Friday, April 1, 2016

Theists Misunderstand Naturalism


Isn't it interesting that theists love to tell atheists that their metaphysical beliefs are incoherent, but they can't accurately describe what those beliefs are?  I'm following two different blog posts currently where this arrogant attitude is displayed by theists.  One is about metaphysical naturalism, and the other is about methodological naturalism.  In both cases, the theist presents a straw-man version of naturalism, and then argues that it is illogical or incoherent.  The straw man is apparently due to a lack of understanding the naturalist's position.

Let's start with metaphysical naturalism.  On CADRE Comments, Don McIntosh has posted an article called Why I Am Not a Metaphysical Naturalist.  It contains a number of statements about the supposed incoherency of naturalism, mostly based on the implicit assumption of theism.  For example, the dualistic notion that mind is immaterial in essence, and can't emerge from or be supervenient upon the physical is taken for granted, and used as a basis for dismissing monistic materialism as a coherent worldview.  This kind of circular reasoning is pervasive among theists, and I have come to expect it. 

But what irritates me is that a theist arguing against naturalism wouldn't bother to understand what naturalism entails.  McIntosh does this with his pronouncement
Per the epistemology of naturalism itself — that only scientifically rigorous beliefs are justified — naturalism is therefore an unjustified belief.
Where does one get the idea that naturalism entails such a thing?  As I explained, the epistemology of a naturalist is likely to be empiricism, which is one of the oldest forms of epistemology in philosophy.  Thomas Aquinas once said "There is nothing in the mind that was not previously in the senses."  It is not something invented by modern scientists to provide justification for their beliefs, as "reformed epistemology" has been invented by modern theists to provide an air of legitimate epistemic justification for emotionally-based theistic beliefs.

A proper epistemology provides a foundation or grounding for knowledge, and empiricism does that, with the basic assumption that the evidence of the senses gives us justification for knowledge.  Note that this is not the same as the notion that all beliefs must be scientifically verified, including the belief that all beliefs must be scientifically verified.  That is obviously incoherent, as McIntosh correctly notes, but it is a straw man.  It simply doesn't represent the actual epistemological views of real naturalists.  In using this as an excuse to deny metaphysical naturalism, the theist may leave us with the impression that he is searching for reasons, and will grasp at any straw, even if he has to invent his own straw man.

And then there's methodological naturalism.  This concept is perhaps even more broadly misunderstood by theists (and to be fair, by some atheists as well).  Robert A. Larmer has presented a straw man argument for metaphysical naturalism that amounts to circular reasoning by misrepresenting what it is.  The argument is given as:
1) If one is a metaphysical naturalist then one should be a methodological naturalist. i. e. refuse ever to postulate nonphysical entities as the cause of a physical event.
2) One should not believe in nonphysical entities without good evidence.
3) There is no good evidence for nonnatural entities.
4) Therefore one should accept metaphysical naturalism, and by logical extension, methodological naturalism.
We can see that this does indeed present a case of circular reasoning, but it doesn't present any kind of realistic understanding of the concept of methodological naturalism.  In fact, it seems to conflate metaphysical and methodological naturalism, or at the very least, it doesn't distinguish between them.  The dialog that follows (on page 118) falsely depicts the naturalist as religiously dogmatic in his insistence that there can't be any non-natural entities.  In this manner, Larmer attempts to turn science itself into a dogmatically anti-immaterialist worldview - one that would "refuse ever to postulate nonphysical entities as the cause of a physical event."

The trouble is that it's not true that science refuses to postulate nonphysical entities.  There have been numerous scientific experiments designed to determine whether nonphysical or non-natural explanations are borne out by observation.  It is possible that experimentation like this would indicate something other than natural law as an explanation for observed phenomena, but so far, all such experiments have failed.  It is observation, not dogma, that excludes supernatural explanations.  As it is, all observable phenomena remain subject to scientific investigation, precisely because they exhibit the kind of behavioral regularity that indicates natural law and not supernatural intervention.

Methodological naturalism is concerned with the reliability and repeatability of results.  Science can only proceed on the basis that phenomena under observation behave in a consistent and repeatable manner, as natural laws would dictate.  Methodological naturalism is not an epistemology.  It is not a metaphysical stance.  In fact, there are many Christian scientists who adhere to methodological naturalism, as scientists must necessarily do.  As Lawrence Lerner describes it:
Methodological naturalism is not a "doctrine" but an essential aspect of the methodology of science, the study of the natural universe. If one believes that natural laws and theories based on them will not suffice to solve the problems attacked by scientists - that supernatural and thus nonscientific principles must be invoked from time to time - then one cannot have the confidence in scientific methodology that is prerequisite to doing science.
The amazing thing is that a PhD philosopher like Larmer, who holds the chair of philosophy at New Brunswick University would think that science dogmatically excludes supernatural explanations.  This is nothing more than a gross misunderstanding of science and methodological naturalism.  And this misunderstanding is common among theists who should know better, like Victor Reppert, who repeats this rubbish without question.

These are the same folks who bash people like Richard Dawkins as being philosophically ignorant for asking the question "Who made God?"  But when it comes to matters of science, they couldn't hold a candle to any kid who graduated from a high school STEM program.  Yet they are convinced they understand it better than the scientists do.  Yeah, right.

16 comments:

  1. These are the same folks who bash people like Richard Dawkins as being philosophically ignorant for asking the question "Who made God?"

    And yet, every time Dawkins (or anyone else) asks that question, they are displaying their philosophical ignorance - for all the world to see.

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    1. I was waiting for you to say that.

      Do you think that Dawkins, whose IQ is probably at least as high as yours, has never heard of the idea of God's metaphysical necessity? Maybe he just doesn't swallow it. But the point of my statement was that people like Reppert are hypocritical in making this complaint, because they spout all kinds of scientific ignorance themselves.

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  2. "...god...metaphysical necessity ..."

    Now there's an oxymoron on its way to being tarred and feathered by science.

    Dr James Lindsay, mathematician: "All philosophy of religion (and theology, which it seeks to work with and upon) have is arguments. But notice that if they had real evidence, they would need no arguments. This hints that the arguments themselves are probably redundant--on the one hand, without evidence, they cannot prove anything about reality, and on the other hand, with evidence, they're unnecessary.
    They tell us what's going on, though. God doesn't exist. "God" is a philosophical concept, an abstraction, an idea. This is all well and good except that the idea is reified by billions and acted upon as if it is a real thing that will one day judge the living and the dead, and in the meantime alternately has absolute dominion over the universe and no capacity to cap human free will (which probably doesn't even exist and may not even be coherent--another abstract idea, then)."

    The god concept, a wholly theological construct, is indeed a failed hypothesis as increasingly humanity looks more earnestly for real answers to life's big questions. Religion has had its day in the sun. Time to move on.

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    1. Scientists understand that science doesn't prove anything. It just helps us arrive at a better explanation. Likewise, philosophers (real ones) understand that there is no a priori argument that proves anything, and a posteriori arguments are only as good as their premises, which must be demonstrated by empirical means, which rules out any proof of God.

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  3. On CADRE Comments, Don McIntosh has posted an article called Why I Am Not a Metaphysical Naturalist. It contains a number of statements about the supposed incoherency of naturalism, mostly based on the implicit assumption of theism. For example, the dualistic notion that mind is immaterial in essence, and can't emerge from or be supervenient upon the physical is taken for granted, and used as a basis for dismissing monistic materialism as a coherent worldview.

    That's not quite right, Skeptical. I didn't say that mind could not possibly emerge from matter, only that there's no reason to expect it should. In fact I explicitly stated,

    "Now it is just possible that rational thought and morality are somehow emergent properties of a wholly naturalistic system, but that seems intuitively implausible. In any event there appears to be no evidence for such a proposition, nor any way to test it."

    Even if a mind did manage to evolve from a process like natural selection, we would have no rational basis for trusting the thoughts that issue from it. Again from the article:

    "This may not make naturalism completely self-contradictory, but it certainly provides fodder for skepticism: If our thoughts have been produced by mindless mechanisms of evolution, then our thoughts cannot at the same time be a product of reason and reflection. Besides, given evolutionary naturalism our brains—hence our thoughts—are still evolving at this very moment. Therefore the very principles of logic we consider rational and true today could be considered crazy and false tomorrow, as evolution dictates. Alternatively, what we believe to be logical or veridical might be false right now. Natural selection couldn't care less either way: If believing what is false confers short-term reproductive advantages upon our species, so be it."

    But what irritates me is that a theist arguing against naturalism wouldn't bother to understand what naturalism entails. McIntosh does this with his pronouncement

    Per the epistemology of naturalism itself — that only scientifically rigorous beliefs are justified — naturalism is therefore an unjustified belief.

    Where does one get the idea that naturalism entails such a thing? As I explained, the epistemology of a naturalist is likely to be empiricism, which is one of the oldest forms of epistemology in philosophy.


    Where does one get the idea that empiricism can ascertain knowledge of decidedly metaphysical concepts like a self-existent or self-contained universe?

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    1. Hello, and welcome.

      That's not quite right, Skeptical. I didn't say that mind could not possibly emerge from matter, only that there's no reason to expect it should. In fact I explicitly stated ...
      - OK. I may have gotten your exact position wrong. You included Lewis' argument from reason in your discussion, which does hold that that rational mind can't arise from physical matter. I suppose I was confused by that.

      Even if a mind did manage to evolve from a process like natural selection, we would have no rational basis for trusting the thoughts that issue from it.
      - This is, of course, Plantinga's evolutionary argument against naturalism. This is based on a shallow understanding of what evolution entails. The truth is that our beliefs are generally reliable to the extent that they correspond to observed reality, but unreliable to the extent that they can't be verified objectively. And this points to the strength of science, which relies upon objective verification.

      Where does one get the idea that empiricism can ascertain knowledge of decidedly metaphysical concepts like a self-existent or self-contained universe?
      - Good question. The idea that naturalists make strong claims about what exists beyond our abilities to observe empirically is a straw man, I think. I certainly find myself saying over and over again that I don't know, in response to theists' assertions that I do claim to know.

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  4. This is, of course, Plantinga's evolutionary argument against naturalism. This is based on a shallow understanding of what evolution entails. The truth is that our beliefs are generally reliable to the extent that they correspond to observed reality, but unreliable to the extent that they can't be verified objectively. And this points to the strength of science, which relies upon objective verification.

    The problem there is that our brains may evolve in such a way as to believe what is false, for example that certain things are objectively verifiable when they are not.

    The idea that naturalists make strong claims about what exists beyond our abilities to observe empirically is a straw man, I think. I certainly find myself saying over and over again that I don't know, in response to theists' assertions that I do claim to know.

    That's fair enough, I guess. But to this point we've been referring to naturalistic epistemology. It seems to me that if a naturalistic epistemology cannot bring you to a knowledge of naturalism, it's a failed epistemology. That would make you more of an agnostic regarding naturalism, wouldn't it?

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    1. The problem there is that our brains may evolve in such a way as to believe what is false, for example that certain things are objectively verifiable when they are not.
      - The evolution of the brain in humans has been in the general direction of improved cognitive function. Plantinga's notion of selection for true beliefs or false beliefs is a red herring. That doesn't mean that our beliefs are completely reliable. Obviously, they aren't. For the most part, we can believe what we see. If a claim is objectively verifiable, it's not just our minds playing tricks on us. Through these (scientific) claims, we survive and we enhance our living conditions. We are justified in saying that scientific claims work.

      When it comes to more abstract things, like metaphysical claims, if we can't observe what is being claimed, and we can't objectively verify it, we have no basis for confidence that they are true. The simple fact that there is no consensus among rational people about the existence or attributes of God, for example, is a strong indication that such claims are not reliable. Maybe there is a God, or maybe there isn't. Nobody really knows. But I am highly confident in many claims of science or empirically-based knowledge, and I entrust my life to such claims every day.

      That's fair enough, I guess. But to this point we've been referring to naturalistic epistemology. It seems to me that if a naturalistic epistemology cannot bring you to a knowledge of naturalism, it's a failed epistemology. That would make you more of an agnostic regarding naturalism, wouldn't it?
      - An epistemology that lets you believe things that aren't true is a failed epistemology. There is no crime in admitting our lack of knowledge when we don't know. But it is a crime (so-to-speak) to say that you know something when you don't.

      Should I be agnostic about naturalism? Perhaps. But you and I both agree that the natural world exists. You go beyond that to postulate another aspect of reality that is not observable or knowable. That is definitely something to be agnostic about.

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  5. I'm sure I don't understand something here, but isn't a logical deduction from observed phenomenon something accepted in (both versions of) naturalism? And yet, logic, as such, is not phsyical. Hence, naturalism DOES accept the existence of non-physical realities.

    Unfortunately, there are no observable data which leads one to a scientific proof that logic is a valid model for thinking something true. One cannot perform a physical experiment whose result is "logic" as such, for example. Or "truth" either.

    When it comes to more abstract things, like metaphysical claims, if we can't observe what is being claimed, and we can't objectively verify it, we have no basis for confidence that they are true.

    So we can have no basis for confidence that logic is true.

    But I am sure that naturalists are completely right in continuing to use it. Quite sure.

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    1. Sorry, I missed your comment until now.

      And yet, logic, as such, is not phsyical. Hence, naturalism DOES accept the existence of non-physical realities.
      - Logic is a process, not something that exists as an entity. Logic has to do with the way information is processed. Consider: a computer can perform logical operations flawlessly. Given some information to start with, it manipulates the information according to a set of rules to produce the output. That's what our brains do, too. And it's entirely physical.

      One cannot perform a physical experiment whose result is "logic" as such
      - One can perform an experiment to show that the process of logic produces consistent results, just as we can test the laws of physics to show that they are consistent. It is this consistence that allows us to call these things "laws". We can't prove them, but we are justified in believing that they work consistently. Logic is no different.

      So we can have no basis for confidence that logic is true.
      - As I said, we do have justification, based on experience and inductive reasoning. But absolute proof? There isn't absolute proof for anything.

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    2. Logic is not immaterial. Logic isn't even really something we should say is part of reality. Logic, more or less, is a language we use to model what we call valid reasoning. Logicians create various types of logic to find valid argument schemata for whatever kinds of sentences they are dealing with. i.e. temporal logics for temporal sentences.

      I would say it makes no sense to say logic is true. Only propositions can be true or false. Logic is basically just a language with syntactical rules to model what is called valid reasoning within whatever language we're dealing with. As a result, no kind of logic can be true or false since no logic is a proposition.

      Likewise, there cannot be a proof of any logic since logic is the language of proofs. To prove a logic we would either need to appeal to the proof rules set out by that logic or appeal to some other logic, but then we would need an addition logic and so on.

      If anyone is actually interested in logic, start here for free: http://courses.umass.edu/phil110-gmh/MAIN/IHome-5.htm

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    3. We agree that logic is not immaterial - it is physical. But I disagree that it isn't part of reality. It is built into nature. Anyone who has designed logic circuits would understand that physical objects naturally perform logical operations. The axioms of logic are not something invented by man. They are what we observe. We feel that they are intuitive because they are consistent with what we see in our world. Yes, we have devised a language to express logic, and it is the language of logic that man has invented, but the underlying reality of it is independent of any mind. Just like the laws of physics.

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  6. - Logic is a process, not something that exists as an entity.

    I am not sure I would be comfortable with the thought that logic being a “process” means that it can be dismissed from being “real”. Sure, of course it isn’t a physical entity, simply speaking. But my point wasn’t a claim that naturalism accepts the existence of non-physical physical realities, it was that naturalism accepts the existence of non-physical realities. If logic is a process, then it is real just the way processes are real, which are process-type realities rather than physical entities. Are processes not real?

    I am also not sure it makes sense to call logic a “process”, i.e. the way “information is processed”, if you mean (for example) the way grapes are processed for making wine. The steps of the process, taken as an algorithm, are not physical realities, but they are instantiated one after another in time in physical conditions imposed on the grapes. Logic isn’t merely a temporally extended set of conditions of physical things. The truth that “If A implies B, and B implies C, then A implies C” is not a process in that sense, it is neither temporally extended nor a series of conditions on physical things. Nor is it a “processing” of information-sorting in the brain, like a mental sifter sifting a bowl of statements to sort out X-sized statements from Y-sized and putting each in its proper bin. Nor is it anything like a bunch of other processing type activities.

    I suspect using the expression “process” for it may be just a sly way of getting out of saying it is a “reality”, without asserting anything that you have to stand by. It has the feel of being a metaphor rather than an actual description.

    Consider: a computer can perform logical operations flawlessly. Given some information to start with, it manipulates the information according to a set of rules to produce the output.

    OK. But the computer is not the source of the operations it performs being logical. The source of that is the person designing the computer. So, in actuality, the operating computer is just a series of physical states of stuff, whereas the logic in the algorithm it uses is something else, and nobody would suggest that it is the computer that causes the algorithm to be a logical one. The algorithm is "logical" only if it successfully addresses a purpose someone extrinsic to the computer has for the computer, if it doesn't we don't call it "logical" we just call it a lump of (expensive) junk. If it doesn't do what the designer intends, it is no more "logical" than the desk that it sits on, it is just atoms obeying laws of nature. We don't call the desk "logical".

    That's what our brains do, too. And it's entirely physical.

    I don’t see that the logic that we see in the syllogism stated above is any more physical than the logic of the algorithm that informs the computer system (as long as it has been designed properly). In both cases, the logic is present. In the case of the computer, we cannot say that the logic rests in the computer's physical causes alone – i.e. the physics of the computer’s parts - and the claim that it is entirely physical in the brain is very hotly contested. As an analogy (comparing the brain to the computer to explain the brain) the thesis falls apart precisely because the logic “in” the computer is really the logic in the person (and his brain), so if the person’s logic being “entirely physical” is disputed, the computer’s logic cannot shed any light on the case. I gather that plenty of scientists don’t think it is entirely physical in the person.

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  7. - One can perform an experiment to show that the process of logic produces consistent results

    That’s an interesting idea. Can you describe such an experiment? Can you explain whether this experiment plays nicely with Humean empiricism, as well?

    I am puzzled whether you are suggesting that the appropriate experiment would “produce logic” consistently, or whether in putting together an experiment that “has logic” as one of the elements, the outcomes are consistent? My big concern is the notion that we can “prepare” an experiment that “has logic” without, you know, using logic to assess whether and how the experiment is what we want it to be. And whether in using that logic (which is not the logic “inside” the experiment) we would be creating an experimental bias. Seems a difficult challenge, to me. But maybe you have already thought that all through, and have a solution, so by all means describe away, I am open to learning new things.

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    1. I am not sure I would be comfortable with the thought that logic being a “process” means that it can be dismissed from being “real”
      - I specifically said it is real. It's part of nature. Ryan apparently thinks it isn't real. I disagree.

      The truth that “If A implies B, and B implies C, then A implies C” is not a process in that sense, it is neither temporally extended nor a series of conditions on physical things. ... I suspect using the expression “process” for it may be just a sly way of getting out of saying it is a “reality”, without asserting anything that you have to stand by.
      - The axioms of logic are fundamental realities. When we use logic to derive the truth of a proposition, we are employing a process. We don't know the truth of "A implies C" unless we go through the steps that lead us to that conclusion. That's what I mean by 'process'. We can reason our way through the steps, or we can have a machine do it for us. The machine does it without thinking, but the information definitely goes through a series of steps in the process before arriving at the result.

      OK. But the computer is not the source of the operations it performs being logical. The source of that is the person designing the computer.
      - I beg to differ with you. Nobody tells a computer how to perform logical operations. That is built into the machine. What we tell the computer is how to string together a series of logical steps in a complex process.

      The algorithm is "logical" only if it successfully addresses a purpose someone extrinsic to the computer has for the computer
      - The algorithm programmed into a computer performs some function according to the rules of logic. It produces the logically correct result for whatever its instructions are.

      I don’t see that the logic that we see in the syllogism stated above is any more physical than the logic of the algorithm that informs the computer system (as long as it has been designed properly).
      - It is important to distinguish between a fundamental logical reality (axiom) and a syllogism or algorithm, where a series of logical steps are applied. The fundamental logical operation (identity, conjunction, inversion etc) can be implemented in many different ways by physical systems. It is the human designer that specifies how we put those operations together as a series of steps to make a syllogism or an algorithm. Logic occurs at the lowest level. The syllogism or the algorithm is the application of logic to a particular problem.

      and the claim that it is entirely physical in the brain is very hotly contested.
      - Not in the scientific community. Scientists of mind and cognition are virtually unanimous on this.

      My big concern is the notion that we can “prepare” an experiment that “has logic” without, you know, using logic to assess whether and how the experiment is what we want it to be.
      - I don't think we can abandon logic in anything we do. But we can observe reality. And we observe that it is self-consistent.

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  8. im skeptical, thanks for the response, I appreciate it.

    - The axioms of logic are fundamental realities. When we use logic to derive the truth of a proposition, we are employing a process

    I'm fine with saying it this way. Sound good to me. When we think with a logical sort of thinking, there is a process in our minds. The logic that comes to be in our minds in process corresponds to a logic that is IN reality itself, even when our minds are not thinking it (as when we are asleep), what you seem to imply in saying that "the axioms are fundamental realities". The aspect of it in reality itself present even when we are not thinking it is the sense I was talking about when I said it "is a reality".

    - I beg to differ with you. Nobody tells a computer how to perform logical operations. That is built into the machine. What we tell the computer is how to string together a series of logical steps in a complex process.

    Well, again, we seem to have been focused on different aspects. I was thinking mainly of the person who designed the computer - that is BUILT IN to the machine by a person (For this purpose, I don't think it matters whether the person who designs the computer physically, and the person who designs the program that runs it, are distinct persons. Either way, the total system (both parts together) are designed by persons.

    - Not in the scientific community. Scientists of mind and cognition are virtually unanimous on this.

    I am afraid we will differ on this until you present substantiation. Last I looked, even within the universe of scientists of mind and cognition that "agree" that it is entirely physical in the brain had several competing theories about how this is true, which theories are incompatible with each other. And that NONE of the theories could adequately account for the difference between the event of a person who fully thought he had proven something - say, a math theorem - logically (but was wrong), and someone who fully thought he had proven it logically, and was right. And that other scientists, seeing the latter reality (and other lacunae of the theories), were unwilling to completely COMMIT to the proposition that it is "entirely physical" just yet.

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