally, I think Joe, unintentionally or not, lures people to validity over soundness of his arguments. You might question some of his premises, but he will give you examples of why the argument is valid and declare the conclusion to be true as a result.
ReplyDeleteall debaters declare their conclusion true 'called making an argument, give me an example of unsound?
ReplyDeleteMy point is some that people focus too much on the validity and presence of validity in arguments when they need to consider the truth of premises. Many people on the internet think their opponent is defeated if they present an argument before their opponent and show that it's valid. Well, that's not how it works. Making an argument and showing it is valid is a necessary step in making a sound argument and showing it's sound, but you also need to defend the truth of the premises. Too many people try to dazzle people by complicated arguments and shift the attention away from whether the arguments are sound.
DeleteI think that I'm inclined toward the idea that The Hard Problem (tm) will never be "solved" - the problem will simply fade from consideration as just a topic based on our poor understanding of how the brain functions. In a way, like no one is really concerned about the aether after Relativity. Nobody solved the mystery of what the aether was, it simply became moot.
ReplyDeleteI have a minor vetch about the language surrounding the use of the word 'qualia'. The phrase "The subjective perceptions of qualia" is, I think, off a tad: qualia are our perceptions not something we perceive. Stating that we percieve qualia, implictly endorses a dualist view: that little homoculus in our head is watching the qualia on the Cartesian stage act out reality.
Yes jdhuey. nicely put.
DeleteI think you hit the nail on the head. And this seems to agree with Dennett. He denies that Qualia exist - in the sense that there is no "thing" that you can call qualia. I agree with this, and I probably could have worded that phrase a little better. The intent was to say that qualia are purely in our mind.
DeleteI think it was Ian Stewart who suggested that our feeling of Free Will should be considered the quale of our brains processing a judgement. That is I think a useful insight so, I'm not so sure I would go so far a Dennett in say Qualia don't exist. It is just that we should think of them more as verbs instead of nouns.
DeleteThe same applies to mind itself. The big conceptual issue that dualists have is that they consider mind to be a "thing", and is is made of some substance that is non-physical or aspect of nature that can't be detected. A better way to see it is that mind is more like a verb. It is a function of the brain.
Deletegot cozy little rationalization don't= ya. you think you are being critical becauwev yiou can wretch bout sources that are not acceptable to the atheist Junta, you did not answer they six points, the two points you hysterically overacted to just because of th4e names(Horizon and Templeton) had nothing to do with the six points is documented by source in peer reviewed journals. you did not touch the six points, the two source you reacted hysterically to were not part of the six points, btw the Horizon source quoted Chalmers.
DeleteJoe,
DeleteYou are bringing in the discussion from another blog (in case people reading this are wondering WTF you are talking about). At any rate, I don't consider parapsychology to be legitimate science, even if they do quote Chalmers (whose views are also rejected by mainstream science). If you want to be taken seriously, you need to expand your reading, and cite some material that has better credibility.
what you are really saying is even though you can[t answer the arguments you hope they will be ignored when your propaganda blinds more people.
ReplyDelete