The Incongruity of Divine Simplicity
I previously discussed some problems with the Thomistic metaphysical concept of act and potency. As expected, it resulted in lots of harsh commentary from the good folks at Feser's echo chamber. One thing that didn't happen is any kind of cogent rebuttal to the issues I raised. I am not arrogant enough to think that I am an expert on scholastic metaphysics, or to think that these issues haven't been raised before. But I can say with confidence that they haven't been answered in a way that is intellectually satisfying to a scientifically-minded skeptic. I raise these questions because in my opinion, they cast serious doubt on the whole enterprise, and all the explanations that have been offered are simply rationalizations. The Thomist must live with some cognitive dissonance when he tries to explain how his metaphysics exists in harmony with modern science.
My next area of criticism is the concept of divine simplicity. This is the notion that God is simple - that he is composed of no parts and has no complexity. He is identical to his properties: simplicity, perfection, goodness, infinity, ubiquity, immutability, eternity, and unity. God's is said to be unknowable except by analogy. His intellect is utterly unlike the intellect of man. And so we have some problems that demand an explanation.