Defending Bertrand Russell
What caused God? To ask this question is to reveal yourself as horrendously ignorant and philosophically illiterate. The sophisticated philosopher, whether theist or atheist, will assume that you are one of those
atheists who think “What caused God?” is some kind of “Gotcha” question for theists, as if they had never considered such objections before. - LowderThis uncharitable interpretation applies whether you are just some stupid GNU like Richard Dawkins, or a highly regarded philosopher like David Hume or Bertrand Russell. They're all ignorant for thinking that there is merit in asking a question like that. Of course sophisticated philosophers of religion have considered this question and provided sophisticated answers. But have they really answered in a way that settles the issue? Maybe some of us just aren't satisfied with the answers we hear. Maybe there's some justification in continuing to ask the question after all.
This question was posed by Bertrand Russell in his essay Why I Am Not A Christian. Ed Feser claims that Russell is attacking a straw man that doesn't accurately represent the First Cause argument of Aquinas. Russell makes the statement "If everything must have a cause, then God must have a cause." And Ed Feser thinks this is an ignorant misstatement of the First Cause argument. But it is not a statement of the argument at all. It is part of his response to the argument. Russell actually summarizes the argument this way:
It is maintained that everything we see in this world has a cause, and as you go back in the chain of causes further and further you must come to a First Cause, and to that First Cause you give the name of God.So Russell correctly recognizes from the start that the argument doesn't say everything has a cause. This is not a straw man at all. But a more careful (and charitable) reading of his response would recognize that based on the first premise, and in light of the fact that the argument purports to be an a posteriori argument, it should be reasonable to conclude that everything must have a cause. If that is the case, then exempting God from this rule is special pleading. And this is Russell's first objection to the argument.
Having misunderstood the first part of Russell's response to the argument, Feser goes on to castigate him for not realizing that causation only applies to potencies that are actualized. And since God is pure act with no potency, causation doesn't apply to him. How could Russell be so ignorant as to not understand Aquinas' view of causation? To me, it seems rather presumptuous of Feser to assume that Russell doesn't understand this. But Russell didn't speak of the reason for God's exemption from causation, because it is irrelevant to his response.
First, it should be noted that God's properties (in particular, pure act) have to be assumed in order to grant him exemption from the need for causation, which, but for that, applies to everything else. This is a sophisticated diversion from the fact that God's properties (and by implication his existence) are assumed as part of the argument, in order to come to the conclusion that God exists. This looks suspiciously like circular reasoning. It is essentially defining God into existence.
But Russell doesn't fall into the trap of this sophisticated circular reasoning. The first thing he says after summarizing the argument is that "cause is not quite what it used to be." This is a rejection of act and potency as an explanation of causation, not an ignorance of it, as Feser assumes. And we have no good reason to think that it has any validity at all. In his second objection to the argument, Russell correctly notes that if anything can exist without cause, there is no reason to assume that it must be God and only God. We don't have to accept that there can't be an infinite chain of causation, nor do we have to assume that there can't be some brute fact that exists without cause.
Note that the reason for something existing without cause, whether it's pure act or something else, makes no difference to Russell's argument. Either everything needs a cause, in which case the conclusion of God's existence is special pleading, or everything doesn't need a cause, in which case the conclusion of God's existence is based on circular reasoning. This is Russell's argument against the First Cause argument, as I see it. I see no good reason to suppose that it is based on ignorance of the sophisticated philosophy of Aquinas.
There is good reason to think "What caused God?" is a dumb question, but it depends on the scenario. As a response to some cosmological arguments it is a dumb question. Lets run a cosmological argument like this:
ReplyDelete1. Either everything has a cause or it is not the case that everything has a cause.
2. If it is the case that everything has a cause then an infinite regress of causation is possible.
3. It is not the case that an infinite regress of causation is possible.
4. It is not the case that everything has a cause.
5. If it is not the case that everything has a cause then there is at least one thing without a cause.
6. A being has no cause if and only if a being is necessary.
7. There is at least one necessary being.
8. If atheism is true then there are no necessary beings.
9. Atheism is not true.
10. If theism is true then God exists.
11. God exists.
12. If God exists then God exists necessarily.
13. God exists necessarily.
The argument is valid, though obviously premise 8 is false, and I think premises 2 and 3 are questionable.
However, as a response to the argument, asking "What caused God?" makes no sense. If the premises are true then God exists and God has no cause. As a result, in a scenario such as this, asking "What caused God?" is inappropriate. A better question would be "Why must God exist necessarily if God exists?" or "Why is atheism incompatible with necessary beings?". Or even asking for justification for each premise would be a better response.
If anyone wants to see modern treatments of cosmological arguments then I suggest reading arguments by Alexander Pruss or Robert Koons.
Given Russel's notes on Aquinas in his history of Western philosophy, I wouldn't doubt that Russel was not as well versed in Aristotelian metaphysics as Feser. But in Russel's defense, since Descartes onwards the Aristotelian philosophy was almost entirely replaced by more mechanistic, and in my opinion, better philosophy.
Any statement can be stupid if the circumstances make it so. In this case, I think both Lowder and Feser are being unfair.
DeleteThey are a bit unfair. Most people probably have no idea that philosophers even argue for and against theism, and I see no reason for them to have such an idea. As a result, most people probably don't know "What caused God?" is not a real issue to the truth of theism.
DeleteIt was not mechanized that replaced it, It wasn't Descartes he was an expert on scholasticism and was well trained in it and used it in the meditations. The mechanistic model for science replaced the alchemical model not scholasticism. Scholasticism was the victim of a cultural revolution, it wasn't realty disproved or anything. But there a lot talk bout the medieval synthesis collapsing,
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ReplyDeleteThe fallacies of composition are often misunderstood.
ReplyDeletehttp://www.nizkor.org/features/fallacies/composition.html
An example of a fallacy of composition might be inferring that a plane cannot fly because none of its individual proper parts can fly. Clearly the proper parts of a plane individually cannot fly but the parts forming a whole can fly so the inference about the parts to the whole is fallacious. On the other hand, saying each proper part is composed of metal and then concluding that the plane is made of metal is not fallacious.
Relation to the universe/cosmological arguments - some people might argue that the universe is contingent if each of its proper parts are contingent, and another person might claim this commits the fallacy of composition. I think this is an instance where the fallacy might be committed, but it depends upon one's background beliefs.
http://www.patheos.com/blogs/camelswithhammers/2010/07/the-cosmological-argument-the-composition-fallacy-and-more-reasons-not-to-believe-in-god/
Good article. I am always amazed that committed theists are adamant about the necessity of God, but refuse to acknowledge that there can be any other possibility.
Deletewhat is it? you don't understand the concepts, that's why you don't get what's wrongly.
Deletesaying what caused God is like saying prove that tables are things to put things on. you would show me a different surface and say: this is not table, it's just something to put things on.
God is necessary by definition no that doesn't mean we defining him to existence., we are deducing from the meaning of the terms that he must exist, but it does mean anything not necessary is not God.
God is eternal necessary and the ground of being, like tables are things to put things on. any alternative you show that is eternal necessary and ground of being is God. then we can quibble about weather or not God is personal that's a different matter,
God is necessary by definition no that doesn't mean we defining him to existence
DeleteYou got it right the first time. Because of your definition of God, you exclude all other possibilities. This is not a matter of logical deduction. It's circular reasoning. You presume the properties of God first, and then conclude that he must exist.
I think the issue is that whatever we define as the 'ground of all being', Joe will say that is God. But suppose I define the ground of all being as being necessarily existent, eternal material stuff. This material stuff is not conscious, is not omnipotent, omniscient, etc. If God is omniscient, omnipotent, conscious, etc, then if God is always whatever we define as the ground of all being then God is both omnipotent and not omnipotent, and God is omniscient and not omniscient, etc. Joe is essentially defining God into existence but that clearly results in contradictions based on the intensions of "God".
DeleteI should add that defining God as necessary does not imply a theist is defining God into existence. We can define anything we want as existing necessarily, and that doesn't imply they exist necessarily unless we want a contradiction.
DeleteYou got it right the first time. Because of your definition of God, you exclude all other possibilities. This is not a matter of logical deduction. It's circular reasoning. You presume the properties of God first, and then conclude that he must exist.
DeleteI exclude other possibilities because they are excluded by logic or data. If you think you have one let's debate? will you come to my 1x1 board? or would prefer the general forum where you can have atheists backing you?,
well the main reason I exclude other possibilities because I know God is real. I've been a Christian 40vyears and I've been intellectually active and working either graduate school or academic carrier all that time, I have more reason than ever to believe.
Deletethe main reason I exclude other possibilities because I know God is real
DeleteHow is that not circular reasoning? You know God exists. Therefore all other possibilities are moot. Because there are no other possibilities, God is the only possibility. Therefore God exists. This is what we see with most cosmological arguments, though they don't explicitly state up front their assumption that God exists. Nevertheless, that assumption is always there.
By the way, I have no idea what your 1x1 board is.
And by the way, I am not impressed by people who tout their academic credentials. I have academic credentials of my own, but I don't use them to impress people. If you have a good argument, is makes no difference what your credentials are. Same is true if you have a bad argument. And there are plenty of people with PhDs who have bad arguments.
His reasoning might be circular. Joe might be thinking something like this:
DeleteLets say "R" refers to a there being a necessarily existent, eternal ground of all being. Lets also say "G" refers to God specifically existing.
Joe wants to argue that God exists. In his cosmological argument Joe is trying to argue that R must exist. As atheists, we do not believe that R implies G since we think there are other possibilities such as necessarily existent material stuff, a multiverse, etc. But Joe thinks G is true so he thinks if R is true then it must be G since G is true. If that is what he is ultimately arguing then he is making a circular argument since he is deducing G from G. That doesn't help us though. Since we don't know G, Joe cannot rule out alternatives to G. He will need to make an argument for G which can bring atheists to believe G is true.
I will note two things though.
First, not all cosmological arguments are circular. The one I created on this blog is not circular, though some cosmological arguments are question begging.
Second, in Joe's defense, he did make a post on his blog trying to defend the notion that R cannot be natural, so R cannot be material. He did that by trying to show that being natural implies being contingent, so being natural implies not being necessary, so being natural implies not being the ground of all being. I responded to him that there are obvious problems with his defense.
I think the concept of necessary existence is meaningless. Obviously, if you are a naturalist, you don't believe that God exists necessarily. You may believe that something exists that is the cause of our world, but that thing (whatever it is) can exist as a brute fact. In other words, if it didn't exist, our world wouldn't exist either. But that doesn't mean it exists necessarily. If you are a theist, you will deny that there is any other possible cause of the world, and that God exists necessarily. But this is only by definition, not by virtue of any logical necessity. God may or may not exist. And if he doesn't, then we don't either. But it is only the fact that we, as contingent beings, exist that entails the existence of the thing that is the cause of our existence. So the reality is that nothing exists necessarily.
DeleteImagine that the oscillating universe theory is correct. That means our universe is caused by the previous oscillation, which in turn, is caused by the oscillation before that. Every instance of the universe has a cause. And since the cause is not contained within its own instance of the universe, it is possible that there can be an infinite series of oscillations, or causes for contingent instances of the universe, each of which is a natural entity.
Note that none of this involves anything that exists necessarily, or anything other than natural entities.
Necessarily existent things can be brute facts. A thing existing necessarily doesn't by definition require an explanation for its existence. As a result, a naturalist can accept that the universe exists necessarily and is a brute fact.
Delete"But it is only the fact that we, as contingent beings, exist that entails the existence of the thing that is the cause of our existence. So the reality is that nothing exists necessarily."
Are you trying to say that the existence of the cause of the world depends on the existence of the contingent things it caused, so the cause of the world must be contingent?
I would say an oscillating universe exists necessarily. To say it exists necessarily is just to say that it could not fail to exist. If an oscillating universe exists necessarily, and each oscillation necessarily causes another, then each oscillation is itself necessary. You might actually be granting the theist too much by even assuming that we are contingent beings, or that the universe as a whole is a contingent being. On a deterministic view of nature contingency doesn't even exist.
Also, it's hard to believe that you think "Necessary existence" is meaningless when you appear to believe it refers to something in your post, and you appear to believe "contingency" refers to something in your post. If necessary existence is meaningless then contingent existence is likewise meaningless, but you seem to believe the latter is definitely not meaningless.
DeleteAre you trying to say that the existence of the cause of the world depends on the existence of the contingent things it caused, so the cause of the world must be contingent?
Delete- No, I'm trying to say that the only reason we have for calling something necessary is because it is needed to explain the existence of contingent things. But it is logically possible that nothing at all exists (in some possible "world"). If that could be the case, then nothing at all exists necessarily.
I would say an oscillating universe exists necessarily. To say it exists necessarily is just to say that it could not fail to exist.
- As I said (and perhaps the concept wasn't expressed clearly enough), if we don't exist (in some possible world), then there is no need to have anything that explains our existence. It seems to me that "necessary existence" is an oxymoron. Theologians say "if God exists, then he exists necessarily". That means the the "necessary existence" of God is contingent upon the existence of God. So necessity itself is contingent, and that's a contradiction in terms. In truth, it's just meaningless babble.
If necessary existence is meaningless then contingent existence is likewise meaningless, but you seem to believe the latter is definitely not meaningless.
- Yes, I believe that contingency has a specific meaning, nut I also believe that it is not related to necessity, at least in the way that you do. Contingent simply means that there is a dependency. Something is caused by or explained by something else, without which the contingent thing couldn't exist. That doesn't imply that anything exists necessarily. There could be an infinite chain of contingent things, for eample. This is simply a denial of the idea that there must be a first cause. There could be something that exists as a brute fact, not necessarily. That means that it is not contingent, because it doesn't depend on anything else, but there is no implication that it must necessarily exist.
There is some confusion here, mainly because talking about the concepts of necessity and contingency is often ambiguous.
DeleteThere are distinct types of ways a statement can be said to be necessary. For example, there is logical necessity, metaphysical necessity, nomological necessity, and others. It is logically possible that no physical thing exists, so there is a possible worlds where no physical thing exists. As a result, the existence of the physical is not logically necessary fact(As far as we know, at least). However, that does not imply that no physical thing is metaphysically or nomologically necessary. In my opinion, the physical is metaphysically necessary.
Richard Swinburne actually argues that God is not logically necessary, so there are logically possible worlds where God does not exist (He partly believes this because he can find no logical contradiction within the statement "God does not exist"), but he believes that God is metaphysically necessary.
If we want to be accurate then we can make sure to note whether the possible worlds we speak of are logically possible worlds vs metaphysically possible worlds vs nomologically possible worlds, etc. While all metaphysically possible worlds are logically possible worlds, not all logically possible worlds are metaphysically possible worlds. As a naturalist, I think no supernatural beings exist. But I also think that there are logically possible worlds where the supernatural exist, though there are no metaphysically possible worlds where the supernatural exist.
Depending on the context, the meaning of contingency is related to the meaning of necessity. For example, in modal logic a statement being necessary might be noted as "□A" and contingency will be defined as "((~□~A) & ~□A)". A contingent statement then is defined as any statement which is not necessarily false but also not necessarily true.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-modal/
If you encounter arguments that make use of concepts such as necessity or contingency then you should have the arguer clarify how those terms are being used.
To give an example of how contingency can be related to necessity, any theorem in propositional logic can be called necessary. Within propositional logic, then, we can say a contingent statement is any statement which is not a theorem but the negation of that sentence is also not a theorem. This implies that contingent statements are any statements which are not theorems and not contradictions.
DeleteAs an example, "If A then (A or B)", denoted as "A -> (A v B)" is a tautology in propositional logic since there is no truth valuation where the statement is false. The negation of "A -> (A v B)" is a contradiction since it is false under every truth valuation. But consider the statement "(A v B)". It is not a tautology, but it is also not a contradiction. As a result, it is a statement which neither fits the description of being a theorem or a contradiction, so in propositional logic there are three types of statements:
1. Theorems.
2. Contradictions.
3. Contingent statements.
Logic books often use the term "Contingent" to refer to the third type of statement in classical propositional logic, and sometimes use the term "Necessary" to define theorems in propositional logic.
I was talking about contingent objects, in the same sense as Aquinas' Argument from Necessity. You will note that as this argument is stated, the conclusion of the existence of a necessary being (aside from the fact that it doesn't follow from the premises) is dependent upon the existence of contingent objects, in the sense that without premise 4, there would be no basis for concluding that a necessary being exists.
DeleteThere not being a basis to conclude that a necessary being exists does not logically imply that a necessary being depends on contingent beings to exist. A necessary being by definition does not depend on anything for its existence. Besides that, that argument is actually trying to deduce the existence of a necessary being from the fact that some contingent objects exist. So it basically tries to argue that "If some contingent objects exist then a necessary being exists" which is quite different from arguing that "If a necessary being exists then some contingent objects exist".
DeleteThat contingency argument is hard to test for validity because it's hard to understand what the premises are actually saying. And if I recall correctly, that argument, and ones like it, are actually used to defend general propositions Aquinas used to demonstrate the existence of God. The Five Ways, if I recall correctly, were just summaries/defenses of thoughts by Aquinas that he would use in larger works to prove theism is true. I think this is the best interpretation of what that particular argument is going for:
1. If everything is contingent then nothing exists.
2. Some objects exist.
3. If some objects exist then it is not the case that nothing exists.
4. It is not the case that nothing exists.
5. It is not the case that everything is contingent.
6. If it is not the case that everything is contingent then there is at least one necessary being.
7. There is at least one necessary being.
The argument as I frame it is valid.
1. C ⇒ O
2. E
3. E ⇒ ~O
4. ~O
5. ~C
6. ~C ⇒ N
7. N
I think that is probably the argument the author has in mind. Aquinas' arguments were often missing steps because they were simplified. Supposing that is a good interpretation of the argument, it would definitely be valid.
To test it, you can look for the corresponding material conditional of the argument.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Corresponding_conditional
((C ⇒ O) & E & (E ⇒ ~O) & ~O & (~C) & (~C ⇒ N))⇒ N
That would be the corresponding conditional. To test for validity, negate the consequent and see if the conditional is false.
As it stands, the conditional with the negated conclusion is false when C is false, O is false, N is true and E is true. As a result, the argument is valid.
I'll grant that might not be what Aquinas has in mind, but it's worth using the most charitable argument that an opponent might be interpreted as advocating.
But even if my argument is valid, I think the premises are false. Aquinas' third premise doesn't make any sense to me, and I'm not sure we should accept his notions given modern physics. Given that, we have less reason to accept premise 1 of my argument.
It's not fallacy of composition to assert that the universe is contingent because all of it's part are contingent. An example of something where all the parts determine the whole, a wall made of brick is a brick wall can be so called.
DeleteDr, Coons at UT argues something called the metrological axiom and that is supposed to prove that if all the parts are contingent the whole is contingent, but I don't understand it.
I do think the situation is different between the air plane and the universe in contingency.
It's a fallacy to think that the universe is just the sum of things we observe. How do you know that?
DeleteSkep,
ReplyDeleteOne of your biggest problems is that you're always getting thing ass backwards. Believers do not define dogma out of thin air and then reason from it (as a "given"), but rather the reverse. In the case of Christianity (I am not speaking for any other faith), the dogmas concerning God, such as the divinity of Christ, the Holy Trinity, the Redemption, the perpetual virginity of Mary, the Necessity of God, etc., are all things that were discovered within the deposit of Apostolic Faith. In other words, they were not the starting point for reasoning, as you always seem to assume - they were the results of reasoning, conclusions arrived at, answers to questions.
The true "starting point" of Christian thought is the Gospel, which alone is subject to (and capable of) empirical validation. If you wish to challenge a Christian's priors, then that is where you need to go. All you are doing is challenging the conclusions.
Please outline the logic for me, because I don't understand it. Start with the gospels and reason your way through to divine simplicity and necessary existence, all without making any assumptions about God along the way.
Delete"... perpetual virginity of Mary..."
DeleteDidn't Jesus have brothers and sisters?
If that is fact, then it seems that it was not from "....the results of reasoning, conclusions arrived at, answers to questions."
It has all the hallmarks of apologetics resorting to post hoc rationalisation from an a priori starting point that she must remain a virgin whatever the circumstance.
'Perpetual virginity" is a Clayton's virginity; the virginity you have when you are not a virgin. 'Illusory' would be a more apposite explanation.
"... perpetual virginity of Mary..."
DeleteDidn't Jesus have brothers and sisters?
If that is fact, then it seems that it was not from "....the results of reasoning, conclusions arrived at, answers to questions."
It has all the hallmarks of apologetics resorting to post hoc rationalisation from an a priori starting point that she must remain a virgin whatever the circumstance.
'Perpetual virginity" is a Clayton's virginity; the virginity you have when you are not a virgin. 'Illusory' would be a more apposite explanation.
For a comprehensive and genuinely readable description of how the process works, I recommend The Apostasy that Wasn't by Rod Bennett. Finish that, and whether or not you agree with Christian dogma, you'll definitely understand how it came to be.
ReplyDeleteLooking at a summary of this book, it appears to be a historical account of how the church succeeded in establishing the primacy of its own orthodoxy over any competing variants of Christianity. That's not what I asked you for.
Deleteit appears to be a historical account of how the church succeeded in establishing the primacy of its own orthodoxy over any competing variants of Christianity
ReplyDeleteWell, first off, those "competing variants" were not Christianity, but Arianism - a different kettle of fish altogether.
But that aside, in the process of showing how Arianism was defeated, the book explains clearly, lucidly, and intelligibly, precisely how Christian dogma was formed, and how dogma is a discovery of truths contained, but not explicit, in Apostolic teaching.
But whatever you think of Christianity, The Apostasy that Wasn't is a real page turner - a genuinely enjoyable experience in addition to being a treasure trove of info and insight. You'll not regret reading it!
Well, first off, those "competing variants" were not Christianity, but Arianism - a different kettle of fish altogether.
DeleteIf the Arians has won, they'd be calling Catholicism heresy today.
If the Arians had won
ReplyDeleteImpossible. The Holy Spirit would have prevented that (as He in fact did). "The gates of hell shall not.." etc.
Yes, the bible is the word of god because the bible says it is the word of god.
DeleteArianism, Manicheanism, Marcionism, catholicism, they're all -isms pulled out of the same bucket. Of course Protestantism doesn't seem to have been prevented by the Holy Spirit, nor Mormonism for that matter. I'd say the Holy Spirit is not unlike the Joker; so fickle.
ReplyDeleteWhile theists continue to peddle the existence of [gods], science is slowly but invariably revealing there is in fact no ghost in the machine, Holy or otherwise. It's confirming that human thought, that delightful ability lending itself to the conjuration of all sorts of gods, is wholly a product of biological processes. To reiterate the point, there is no ghost holy or otherwise in the machine. I took the liberty of referring this article on your site as it is pertinent to this OP. [Hat tip to Loftus's DC]
ReplyDeleteIt renders arguments about the existence of gods moot, and indeed pretty much consigns all arguments and questions about such ethereal existences as inconsequential as that of imagining pink unicorns. Bertrand Russell knew that a century ago.
But as the article indicates there is hope for us all, "In the public sphere, this understanding is dawning." Theists are just taking longer to come to the party.
There not being an immaterial soul is irrelevant to most theistic arguments. A cosmological argument, ontological argument, or whatever, can still be sound even if humans are purely physical beings.
DeleteSome theists do not even believe that dualism is true. For example, philosopher Peter van Inwagen is well known for his arguments for the physicalism of the mind/identity, and he is a Christian.
You should definitely try to be more accurate in your assertions. Remember, theism is the belief that God exists. Theism is not the belief that humans have souls, or that there is more to humans than their physical bodies. Nor are either of those beliefs derivable from the assumption of theism, so theism doesn't even imply them.
DeleteWhen making an assertion about a group, watch your implied quantifiers. Most theists probably do not think much about arguments for God, so most theists probably do not 'peddle' the existence of God to anyone. If you want to be accurate, you should say "There are some theists...".
Actually, this has been going on for hundreds of years. Newton believed God had to tweak the orbits of planets. That was refuted by science. Darwin showed that God wasn't needed to explain the apparent design of animals and people. Theists continue to modify their stories about how God makes everything happen. Their explanations get more and more convoluted as science continues to disprove all their stories.
DeleteMind used to be simple. A ghost that is in the driver's seat of the human body. Now that we understand so much more about how the brain functions, they have to invent strange accounts of how the brain acts like some kind of radio receiver (like a drone airplane under remote control) which makes it look like the brain is doing all the work.
Some theists do not even believe that dualism is true. For example, philosopher Peter van Inwagen is well known for his arguments for the physicalism of the mind/identity, and he is a Christian.
DeleteThis guy seems to have some strange ideas. He apparently believes in some kind of material dualism - that living organisms are fundamentally different from other physical structures. See here.
Van Inwagen's ideas might seem strange, but it's because hes clearly trying to resist any sort of pure mereological nihilism. A proponent of pure mereological nihilism would take the position that there only exists fundamentally simple objects, objects with no proper parts. So for a pure mereological nihilist, there exists quarks, electrons, and perhaps some unknown particles, but that is all that exists as far as material objects go.
DeleteVan Inwagen takes the position that partial mereological nihilism is true because he thinks there are simple objects AND organisms. He does not think organisms are composed of anything other than simple objects, but thinks there is some meaningful difference between organisms being composed of simple objects and chairs being composed of simple objects that allows organisms to exist as material objects with proper parts. I suspect most physicalists would actually accept something like Van Inwagen's view about material objects.
Van Inwagen defends his ideas in his book "Material Beings" where he argues for physicalism about identity and composition, and he covers some of the topic in his book on metaphysics. His ideas being strange are beside the point though since hes an example of a theist and a Christian whom does not believe in souls.
He doesn't believe in souls, but he believes there's something different about living things. They're not just collections of particles, like a chair. That sounds like some kind of dualism, but at it encompasses the whole body, rather than just the mind.
DeleteNo, organisms are just collections of particles according to van Inwagen. But their arrangement is of a different sort than that of chairs, desks, and lamps since they are sentient and sometimes conscious. Before dismissing him, I would read his book on the subject. The nihilist alternative to his view definitely isn't attractive since it implies van Inwagen doesn't exist at all.
Deletehttp://en.bookfi.net/s/?q=material+beings&t=0
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/material-constitution/
That doesn't sound like the description given in the wiki article that I cited. Inwagen says "There is some y such that the xs compose y if and only if the activity of the xs constitute a life." in other words, a living thing is different in composition from everything else.
DeleteNo, a living thing is different from other "clumps" of matter. Inwagen advocates the view that there are simple structures, which are material structures with no proper parts, and there are organisms which are compound material objects with proper parts. So he says there is one class of concrete things; physical things. And there are two subclasses of physical things; 1. simple things, 2. compound things. Among compound things there only exists organisms. But saying there exists two sorts of physical things within the class of physical things is no more dualistic than to say there are two subclasses of simple things; 1. quarks, 2. electrons. Quarks and electrons are definitely two different types of simple objects, but it would be nonsense to say a person is a dualist for accepting there exists two types of simple things.
DeleteMy advice, again, would be to read up on material constitution to get an idea for why someone would be a partial mereological nihilist rather than a full mereological nihilist. Much of it comes down to there being no real necessary/sufficient conditions for the nature of anything outside of quarks, electrons and animals respectively.
I should clarify, a living thing is not different in composition than chairs, desks, etc. Inwagen's definition says x is a composite object only if x is alive. It doesn't say "if x is alive and y is not alive then x and y are not fully composed of the same kinds of material parts". Inwagen would say there are simple objects, and every composite object is composed only of simple objects, and that if x is a composite object then x is alive. So chairs, desks and humans are composed of the same stuff, but only humans actually exist whereas desks and chairs are more so useful fictions. You should probably read an introductory book to metaphysics to be honest.
DeleteI suppose I should read up on it.
Delete