The Circularity of Aquinas' Fifth Way
In a discussion with the Quantum Thomist, I made a statement to the effect that the Fifth Way of Aquinas exhibits circular reasoning. The Fifth Way is one of Thomas Aquinas' five famous arguments for the existence of God. It is also known as his Teleological Argument, or his Argument From Design. It is based on the presumption of teleology in nature. Of course, my claim that this argument is circular is something that Thomists don't like to hear. Most dedicated Thomists are convinced beyond any doubt that the logic of Thomas Aquinas is beyond reproach. The impeccable logic of Aquinas is the basis of their Thomistic philosophy and the foundation of their theistic belief. How can someone like me (who isn't even formally educated in philosophy beyond Phil 101) take issue with such a master of logic and philosophical thought? I will attempt to explain.
First, let me provide a definition of teleology from Merriam Webster
1 a : the study of evidences of design in natureTeleology is about end-directedness. For Aquinas, all things are directed toward some end. The end, or purpose, or final cause of an acorn, for example, is to become an oak tree. This is the design that is built into natural things. This concept is fundamental to Aquinas' philosophy.
b : a doctrine (as in vitalism) that ends are immanent in nature
c : a doctrine explaining phenomena by final causes
2 : the fact or character attributed to nature or natural processes of being directed toward an end or shaped by a purpose
3 : the use of design or purpose as an explanation of natural phenomena
So with that in mind, we may now state the Fifth Way argument in the words of Aquinas:
The fifth way is taken from the governance of the world. We see that things which lack intelligence, such as natural bodies, act for an end, and this is evident from their acting always, or nearly always, in the same way, so as to obtain the best result. Hence it is plain that not fortuitously, but designedly, do they achieve their end. Now whatever lacks intelligence cannot move towards an end, unless it be directed by some being endowed with knowledge and intelligence; as the arrow is shot to its mark by the archer. Therefore some intelligent being exists by whom all natural things are directed to their end; and this being we call God. - Thomas AquinasIt is a fairly simple argument. And it is obvious that without the presumption of teleology, it would have no basis at all. Aquinas makes a meager attempt at justifying his assertion of teleology by noting that things usually behave in the same way to achieve the best result. But it is easy to cast doubt on that. One merely has to note that there are other explanations for the way things behave. In particular, modern science has shown that organisms develop according to patterns that are established by their DNA. And DNA is structured in a particular way (that establishes the pattern of development) by accidental processes, including natural selection. This scientific explanation does not depend on, and makes no presumption of any kind of design or purpose for living organisms. One need not accept the scientific explanation, but merely recognize that it is a viable alternative to Aquinas' teleology, in order to understand that Aquinas makes a presupposition in his argument that may not be fully justified - namely that natural bodies act for an end. As an aside, I think it would be fair to say that there may not have been any good alternatives to teleology at the time Aquinas formulated this argument. Nevertheless, Aquinas denies any alternative possibility. He makes a strong claim of teleology at the outset.
It is worth noting that Aquinas's version of the argument relies on a very strong claim about the explanation for ends and processes: the existence of any end-directed system or process can be explained, as a logical matter, only by the existence of an intelligent being who directs that system or process towards its end. Since the operations of all natural bodies, on Aquinas's view, are directed towards some specific end that conduces to, at the very least, the preservation of the object, these operations can be explained only by the existence of an intelligent being. - IEPSo now we come to my claim: that this is a circular argument. I contend that Aquinas' presumption of teleology in nature is tantamount to a presumption of God. But if this is a premise to his argument, then the conclusion that God exists is nothing more than a restatement of an implicit assumption. And that is a circular argument. Of course, my claim hinges on whether or not the teleology of Aquinas really does presume God. In my discussion with the Quantum Thomist (Dr. Nigel Cundy), this was a matter of dispute. His claim is this:
Aquinas took his teleology from Aristotle pretty much unchanged, who maintained that motion and ends were wholly natural. The only place where God entered Aristotle's thought was as the terminus of the cosmological argument (the series of movers). So the presumption in Aquinas' thought was that things had natural ends, in the sense that I have described above. The fifth way was an attempt to demonstrate the existence of God from the premise that final causes exist in nature. You might not think much of Aquinas, but he clearly wasn't so much of an idiot that he would take as his premise something that presumed his conclusion. The existence of God was not an assumption of Aquinas' teleology, but a conclusion which Aquinas (but not Aristotle, who shared the same teleology) drew from it. - CundyBut it is worth noting that Aristotle's teleological view was that the final cause of an object was an intrinsic part of its own nature. There was no implication of an intelligence. Aquinas, on the other hand, departs from Aristotle on this very question. He says it right in his argument: "whatever lacks knowledge cannot move towards an end, unless it be directed by some being endowed with knowledge and intelligence". It is intrinsic to the natural object only by virtue of God's design. Aristotle did not define his teleology in that manner. This presumption of an intelligence is further corroborated by Ed Feser:
But it obviously does not exist in the natural object itself; if the form of an oak were already in the acorn itself, it would be an oak, and it is not ... The only possibility remaining, then, is the last one: Final causation in the natural world is intelligible because there is an intelligence altogether outside the natural order that directs natural objects to their ends... the final cause of a natural object must exist already as an idea or form in an intellect existing altogether outside the natural order - Feser [Teleology: A Shopper's Guide]There can be no question that Aquinas' version of teleology is based on the presumption that God is the intelligence that defines the final cause. And this is a fundamental assumption in his teleology.
To sum up:
1. The existence of an intelligence is a basic assumption of Aquinas' teleology.
2. Teleology in nature is an explicit premise of the Fifth Way.
3. Therefore, the existence of an intelligence is an implicit assumption in the Fifth Way.
4. Since an intelligence is assumed in the argument, the conclusion that this intelligence exists is an instance of circular reasoning.
You may benefit from reading this article about the Fifth Way by Dr. Dennis Bonnette on Strange Notions, which, coincidentally(?) was posted either on the same day or a day after you made this post.
ReplyDeleteI'm also asking Dr. Bonnette about what he thinks of your post, and you can do the same if you'd like. :)
Geez, I'm forgetful. Forgot to actually put the article link. https://strangenotions.com/understanding-the-mysterious-fifth-way-to-gods-existence/
DeleteI see nothing in Dr. Bonnette's article that actually substantiates the assertion that things act for an intended end. This is consistent with my claim that teleology presumes God. In fact, Bonnette says: "God’s existence is the foundation on which logically rests the entirety of his multiple volume masterpiece". The presumption of God is evident in virtually every aspect of Thomistic thought. The fifth way is no exception.
DeleteThen tell him that.
Delete>In fact, Bonnette says: "God’s existence is the foundation on which logically rests the entirety of his multiple volume masterpiece". The presumption of God is evident in virtually every aspect of Thomistic thought. The fifth way is no exception.
DeleteHe says that because the vast majority of the Summa discusses matters of theology (it's literally the summary of theology), which is fundamentally a study that assumes God. The work doesn't discuss teleology at all, but it does discuss things like the characteristics of God, Holy Trinity, the life of Christ, and subjects like that. In fact, the only part that isn't solely theological is the part where Aquinas provides brief summaries for arguments of God's existence, like the fifth way.
If you truly think there are problems with the article, then again, talk to Bonnette himself about it. He's only one combox away, and even Ficino has already gone to talk to him.
If you truly think there are problems with the article, then again, talk to Bonnette himself about it.
Delete- I didn't disagree with anything Bonnette said in that article. We both agree that Aquinas presumes the existence of God, but that's not what his article focused on. He never addressed the question of whether the fifth way is circular reasoning. That's what I focused on in my own article. And while the Summa Theologica may not discuss teleology explicitly, there is no question that it presents a teleological metaphysical view of the world. This is at the heart of Thomistic philosophy. And it is presumed without question before the five ways are ever expressed.
If you didn't disagree with anything Bonnette said in the article, then our conversation is over! Because then, you agree with this:
Delete"If an agent were totally indifferent to multiple possible effects, no sufficient reason would explain why a specific outcome occurs, making production of a definite effect impossible. But every agent produces a definite effect. Hence, every agent must act toward a definite end."
And this:
"The fifth way’s argument actually advances just two essential claims:
(1) “Things which lack knowledge, such as natural bodies, act for a [definite] end.”
(2) “Those things which do not have knowledge do not tend toward an end unless directed by something with knowledge and intelligence.”
*Both claims have been demonstrated above*, employing texts from St. Thomas as well as added arguments, such as Maritain’s. St. Thomas concludes from these premises: “There exists some intelligent being by whom all natural things are directed to an end.”"
I also asked Bonnette if he agrees with you on the circular reasoning, to which he responded the following:
"I think I would refer you to the first paragraph of my article above, where I point out, regarding all Five Ways, that " no complete scholarly demonstration was ever intended."
If that is the case, looking for question begging is of limited relevance."
"Without trying to sort out how a proof works that I just noted was never intended as a complete scholarly demonstration, I would completely agree that St. Thomas was far too astute a thinker as to assume what he was trying to prove, especially in so evident a context as this one."
So it seems that you've misinterpreted him here.
>And while the Summa Theologica may not discuss teleology explicitly, there is no question that it presents a teleological metaphysical view of the world.
Completely irrelevant to what I said. How can you discuss theology without assuming God exists? The goal of 99% of the Summa, thousands of pages of it, is to discuss theology. The five proofs not only aren't complete scholarly demonstrations, they're about five-ten pages of the whole 2000+ page book.
It's also, once again, ridiculous that you'd refuse to engage Dr. Bonnette about your disagreements (it would take five minutes at most!), and decide to engage an eighteen-year-old instead.
If you didn't disagree with anything Bonnette said in the article, then our conversation is over! Because then, you agree with this: ...
ReplyDelete- What I'm saying is that IF you accept the metaphysical presumptions that are implicit in this argument, then you can logically make the remainder of the argument as it follows. Of course, I do not accept Thomistic metaphysics, so I disagree with the conclusion of the argument. So my disagreement with Bonnette is not specifically about this particular article, but it is much deeper than that.
If that is the case, looking for question begging is of limited relevance.
- On this question, I would say that he is giving a facile answer to an issue that pervades the entire Thomistic system of philosophical thinking. It is ALL based on the presumption of God, and that is exactly what Bonnette himself has admitted.
So it seems that you've misinterpreted him here.
- And yet Bonnette himself said as much. If you think I have made any misrepresentation, it is not sufficient to simply make this claim. You should be willing to tell me exactly what I got wrong.
Completely irrelevant to what I said. How can you discuss theology without assuming God exists? The goal of 99% of the Summa, thousands of pages of it, is to discuss theology. The five proofs not only aren't complete scholarly demonstrations, they're about five-ten pages of the whole 2000+ page book.
- This only backs up what I have said. The presumption of God comes first. What follows is rationalization.
It's also, once again, ridiculous that you'd refuse to engage Dr. Bonnette about your disagreements (it would take five minutes at most!), and decide to engage an eighteen-year-old instead.
- I didn't decide to engage you. That is your choice. Please don't pretend that I'm just picking on a defenseless kid. And I don't think it is appropriate for you to attempt to thrust me into new discussions at different places. Making the suggestion is fine. But you don't need to serve as a proxy if neither of us has asked for that. I never made an issue of what Bonnette said in that article. But I can go there if I choose to do so. And if he chooses to speak to me, he is welcome to do so.
-So my disagreement with Bonnette is not specifically about this particular article, but it is much deeper than that.
DeleteOkay. But you said you "didn't disagree" with anything he said in this article, which literally cannot be entirely correct.
- What I'm saying is that IF you accept the metaphysical presumptions that are implicit in this argument, then you can logically make the remainder of the argument as it follows.
First off, please quote where you stated this in your post. I used your words in saying that you didn't disagree with anything that Bonnette said in his article! Quote: "I didn't disagree with anything Bonnette said in that article."
- On this question, I would say that he is giving a facile answer to an issue that pervades the entire Thomistic system of philosophical thinking. It is ALL based on the presumption of God, and that is exactly what Bonnette himself has admitted.
Again, theology is literally the study of the nature of God and religious belief. So it is not a point against the theologian to presume that God exists when discussing theology! The goal of St. Thomas in writing the Summa was not to convince skeptics that God existed and explore his metaphysics. Instead, as Bonnette states, St. Thomas' goal with the Five Proofs was to "[summarize] St. Thomas’ take on classical arguments his students already knew well" for a few pages, before discussing theology- the heart of the matter that he wanted to write about. As I will say multiple times, Thomas' goal in the Summa was not to explain and defend his metaphysics.
(cont)
Delete- This only backs up what I have said. The presumption of God comes first. What follows is rationalization.
If you want to call the arguments for the existence of God or the metaphysics they are based on presumptions, then that's on you. I was talking about theology assuming God's existence inherently as a field, not St. Thomas' metaphysics assume God from the get-go. Note that I'm not saying you have to agree with the arguments or St. Thomas' metaphysics.
- Please don't pretend that I'm just picking on a defenseless kid. And I don't think it is appropriate for you to attempt to thrust me into new discussions at different places. Making the suggestion is fine. But you don't need to serve as a proxy if neither of us has asked for that. I never made an issue of what Bonnette said in that article. But I can go there if I choose to do so. And if he chooses to speak to me, he is welcome to do so.
I wasn't trying to make you seem like you're picking on a defenseless kid. I will point out that you did respond to my comment on Feser's blog, then message that you had responded to the comment Anonymously to notify me that you had responded (or, at the very least, someone reading your blog did). Thus, I felt it was fit for me to come here and discuss my comment with you. And... now we're here.
>I didn't decide to engage you. That is your choice.
Yes, it was my choice to engage you. It is yours to engage me, and it was yours to bring me here at all. If you really don't want to engage me, then you don't have to at all. You can always just stop responding to my comments, and you could always not write a post responding to the points I've made! As you said to me, you don't need to think of this as a battle to be engaged.
(cont)
Delete>But you don't need to serve as a proxy if neither of us has asked for that.
Whether you want to or not is your choice. On this subject, you mentioned at one point that you had a discussion with Feser before. If you have a link to that, I'd be interested in reading it. Also, me talking to Dr. Bonnette about your article, and noting that I've been talking to you about it, doesn't necessarily mean I was trying to bring Dr. Bonnette out of the woodwork to personally come comment on your blog. I was just doing what I did before- trying to unpack your comments with someone who understands Thomism. You post these articles publicly for the world to see, so I don't see a problem with providing others the link and letting them see what you've written. I would not mind seeing you engage Dr. Bonnette, and I'm not forcing you into a debate. If I really wanted to do that, I probably would have pressed Dr. Bonnette into it in my comments to him, but... I explicitly didn't. I just asked for his thoughts on what you said, and said that you could discuss with him if you wanted a conversation with more substance.
As far as me trying to get you to talk to Phil earlier, I'll admit I did want to see that discussion happen. However, it's very likely not going to, seeing as I forgot that Phil has a personal life too, and he didn't express interest in a discussion at all. I won't try to get you into a debate like that again.
But, as I've noted previously, it wasn't my intent to get you into a debate initially. Again, I just wanted to unpack your post with other Thomists, to learn from it and how to overcome it. You brought me here, referring to my discussing your article with others as staying in an echo chamber. I'll also point out that you made this post seemingly due to my comments about your exchange on the Quantum Thomist- you even asked what my problem with your argument was shortly before you wrote the article, saying it was "bothering you," so it doesn't seem ill-fit for me to comment on the article. (Especially since you don't seem too inclined to reach out to Dr. Cundy or Scott Lynch to discuss this further!)
- And yet Bonnette himself said as much. If you think I have made any misrepresentation, it is not sufficient to simply make this claim. You should be willing to tell me exactly what I got wrong.
I will try my best to. When Bonnette was talking about the Summa, he did say this: "God’s existence is the foundation on which logically rests the entirety of his multiple volume masterpiece," which seems to be where you get the impression that St. Thomas assumes God's existence. If I'm wrong about this being the quote you used to support your claim, please correct me.
But what Bonnette meant by this wasn't that St. Thomas starts out his metaphysics already assuming his conclusion, as you seem to have portrayed it. What he means by this is that, when you're writing a work about theological subjects like the nature of God, the Holy Trinity, and how to approach ethics in a theistic way, you need to found it on the existence of God. God is presumed throughout the rest of the Summa so that St. Thomas can discuss theology. It is not meant to be a work that works from the ground up to prove the existence of God. The work does not even discuss metaphysics! If you want a contemporary introduction to A-T that isn't inherently theological, you could look at books like Scholastic Metaphysics by Edward Feser, or The One and the Many by Norris Clarke. Both of them are very in-depth.
First off, please quote where you stated this in your post.
Delete- Forgive me. I should have said I didn't take issue with anything he said in his article. It goes without saying that there is much we disagree about.
Again, theology is literally the study of the nature of God and religious belief. So it is not a point against the theologian to presume that God exists when discussing theology!
- Now I would suggest that you make a honest effort to understand what I'm saying. I was arguing against the fifth way, not theology in general. That was the topic of my post.
I was talking about theology assuming God's existence inherently as a field, not St. Thomas' metaphysics assume God from the get-go.
- OK. I was talking about a specific argument for the existence of God. That is, after all, what the fifth way purports to be. But the fifth way DOES presume the metaphysics of Aquinas, and the metaphysics of Aquinas DOES presume God. As a logical argument, it doesn't get excused from the need to provide substantiation for its assumptions simply on the basis that it appears in a book of theology.
I wasn't trying to make you seem like you're picking on a defenseless kid. I will point out that you did respond to my comment on Feser's blog, then message that you had responded to the comment Anonymously to notify me that you had responded
- I made no comment at Feser's. Nevertheless, you are welcome to come here and reply to what I have said. But you have twice referred to yourself as an eighteen-year-old, while simultaneously trying to redirect my discussion to another party. In the latter case, you seem to be manufacturing a disagreement, and then telling me I need to take it up with Bonnette.
Yes, it was my choice to engage you. It is yours to engage me, and it was yours to bring me here at all.
- Let me recap what happened. You made comments about an earlier article of mine at Feser's blog, instead of making it here. I tried to respond there, but the comments had been shut off by that time, so I responded under my own article that was the subject of your comments. Someone (which you wrongly took to be me) noted my reply under yet another article at Feser's, and THAT's what prompted you to come here.
I'll also point out that you made this post seemingly due to my comments about your exchange on the Quantum Thomist
- That's true.
it doesn't seem ill-fit for me to comment on the article. (Especially since you don't seem too inclined to reach out to Dr. Cundy or Scott Lynch to discuss this further!)
- I hope I haven't given you the impression that you aren't welcome to comment here. As for Cundy and Lynch, we did have an ongoing discussion which I would have been happy to continue, but Lynch took an uncordial and disagreeable "tone" toward me, so I stopped relying to him, and Cundy later stopped replying to me.
When Bonnette was talking about the Summa, he did say this: "God’s existence is the foundation on which logically rests the entirety of his multiple volume masterpiece," which seems to be where you get the impression that St. Thomas assumes God's existence.
- That's right. What I don't get is how you think I have misrepresented something. Bonnette DOES admit that the presumption of God IS the basis of the whole thing. I have nor misrepresented that. It's what he says.
It is not meant to be a work that works from the ground up to prove the existence of God. The work does not even discuss metaphysics!
- Now listen to MY argument: The fifth way argument DOES presume Thomistic metaphysics. And Thomistic metaphysics DOES incorporate teleology. And Thomistic teleology DOES presume God as the "designer" of the ends toward which all things aspire. Therefore, the fifth way argument (which concludes the existence of God) is circular.
I think we should abandon the talk about how we got into this conversation and focus on the discussion at hand. I know I'm just as suspect as you are about this, but let's focus.
Delete- Now listen to MY argument: The fifth way argument DOES presume Thomistic metaphysics. And Thomistic metaphysics DOES incorporate teleology. And Thomistic teleology DOES presume God as the "designer" of the ends toward which all things aspire. Therefore, the fifth way argument (which concludes the existence of God) is circular.
I understand your argument, but I don't necessarily see how it is right. Nevertheless, I think that you are interpreting teleology as assuming the existence of God, when in reality, Thomists propose the existence of God as a conclusion to order in nature. I'm currently reading The One and the Many, one of the books that I mentioned in my last comment. I'm not quite there yet, but Clarke has said in the book thus far that, soon in the future, he will argue for the existence of God using the order of things as his premise. The book has barely mentioned God himself up until this point, although Clarke apparently does so more later on.
I will grant that the Fifth Way assumes Thomistic metaphysics. As Bonnette says, students of St. Thomas would have understood the premises he was taking for granted in his argument. But, I have always been under the impression that the argument for teleology goes more like this,
"There is order in things, and this order can only be the case if God exists. Hence, God exists. In order for there to be consistent order in the universe, there would have to be a God who designs the ends towards which all things aspire."
than this,
"God exists and designs the ends towards which all things aspire. Therefore, there is order in nature. Therefore, God exists." This seems to be what you are saying Thomists argue for? Please let me know if I'm strawmanning you. If I am, please take a quote from your article to better summarize your position.
Essentially, I have always been under the impression that we start with order in nature and from there conclude God's existence.
- That's right. What I don't get is how you think I have misrepresented something. Bonnette DOES admit that the presumption of God IS the basis of the whole thing. I have nor misrepresented that. It's what he says.
About this: I'm not trying to put you in bad faith, intentionally misrepresenting Bonnette to mislead readers. I will ask Bonnette to clarify about what he said. I believe, however, that he wasn't trying to make the exact point you're going for. He's trying to say that theological works like the Summa assume God fundamentally, not that A-T metaphysics assumes God before it gets started. This is the difference in what we are saying- I think Bonnette is talking about something other than what you are. That is why I brought theology into the conversation at all.
-As a logical argument, it doesn't get excused from the need to provide substantiation for its assumptions simply on the basis that it appears in a book of theology.
I agree with this, though we need to keep in mind that such a task wasn't the purpose of the Summa.
-Thomistic teleology DOES presume God as the "designer" of the ends toward which all things aspire.
But, I don't agree with this. As I said before, I've always been under the impression that we start with order and conclude with God. Now, Thomists like Edward Feser may write with their conclusions in mind from the get-go, which perhaps is a flaw in their own teaching abilities, but I don't think that's a fundamental part of the argument. I can get back to you on this after I get to that part of Clarke's book.
I will add that Dr. Bonnette has responded to my question and confirmed that he meant what I interpreted his statement as- "since the rest of the Summa is theological in nature, and discusses the Holy Trinity, the Nature of God, and so on, St. Thomas has to assume God in everything beyond the Five Ways. And, since he wanted to write on theology rather than defining his metaphysics in the Summa, he didn't feel the need to provide in-depth arguments for God's existence."
DeleteHe said this hit the nail on the head, so we call this discrepancy closed.
I think that you are interpreting teleology as assuming the existence of God, when in reality, Thomists propose the existence of God as a conclusion to order in nature.
Delete- I would like to see the specific argument that derives teleology (complete with its assertion that all outcomes are intended before they are ever realized) from the observation of nature. It seems to me that (as I pointed out earlier) we don't actually observe intention in nature. We merely make the assumption of intention. And in doing so, we are assuming God.
I agree with this, though we need to keep in mind that such a task wasn't the purpose of the Summa.
- I'm not the one who brought it up. I was only talking about the fifth way.
But, I don't agree with this. As I said before, I've always been under the impression that we start with order and conclude with God.
- I don't see how you can get around it. Even if teleology is based on observation, and makes no prior assumption of God, it still includes the understanding that God is the designer of the ends. Yet, this is a premise of the fifth way. So the fifth way is circular. Aquinas would have been better off making an argument to show how his teleology is the conclusion reached from the observation of nature. Maybe he did (somewhere other than the Summa), but I don't know what that argument is.
As I am just now reading the chapter of Clarke's The One and the Many that deals with teleology, I'll try to outline his arguments sequentially. I'll essentially be quoting him here, mostly, with some summarizing for length.
DeleteWithin our actions as humans, we can clearly observe a sense of purpose or end. However, Clarke notes, there is a metaphysical problem in relating this to inanimate objects, and many philosophers reject final causality for this reason.
Clarke argues that, if the efficient cause of a productive action is not interiorly determined or focused on producing one effect rather than another, there is no sufficient reason why it should produce this one rather than that. Hence, it will produce nothing at all, since indeterminate action is nothing at all. Thus, the effect must find its reason for being in the cause that brings it into being. This is precisely the meaning of final causality, says Clarke- efficient causality focused toward a determinate end or goal.
Clarke also argues that the effect of a cause, being some determinate being or mode of being, must have its sufficient reason for being in its efficient cause, for being this particular effect and not another. Once again, this is what is meant by final causality: the influence of the end or goal of the action, the effect-to-be-produced, on the causal action itself.
The conclusion of these two premises is that every efficient cause, to be a cause at all, must act for an end. Its action must be finalized internally to have its effect be produced and its "goal" attained.
From here, Clarke proposes another argument a few pages later, more related to what we're talking about here.
The final cause must somehow be present in the agent, guiding its action, before the effect is actually produced in its own real being. But, since this effect doesn't exist until it is actually produced, the final cause cannot have real being. Hence, it must be present in some form of mental being.
The only adequate sufficient reason for the presence of this not yet existence future in the form of mental being must be that power which can make the future present in the form of mental being- intelligence. This requirement can be filled by either the agent itself being intelligent, or if the immediate agent is not intelligent, from an intelligent planning cause constructing the nature of the agent so that it has innate tendencies towards producing that end. Thus, every natural property of a non-conscious agent is an innate intentionality toward a determinate type of effect.
The conclusion of this argument is that all determinate action of an efficient cause must reside in some residing intelligence: either the agent itself as in the case of a human, or in an intelligent designer.
if the efficient cause of a productive action is not interiorly determined or focused on producing one effect rather than another, there is no sufficient reason why it should produce this one rather than that. Hence, it will produce nothing at all, since indeterminate action is nothing at all. Thus, the effect must find its reason for being in the cause that brings it into being.
Delete- I have no reason whatsoever to accept this line of reasoning. Things happen, and they happen accidentally. To say that no effect can be produced without some kind of "reason for being" (ie. purpose) seems to be begging the question.
the effect of a cause, being some determinate being or mode of being, must have its sufficient reason for being in its efficient cause, for being this particular effect and not another.
- Again, I can see no logical reason to assume that things can't just happen. It's what we observe. Quantum events, in particular, are random in nature. They don't need a definitive reason, and as far as we can tell, they don't have one.
The final cause must somehow be present in the agent, guiding its action, before the effect is actually produced in its own real being. But, since this effect doesn't exist until it is actually produced, the final cause cannot have real being. Hence, it must be present in some form of mental being.
- That assumes that a final cause exists in the first place.
I haven't been inclined to respond to this because, in addition to having gone on a Church retreat, it seems unfocused from our original subject matter: whether or not the Fifth Way is circular reasoning. What I said above was, quite literally, a contemporary reformulation of the fifth way, the argument used by Thomists like Norris Clarke and (I think) Edward Feser. One could even correlate the different parts of the arguments to different parts of what St. Thomas said. Of course I don't expect you to agree with the argument; it relies on PSR, which you evidently don't accept, and which ultimately we'll almost definitely just have to agree to disagree on. But that's not the discussion we're having. Can you point out a way that the arguments I posted above are circular? If not, then our discussion about this is over, and I've successfully expressed what Scott Lynch and Dr. Cundy tried to. Whether or not the Fifth Way as St. Thomas expressed it was poorly written or too brief, if it can be restated without using circular reasoning, then you must abandon the idea that it is circular reasoning.
DeleteKeep this in mind: what you said here- "That [second argument] assumes that a final cause exists in the first place"- doesn't entail circular reasoning in the argument, since I actually wrote two arguments up there. The first one attempts to show final causality exists (note: it doesn't mention God at all!), while the next attempts to show an intelligent designer exists given final causality. That's the part where God is a conclusion (not a premise!). Thus, using the conclusion of the first argument as part of the second is not circular reasoning. If it is, then it is circular reasoning to discuss the implications of any previous argument one could make, since it would assume that previous argument was true!
I haven't been inclined to respond to this because ... it seems unfocused from our original subject matter: whether or not the Fifth Way is circular reasoning.
Delete- Let me be sure I understand what you're telling me. My original post was about the circularity of Aquinas' Fifth Way argument. You have proposed Clarke's argument as an alternative to Aquinas' formulation. My latest comment (before this) made three points, all relating to what you said about Clarke's argument. But I didn't explicitly address the notion of Clarke using circular reasoning, so I'm straying off topic. Is that the way you see it? In other words, you don't want me to address any issues with Clarke's argument except for the single issue of circular reasoning?
what you said here ... doesn't entail circular reasoning in the argument, since I actually wrote two arguments up there. The first one attempts to show final causality exists (note: it doesn't mention God at all!), while the next attempts to show an intelligent designer exists given final causality.
- OK. Let me address this in a slightly more explicit manner.
First to briefly summarize your top-level argument (based on Clarke, and leaving out much of the detail that supports the premises):
1. Final cause exists.
2. If final cause exists, then an intelligent designer must exist.
3. Since final cause does exist, an intelligent designer does exist.
Now, how does Clarke argue in support the first sub-argument? From what you have said, he says that final cause seems to exist, and he asserts that without a purpose (or final cause), no effect can be realized. And given that there are realized effects, we must conclude that final cause does exist. Perhaps Clarke fleshed out this argument more completely, but this is not a valid argument. The first statement is irrelevant, because just seeming to be true does not imply that something actually is true. The second statement is utterly unsubstantiated, so there is no rational basis for it. It simply assumes that final cause is required for anything to happen.
Moving on to the second sub-argument, I will say that IF we define final cause as the purposeful end toward which any effect is directed, and we assume that purpose implies an intelligent agent, then we can accept this argument. But please note that we need not define final cause in terms of an intelligent purpose.
Putting it together, the first argument purports to show that final cause exists, and aside from the fact that it's not a valid argument in its own right, we must note that we have already implicitly accepted a definition of final cause that includes an intelligent agent. (If that were not the case, then the second argument would be false.) So you are correct that Clarke's argument doesn't mention God before the conclusion. But you ignore the fact that arguments generally contain implicit premises, and in this case, that includes the assumption of an intelligent designer, which comes into play in the premises, long before the conclusion is stated. Therefore, I can say that this argument is just as circular as Aquinas'.
"Essentially, I have always been under the impression that we start with order in nature and from there conclude God's existence."
ReplyDeleteI was under that impression too, but Dr. Bonnette's "repair" of the Fifth seems to me to abandon an attempt to derive from what we see in nature the existence of an intelligent governor. I wrote a too-long spiel on SN to this effect.
If Thomas' premises, sc. that we see natural things operate "always or for the most part" for "that which is best," are "not essential" to the argument, as Dr. B wrote, then I am at a loss to find a tie to reality in what's left of the argument. The "repaired" argument seems basically to collapse into an argument from the PSR or the like.
Can you please link me to the exchange between you and Dr. B? Or is it just the one in the comments?
DeleteThe exchange is just the one in the comments. Dr. B replied at length, and I haven't gone over there to read his yet.
DeleteWhat you cite from Norris Clarke does indeed sound like what I have read in Feser about the stipulation that "the final cause must exist somewhere, since it isn't in the natural thing." So far I don't think that argument is actually in Aquinas. Perhaps Feser and predecessors like Garrigou-Lagrange and Maritain were trying to make explicit things that they thought were implicit in Aquinas.
I don't think the problem of "backwards causality" arises if we construe the work done by the final cause as explanatory and not as productive. And the view that the final cause explains but does not produce seems, as far as I understand him, to be that of Aristotle. This is backed up by recent treatments of Aristotle's causality by Monte Johnson and Mariska Leunissen.
In Aquinas himself it's clear that the final cause precedes other causes by nature/in origin but not in time. In the order of explanation, we refer to the final cause. In the order of production in time, the efficient cause produces form configuring matter. The new thing's operative powers are conferred by the form. The actualized form is identical to the end. We can look at the end and retrospectively explain the process that led to the end, but the process itself is consonant with the substantial form. It's form that has "virtus effectiva," productive power, according to which the result is perfected, not the end qua end. cf. ST 1a 5.4 co.
I definitely agree that St. Thomas' Five Ways are not ideally stated. And, though I disagree with him, as skeptic said, it would have been more effective for St. Thomas to do what the neo-Aristotelians have to do by going from final causality to God, rather than only briefly stating his fifth way under the pretenses that his students would have already known it and only needed a summary. But, what we have is what we have.
DeleteMan, especially for an atheist, I can't believe how much I end up agreeing with your comments. I know I gush every time you comment, but it's honestly magical.
I think pressure points in Aquinas' arguments for intelligent governance of natural things come up in his use of "tend toward" (tendit, intendit) and "determinate." We can say that a projectile is "tending toward a determinate end" but mean two different things: 1) a projectile is in motion, it will hit some spot, and that spot is only one spot, not many; 2) a projectile has been aimed at a spot chosen beforehand, and it hits that one spot, not other spots, toward which it is aimed.
ReplyDeleteCompare a boulder propelled out of an exploding volcano and a boulder shot by a trebuchet. The physics of the boulder's flight may be the same, I don't know. But the target picked beforehand by the soldiers is that to which they aim the boulder. There is no target picked beforehand by the volcano, but the boulder will in fact smash into something and not into something else.
Someone asks, Why did the boulder hit the thing it hit? In the case of the volcano boulder, scientists if they had enough data could specify the causes that made the boulder hit the spot it hit. That explanation from efficient and material causes would suffice. There is no remainder to be explained with regard to the boulder. If a homeowner complains, but why did it smash my house? I suggest that is an ill-formed question if the answer is to go beyond the physics of the boulder's locomotion.
In the case of the boulder aimed by soldiers, obviously, an explanation of why it smashed the enemy siege tower will be just as effective w/ regard to its arc of locomotion if the scientists have the requisite data. The further question, but why did it smash our siege tower, is answered sufficiently from the POV of the boulder by the scientists. Further 'why' questions really concern the plans of the soldiers who fired the trebuchet. There, final causality is needed to give a full account of the scenario, because the scenario includes agents who act from reason and moral choice: the soldiers consider it a good to destroy the siege tower.
I don't see what's lacking in explanations here. What further questions get meaningful answers when we demand a final cause of the boulder's flight out of the volcano and its destruction of a house? The boulder in Aristotelian physics "seeks" to actualize its form by being situated as close to the earth as it can, but this natural tendency to move "down" does not explain what end is achieved by its smashing the house rather than a pile of dirt. In any case, the scientists speaking about efficient and material causes have already explained the forces etc that led the boulder to hit the house. Someone who wants to go on to find a final cause in, at bottom, God's directive will isn't adding anything to the explanation of the boulder's locomotion, since on that theory, every operation of every entity cashes out as directed by God's will. So "because God so directed it" doesn't have any explanatory power in this case; that explanation would pertain to every event whatsoever.
So at this point I think that arguments for an intelligent governor based on claims that a "determinate" outcome implies intelligent governance are vitiated by an equivocation latent in terms like "determinate." Its range of meaning is broad enough that its vagueness allows a slide from "identifiable" to "planned in advance" or the like. We get a form of Texas Sharpshooter fallacy.
To say that an effect cannot be achieved unless it is first conceived in the mind of an agent is something that even most theists should recognize as having the appearance a blatant question-begging assertion. I'd like to see how Clarke justifies this.
DeleteI don't see how the argument is circular. The first part of the argument is based merely on the observation that things are directed towards certain ends. This is just another way of saying that there is regularity in nature, which is another way of saying that nature exhibits final causality. At this point, the question of where ends/final causes exist is left entirely open.
ReplyDeleteThe second part of the argument really boils down this: it's impossible for things to be directed towards ends (final causes) unless those ends can be said to exist in some sense. But where do they exist? They cannot, as Aristotle seemed to believe, exist in material nature. A common criticism of Aristotle's theory was that it required ends or final causes to exist "in the future" somehow. Aquinas rejects this. Therefore they must exist outside of material nature. For Aquinas, this leaves two possibilities: final causes must exist either in human minds, or some other mind. They certainly don't exist in the minds of humans, ergo, they must exist in some other mind. This other mind, he calls "God".
Aaron, welcome.
DeleteThis argument doesn't have the appearance of circularity at first glance. I think that's why so many people accept it. But it is my claim that it nevertheless contains circular reasoning.
You say "The first part of the argument is based merely on the observation that things are directed towards certain ends." But is that true? I don't observe that things are directed toward an end. I observe that things behave in patterns of regularity, but that doesn't imply that there are intentional ends involved. (And make no mistake about it, Aquinas did believe that.) In fact, if you care to look all kinds of behavior - not just things that fit the argument, you can easily observe that many instances of regular behavior don't appear to serve any beneficial purpose at all. So it seems to me that this supposed end-directedness is really an assumption. It is not an observation.
So how does this affect the argument? If you assume that things are end-directed, and you follow the logic of Aquinas, then you are really assuming that there is some intelligence defining what those ends are. Now, I suppose you will say that's what the argument concludes. But I say you couldn't make the first statement (about the observation of end-directedness) without first assuming that there IS an end, and that end couldn't exist without the intelligence that defines it. All of this must be accepted when one asserts that there is end-directedness. And on that basis, I am justified in saying that the argument is circular.
Now, Aquinas could have made a different argument. He could have observed that things appear to be directed toward an end, and then set out to prove it (somehow). But he didn't do that. He merely makes an assertion that entails the existence of God right up front. It doesn't work for me.
Thanks for the reply, im-skeptical. You said "I don't observe that things are directed toward an end. I observe that things behave in patterns of regularity, but that doesn't imply that there are intentional ends involved. (And make no mistake about it, Aquinas did believe that.)".
ReplyDeleteI suppose that this will come down to an interpretive point regarding Aquinas's intention, and honestly I'm not versed enough in Aquinas's writing to make an exegetical argument. That probably leaves us at an impasse. In defense of my interpretation I suppose all that I can say is that, by the principle of charity, I personally lean towards interpreting Thomas in a way that does not make his argument blatantly circular. And if we give him the benefit of the doubt by interpreting the first part of his argument as invoking a non-intentional conception of end-directedness, I think his argument escapes circularity.
The question of whether ends are by intention is really secondary to the question of whether they are real. Why must we assume that all things are end-directed. I can certainly see how you might think that by looking at living things, but to then extend that "observation" to everything in the world seems like a real stretch.
DeleteAs I mentioned, if you think that things are end-directed, then it becomes incumbent on you to show that that is indeed the case. Then your teleological argument will be on more solid footing.
Thanks again for the reply, im-skeptical. You wrote: "The question of whether ends are by intention is really secondary to the question of whether they are real. Why must we assume that all things are end-directed."
DeleteBecause if things were not end-directed, then we would observe chaotic behavior. To say that things are end-directed simply means that they tend to reliably produce the same outcomes. Aquinas and Aristotle saw efficient and final causality as two sides of the same coin. Efficient cause answers questions about the antecedents, final cause answers questions about the consequent. Modern science abandoned a rather crude interpretation of final cause, but if Aquinas were alive today he likely argue that final cause is implicit even within the equations of modern physics, for they include within them the information that specifies the consequent state given any set of valid antecedent states. Of course, Aquinas would reject the notion that the laws discovered by modern science are "out there" in nature, but he would claim that they have to held to exist "in some sense". For him, the mind of God is the only other viable option.
Because if things were not end-directed, then we would observe chaotic behavior. To say that things are end-directed simply means that they tend to reliably produce the same outcomes.
Delete- I don't think that's true at all. If things simply behave in accordance with physics, without any kind of ends or goals, we would see exactly what we see. That is to say, mindless laws of physics produce the world as we know it. There is no need to infer final causes. Once again, I must say that this is nothing more than a presumption on your part.
Furthermore, it seems that the goalposts have moved with regard to specifying what "ends" are. Because Aquinas and Aristotle both had living things (which develop into a certain form) in mind when they "observed" this end-directedness. Now, you are saying that the laws of physics in themselves are an expression of this concept. So now, literally every outcome is an "end", simply because the definition of "end" has been extended to mean the outcome of any cause. Everything that happens is because that was the intended goal. There are no accidents. Nothing breaks, nothing fails to thrive, no anomalous result occurs, without that being the intended outcome.
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DeleteHi im-skeptical, sorry about the deleted post, and thanks for the again for the reply. You wrote
Delete"Furthermore, it seems that the goalposts have moved with regard to specifying what "ends" are. Because Aquinas and Aristotle both had living things (which develop into a certain form) in mind when they "observed" this end-directedness."
I don’t think that it is correct to say that the goalposts have been moved. Aquinas was very consistent in claiming throughout the body of his work that efficient causality implies final causality. This was always intended to include efficient causality at the level of both living and non-living substances.
You wrote: "Now, you are saying that the laws of physics in themselves are an expression of this concept. So now, literally every outcome is an "end", simply because the definition of "end" has been extended to mean the outcome of any cause. "
Well, this is Aquinas’s claim, not mine, but yes. And again, the definition of an end hasn’t been “extended”. This was always what Aquinas had in mind when he said that efficient causality implies final causality. Aquinas didn’t have modern science when he was alive, so I am trying my best to take what he did say and apply it to that context. For Aquinas, final causes are just the various “ends” toward which various things tend. If such ends were not real, then we’d expect to see chaos and randomness all around us (in fact, we wouldn’t even be here to make any observations).
You wrote: "Everything that happens is because that was the intended goal. There are no accidents. Nothing breaks, nothing fails to thrive, no anomalous result occurs, without that being the intended outcome."
No, that is not Aquinas’s claim. He allows that chance may sometimes be involved, but it is the exception that proves the rule. That why he says “nearly always” act for an end, and contrasts it with those things that happen merely “fortuitously”. It’s actually very similar to the idea of an attractor in modern dynamical systems theory. Dynamical systems tend to stabilize around an attractor. That doesn’t mean that they always behave the same given the same circumstances, but that they tend to.
I like you. :)
DeleteI don’t think that it is correct to say that the goalposts have been moved. Aquinas was very consistent in claiming throughout the body of his work that efficient causality implies final causality.
Delete- Moving the goalpost wasn't the best way for me to describe the issue. The point is that if you start from the observation of things that seem to be acting for an end, you might infer that some things act for an end, but then you have to change the basis of that inference in order to conclude that all things act for an end.
If such ends were not real, then we’d expect to see chaos and randomness all around us (in fact, we wouldn’t even be here to make any observations).
- This raises the question of what we mean by 'end'. I think it's imperative here to say exactly what an 'end' is. We could take it to mean simply the outcome of some cause. If that is the case, then all things act toward ends, but there is no intent involved in it and final cause is not inferred, either On the other hand, if you mean to imply some kind of intent, then you can't easily make the claim that all things act (or even tend to act) toward some 'end'.
No, that is not Aquinas’s claim. He allows that chance may sometimes be involved, but it is the exception that proves the rule.
- If this is true, then the laws of physics are NOT an expression of final cause. Because those laws ALWAYS apply.
Dynamical systems tend to stabilize around an attractor. That doesn’t mean that they always behave the same given the same circumstances, but that they tend to.
- Actually, you are wrong about that. In chaotic dynamical systems, it is difficult or impossible to predict the exact behavior, but that behavior is fully deterministic, and you will always see identical behavior given identical circumstances.
Im-skeptical, thanks for another great response.
DeleteYou said: “Moving the goalpost wasn't the best way for me to describe the issue. The point is that if you start from the observation of things that seem to be acting for an end, you might infer that some things act for an end, but then you have to change the basis of that inference in order to conclude that all things act for an end.”
I don’t think I understand the objection you are making here.
You said: “This raises the question of what we mean by 'end'. I think it's imperative here to say exactly what an 'end' is. We could take it to mean simply the outcome of some cause.”
Yes, I believe that this is the best interpretation of what Aquinas was trying to say.
You said: “If that is the case, then all things act toward ends, but there is no intent involved in it and final cause is not inferred, either”
Yes, that’s correct. However, in order for something to act as a cause, it must exist in some way. So the question arises: “where do these ends exist such that they could act as the final causes of things?”.
“If this is true, then the laws of physics are NOT an expression of final cause. Because those laws ALWAYS apply.”
So, I went back to some commentary on Aquinas to see what he has to say about chance, and I think my previous statement was a misinterpretation. For Aquinas, chance events are simply the accidental intersection of non-accidental causes. So, I think Aquinas would agree that laws always apply in any cause/effect relationship. Either way, whether or not the laws apply all of the time or only some of the time isn't really relevant. In any instance where the law applies, final causality is involved.
You said: “Actually, you are wrong about that. In chaotic dynamical systems, it is difficult or impossible to predict the exact behavior, but that behavior is fully deterministic, and you will always see identical behavior given identical circumstances.”
Ok, I admit that I am not well versed in dynamical systems theory, but I thought that deterministic attractors could be embedded in non-deterministic systems and act as “dynamical sinks” for those systems. In any event, it was only intended as an analogy and, perhaps, a poor one.
At this point, I’d like to ask if you are willing to concede that perhaps Aquinas was not using a concept of “ends” that presupposed mind. While there are certainly many other objections that could be leveled at Aquinas, I really don’t think that the objection that his argument is circular because of his concept of “ends” presupposes mind, is successful.
I think that if you are not willing to concede at this point, that’s perfectly fine, but I'm not sure there's much more to be said on that particular issue. Either way I have enjoyed the discussion immensely. Thank you.
I don’t think I understand the objection you are making here.
Delete- OK. Does Aquinas observe that all things behave to achieve a determinate outcome? No. You said that he allows for exceptions. At best, you might say that things have a tendency, which would be the 'end' toward which they strive. But it is also true that there are exceptions, and clearly, we don't think that accidental things happen without cause. So there are causes that don't serve to achieve the supposed 'end' for some things. What is the justification, then, for Aquinas to say that all causes are directed toward an end? The only way you can make sense of it is to realize that the meaning of 'end' has shifted. But if that is the case, then there are no exceptions, because one 'end' or another is always the outcome. So the way I read Aquinas is that he starts out by saying that an 'end' is a goal of some kind, but ends up saying that an 'end' is any outcome of any cause.
Yes, I believe that this is the best interpretation of what Aquinas was trying to say.
- But do you agree that his initial use of the word (in this argument) is more consistent with the other meaning?
I said: “If that is the case, then all things act toward ends, but there is no intent involved in it and final cause is not inferred, either”.
You reply: Yes, that’s correct. However, in order for something to act as a cause, it must exist in some way. So the question arises: “where do these ends exist such that they could act as the final causes of things?”
- I think you are trying to justify a mind as the source of these 'ends'. But you just agreed that there is no intent implied. So how does a non-intentional outcome now transform into an intentional 'final cause'? It is a leap of logic. And the assertion that 'ends' must exist before the cause is purely ad hoc.
chance events are simply the accidental intersection of non-accidental causes.
- That's one way of explaining it. But there are two points to note here: 1) How did we make the transition from non-intentional to intentional? 2) Isn't it easier to explain if there is no intention involved?
At this point, I’d like to ask if you are willing to concede that perhaps Aquinas was not using a concept of “ends” that presupposed mind.
- But is it consistent with what he says? Read the argument again. He first uses the word 'end' in connection with "best result", which is goal oriented. He does not discuss an 'end' as being just the outcome of any cause, and I'm not reading that into his argument. But it seems to me that you are. He doesn't even make a pretense of arguing that 'ends' could be anything but goal-oriented. He simply presumes that ends are intentional goals, as is evident in the second sentence of the argument: "designedly, do they achieve their end". He is clearly saying that 'ends' are by design. Now I will admit that at this point, he has yet to "conclude" that an intelligence exists as the source of this design. But how could he conclude otherwise, given the assumptions he has already made?
To paraphrase: Things act toward ends. Ends are goals (the best result). The best result is by design. An intelligence must exist to formulate this design. Where in this argument does Aquinas ever speak of or allow for any other meaning of the word 'end'?
Thanks again for your reply.
DeleteYou said: “So there are causes that don't serve to achieve the supposed 'end' for some things. What is the justification, then, for Aquinas to say that all causes are directed toward an end? The only way you can make sense of it is to realize that the meaning of 'end' has shifted. But if that is the case, then there are no exceptions, because one 'end' or another is always the outcome. So the way I read Aquinas is that he starts out by saying that an 'end' is a goal of some kind, but ends up saying that an 'end' is any outcome of any cause.”
The way I read Aquinas on this is that things are always directed to their ends, and yet they can sometimes be frustrated from achieving those ends (see Summa Contra Gentiles 3.73.3). So when we say that Aquinas allows for exceptions, we mean only that he grants that sometimes the ends are not achieved even though they are always “aimed” for. So ends are not actual outcomes, they are the outcomes towards which things are directed if not hampered by something else along the way.
You said: “I think you are trying to justify a mind as the source of these 'ends'. But you just agreed that there is no intent implied. So how does a non-intentional outcome now transform into an intentional 'final cause'? It is a leap of logic.”
You are correct, there is still no intent implied. We’re not merely asking how an (non-intentional) end can act as a cause if it does not exist. Remember, inanimate objects Aquinas says there’s always an end toward which it is non-intentionally directed. Inanimate things do not choose their ends or have them as conscious goals. The ends toward which they are directed are implied by their nature or essence. But although these ends are implied by the essence, they are distinct from the essence. But they must exist somewhere in order to be efficacious as a cause. So where do they exist?
You said: “And the assertion that 'ends' must exist before the cause is purely ad hoc.”
I don’t think we can say that it is add hoc. What sense does it make to say that things are truly directed towards ends but that those ends do not exist in any way?
You said: “To paraphrase: Things act toward ends. Ends are goals (the best result). The best result is by design. An intelligence must exist to formulate this design. Where in this argument does Aquinas ever speak of or allow for any other meaning of the word 'end'?”
Here’s my paraphrase: Things act towards ends. If things act towards ends, those ends must exist. They don’t exist in material nature or in the immaterial minds of any finite creature. Therefore, they must exist in some other mind.
Now, this is very much a reconstruction of Thomas’s argument based off of my (and others’) understanding of his entire body of work. The thing about Aquinas’s five ways is that they were written very tersely because they were merely intended by him as brief summarizations rather than full expositions. You have to be willing to go back through the rest of Thomas’s corpus to try to reconstruct how he would have defended this argument from various objections. It makes discussing these arguments very difficult, and it makes it really easy to strawman what he says. Most people who criticize Thomas’s five ways don’t realize that their objections are answered in other places in Thomas’s writings. And, unfortunately, there’s no way to know that without spending quite a bit of time digging into commentaries, or into the writings of Aquinas himself.
Correction: in the second sentence of the fifth paragraph should read "We are NOW merely asking how a (non-intentional) end can act as a cause if it does not exist".
DeleteSo ends are not actual outcomes, they are the outcomes towards which things are directed if not hampered by something else along the way.
Delete- I don't take issue with that. Different causes may work at "cross-purposes", so to speak. But the real question we are trying to answer here is whether 'ends' are purposeful or not. I think there is no question that Aquinas thinks they are. The point to be resolved is whether that assumption exists in the first premise of his argument. There is disagreement on that point. I think it is evident in the wording of the argument.
We’re not merely asking how an (non-intentional) end can act as a cause if it does not exist. ... Aquinas says there’s always an end toward which it is non-intentionally directed. ... But they must exist somewhere in order to be efficacious as a cause. So where do they exist?
- I'm trying to understand what you are telling me. There are a couple of things that need to be unpacked. Do I see equivocation here? If an end is non-intentional, it is the (nominal, if not intended) result of a cause. But then you are saying that an end must be efficacious - meaning that is IS the cause. A cause has to be efficacious, but a result doesn't. If it is not intentional, then the result doesn't exist until it is achieved. Only if you regard the end as a conception of the outcome does it exist (in the mind that conceives it) before the result is achieved. But then, that disregards the stipulation that it is non-intentional. It seems to me that this requirement that the end must exist before the action is taken to achieve it is nothing more than an assertion that the end MUST BE intentional. This is not a conclusion. You can't say the end exists beforehand without assuming that it is conceived beforehand.
I don’t think we can say that it is add hoc. What sense does it make to say that things are truly directed towards ends but that those ends do not exist in any way?
- It makes sense if you regard 'ends' as being intentional, because they conceived by a mind. It does not make sense if you are trying to argue that 'ends' are not intentional.
The thing about Aquinas’s five ways is that they were written very tersely because they were merely intended by him as brief summarizations rather than full expositions.
- Still, words have meaning and statements carry implications. We shouldn't assume that his argument says something different from what he means.
Hi im-skeptical, thanks again for the reply.
DeleteYou said: “But the real question we are trying to answer here is whether 'ends' are purposeful or not. I think there is no question that Aquinas thinks they are.”
I continue to disagree with this interpretation. I’ll provide some additional textual evidence to support the claim that Aquinas clearly distinguished between end-directedness and purposefulness.
In Summa Contra Gentiles, Aquinas writes:
“Among inanimate things the contingency of causes is due to imperfection and deficiency, for by their nature they are determined to one result which they always achieve, unless there be some impediment arising either from a weakness of their power, or on the part of an external agent, or because of the unsuitability of their matter.”
Notice how he says that it is “by their nature” that they are determined to a particular result, not due to the conscious intention of some agent.
In De Principiis Naturae, he writes:
“Although every agent, be it natural or voluntary, tends toward an end, we should realize nonetheless that it does not follow that every agent knows or deliberates about the end.”
He later writes:
“But in natural agents (in comparison to voluntary agents) the actions are determined, hence it is not necessary to choose those things which are for the end.”
And again:
“Therefore it is possible for the natural agent to tend toward an end without deliberation; and to tend toward an end is nothing else than to have a natural inclination to something.”
I could continue quoting passages, but to me it is quite clear from that Aquinas’s concept of end-directedness did not presuppose purposiveness for natural or inanimate agents, and that there is not really any basis for interpreting his fifth way argument in such a way as to suppose he was making this presupposition.
Additionally, this is how Aquinas scholars interpret him as well. Looking at commentaries in the secondary literature by prominent Aquinas scholars, I couldn’t find anyone who interpreted him in the way you are proposing. I surveyed Feser, Oderberg, Carroll, Verschuuren, Ashley and few others, and all of them were in agreement. As Benedict Ashley writes:
“This final causality or teleology, as understood by Aristotle and Aquinas, is not some kind of conscious purpose in a body…It is nothing more than precisely this predetermination of a natural efficient cause to produce a specifically determined effect…”
For my part, I’m convinced that it is not really an open question as to how we should interpret Aquinas’s fifth way regarding this particular matter. I am willing to agree with you that the way that Aquinas worded the fifth way can be misleading. However, I think that to continue to insist on an interpretation that doesn’t square with Aquinas’s own words on the subject, or with anything written about it in the secondary literature, is uncharitable.
At this point, I think I am going to bow out of the conversation. I have very much enjoyed talking with you about these issues. I very much hope that you will continue to explore Aquinas’s work and perhaps we’ll meet again in a future post.
Take care.
Aaron, I understand that the ends may not be the intention of the agent that acts. But nevertheless, Aquinas does think they are the intention of the mind that conceives them. In the case of natural objects, their nature is the design God, and it is God who conceives the ends. That's what this argument is saying. I thought that was well understood.
DeleteAaron,
ReplyDeleteI definitely agree with your interpretation of the Fifth Way. I'm inclined to accept this partially for the sake of charity towards Aquinas, but also because I've never seen anyone else make im-skeptical's claim of the Fifth Way being circular before- atheist or theist. I've even done Google searches for others who have said this, and I have found absolutely none. I'd assume that, if this argument was as blatantly circular as im-skeptical claims, some other atheist would have discovered it already: J.L. Mackie, Bertrand Russel, Richard Dawkins, and Graham Oppy have all looked at the five ways, and none of them made this observation, nor has any other atheistic blogger studying Aquinas- trust me, I would have seen it if they had- just to name a few. There are also those who have studied this argument and teleology extensively, like Bonnette (a PhD.), Feser (a PhD.), Brian Davies (PhD.), Alexander Pruss (PhD.), David Oderberg (PhD.- I think?) and Clarke, all of whom very much take Aquinas' statement of "things acting for an end" as referring to regularity among things, rather than intentional ends directed by God. For the record, I've even talked to ficino4ml (the other commenter on this thread) about this elsewhere, and he agrees with us too, Aaron. So it does seem that im-skeptical is alone on this one.
It is true that Aquinas believed in end-directedness as done by God, as do all Thomists, but that truly is a consequence of this argument- not an assumption. And, again, I'm inclined to agree with the centuries of research on the Fifth Way- in which no philosopher (or even another atheist blogger- trust me, I'd know if they had!) has ever stated that the Fifth Way is circular- over someone who states they aren't even formally educated in philosophy beyond Phil 101, and who has not exactly been charitable to those he disagrees with in the past (you may want to see his discussions with fellow atheist Tim O'Neill, for instance).
Scott Lynch (a frequent commenter on Feser's blog), myself, and you have all explained what appears, given all of the evidence and research on the Fifth Way, to be Aquinas' definition of end-directedness, to im-skeptical. He does not agree with our definition. As you said, the discussion simply comes to an impasse. Oh well, we agree to disagree.
That being said, I don't mean this to talk down to im-skeptical, but like you, I'm trying not to tip-toe around disagreeing with you anymore. Regardless, I hope you're doing well.
There are also those who have studied this argument and teleology extensively, like Bonnette (a PhD.), Feser (a PhD.), Brian Davies (PhD.), Alexander Pruss (PhD.), David Oderberg (PhD.- I think?) and Clarke ...
Delete- It it certainly not surprising that Thomists agree with Aquinas. But please explain again how you get from regularity to end-directedness without just assuming it. That is the part that eludes me. I have yet to hear any of these experts make the logical connection.
And please don't tip-toe. If we disagree, that is usually what makes for interesting discussion (as long as you are willing to participate in discussion). I don't think I have treated you badly. Nor anyone else, for that matter, who hasn't already set the tone. (The way I responded to Scott Lynch when he started getting unpleasant was simply to stop answering him.) I do think you might be a bit over-sensitive.
My last comment really had nothing to do with my sensitivity or lack thereof. It's just not relevant- I was simply trying to be nice by telling you I'm not trying to talk down to you, since I knew the way Scott Lynch talked to you bothered you. If you don't care about that, fine.
DeleteAlso, you mentioned that it's unsurprising that Thomists agree with Aquinas, but made no mention of no atheist philosopher ever thinking the Fifth Way is circular. Or no atheist blogger ever (other than you) thinking the Fifth Way is circular. Or that even Ficino agrees with me on this. That is the more important issue here; much more important than my sensitivity!
Would you not think that at least one other atheist blogger or philosopher looking at this argument for the past seven centuries would have realized your conclusion? Or, even a theistic contemporary? (Keep in mind that, when St. Anselm of Canterbury developed his Ontological Argument, his contemporary monk Gaunilo of Marmoutiers objected during his lifetime- then, Aquinas objected strongly to it as well! So theists are clearly not incapable of fact-checking one another.) You are smart, but I would hope you don't think you're smarter than every atheist and every theist who has ever looked at this argument. It would simply be embarrassing if literally no one else noticed this- for over seven centuries!
Anyways, Clarke's argument does go from regularity in nature to end-directedness. You have stated previously that you have no reason to accept the argument because you do not accept PSR. That's irrelevant to a discussion about circular reasoning, however. That's why I told you to stay focused earlier.
You can read the rest of the argument in the comments above, but I can't retype it in this comment or it'll be too long.
Let's look at Clarke's word choice- "interiorly determined or focused," since this seems to be where things get off track. Here, Clarke is not stating that God endows things with purpose before actually showing God's existence. He is instead saying that, if things do not act with patterns of regularity, they would not act at all. You can tell this given the context of the argument and its discussion of effects having sufficient reason in their cause, rather than Clarke immediately saying that God has to direct these things. Clarke's definition goes along with what Scott Lynch, Bonnette, Feser, Davies, Pruss, Clarke, Ficino, Mackie, Oppy, Dawkins, Russel, me, and Aaron all agree on. You mention implicit premises in the argument, and I understand what you mean by this. You say that, for a thing to be directed to an end, you must assume a director- God. So, you say that, since this is the first premise of the argument, the argument assumes the existence of God before showing God exists, so it's circular reasoning. I get that. But, where your understanding is lacking is that no Thomist is actually saying this. When Aquinas says things act for an end, he is saying they act with patterns of regularity. That's what Clarke means here too. If gravity on Earth didn't always cause things to fall to the Earth, but sometimes propelled them forwards, then this would be a counter example to what Clarke means. But, since gravity acts in such a way consistently, Clarke says this shows that the effect must find its origin (or reason) in its cause. I think you can follow the argument to final causality from there, and that our definition of end-directedness is the problem.
If I have misrepresented you, please tell me. Otherwise, I truly think you should take another, more charitable look at the Fifth Way.
I've never seen anyone else make im-skeptical's claim of the Fifth Way being circular before- atheist or theist
Delete- I was intrigued by this statement. Surely I am not the only one who sees this. But in fact there are a number of philosophers who have said the Fifth Way begs the question. Perhaps you are not aware that begging the question is a form of circular reasoning. (See here.) I looked at my copy of Oppy's Arguing About Gods, and I see that he never explicitly comments on the Fifth Way in that book. He does note that Mackie calls various teleological arguments question-begging. I also found this Article by Antony Flew that explicitly addresses the Fifth Way. Flew also finds it to be question-begging.
I would need more examples than just Flew's to conclude that philosophers have seen the Fifth Way as circular reasoning *in the same way you have.* You seem to be drifting back into other criticisms of the Fifth Way.
DeleteHere is what I could find from Mackie's objections to arguments from design... no mention of circular reasoning here. http://www.leaderu.com/offices/koons/docs/lec17.html
Look at this quote from Flew:
"I shudder to imagine Topsy's reaction had anyone drawn her attention to this argument. For Aquinas is confidently offering all those apparently teleological phenomena which to all appearance proceed without "the direction of someone with awareness and with understanding" as premises from which to derive the contradictory conclusion that "Everything in nature ... is directed to its goal by someone with understanding." He too is taking as premises for his argument to (supernatural) design what ought instead to be seen-absent revelation to the contrary-as conclusions about what actually occurs, and hence what is naturally possible, without supernatural contrivance."
So it seems that even Anthony Flew agrees that Aquinas isn't starting out the argument by assuming God, even if he ultimately thinks the argument is question begging. (At the very worst, Flew thinks that Aquinas adds in his own extrapolation- but he actually makes it clear that he agrees with the definition literally everyone else uses.) Ficino, for example, also agrees with our definition of things "working to an end" as regularity in nature, but still thinks that the Fifth Way has steps that are question begging a-la Flew. The positions are not mutually exclusive.
Here is Ficino's critique of the Fifth Way. Which apparently you've seen before, seeing as you're in the comments of it, discussing your own conclusion of the Fifth Way that no philosopher in history has had before. https://www.patheos.com/blogs/tippling/2019/01/06/deconstructing-aquinas-fifth-way-the-first-fallacies/
Ficino says, "As far as I can see, the Fifth contains a) a bifurcation fallacy and b) question-begging steps." Ficino agrees with Flew on pretty much everything related to this argument. He says it does question-beg. But, if this is the case, wouldn't you think he'd agree with you on your conclusion if it's so evident? Is Ficino, who has a PhD. and has actually studied Aquinas, unable to find blatant circular reasoning that someone who isn't formally educated in Philosophy beyond Phil 101 is?
Can you find any philosopher or blogger who has claimed in the past 700 years that the Fifth Way to be circular reasoning in the same way you have?
I would need more examples than just Flew's to conclude that philosophers have seen the Fifth Way as circular reasoning *in the same way you have.* You seem to be drifting back into other criticisms of the Fifth Way.
Delete- First, you stated: "I've even done Google searches for others who have said this, and I have found absolutely none. I'd assume that, if this argument was as blatantly circular as im-skeptical claims, some other atheist would have discovered it already". Well it turns out that you didn't really search hard enough, because I spent a few minutes looking for an example, and I found it. Second, if others find the argument to be question-begging, that means that the conclusion of the argument is stated or assumed within the argument. That's EXACTLY what I have asserted. Are you now demanding that they also must word their objections in exactly the same way I have?
Here is what I could find from Mackie's objections to arguments from design
- This is not what Mackie said about Aquinas' Fifth Way. That is the one and only teleological argument that My article was addressing. And I think it would be rather pointless to name a litany of philosophers who never made a particular statement about the Fifth Way if they weren't even speaking about the Fifth Way in the first place.
So it seems that even Anthony Flew agrees that Aquinas isn't starting out the argument by assuming God, even if he ultimately thinks the argument is question begging.
- I don't think you are reading Flew (or me) correctly. In the passage you quoted, it says: "He too is taking as premises for his argument to (supernatural) design what ought instead to be seen-absent revelation to the contrary-as conclusions about what actually occurs, and hence what is naturally possible, without supernatural contrivance." That is very much the same point that I made. The argument assumes God.
Ficino, for example, also agrees with our definition of things "working to an end" as regularity in nature, but still thinks that the Fifth Way has steps that are question begging a-la Flew.
- So now, it becomes apparent that you think I define terms in a different manner than the rest of the world. No, I don't. I agree that the argument says what it says, and that it equates "ends" with the regular behavior that things exhibit. Perhaps my point was too subtle. What I objected to is the notion that it is logically valid make the leap from regular behavior to end-directedness. Is that not the same thing that Flew was saying? Here is what Ficino said: "the ambiguity of “best” in “so as to attain that which is best” leads to a question-begging step. In fact, there are many cases where natural things in the broad sense, ... fail to actualize their form." That is a comment about the regular behavior of things. So yes, his take on it is entirely consistent with what I said. He can't swallow the logical leap from regular behavior to end-directedness, and he thinks that that is begging the question. We are in complete agreement. I must say, I don't understand what you think I said that is so out of line either Flew or Ficino.
Ficino, who has a PhD. and has actually studied Aquinas, unable to find blatant circular reasoning that someone who isn't formally educated in Philosophy beyond Phil 101 is?
- Appeal to authority is not a valid argument.
Can you find any philosopher or blogger who has claimed in the past 700 years that the Fifth Way to be circular reasoning in the same way you have?
- Yes, and I showed it to you. What more do you need?
I'm going to ask Ficino for his comments on this. Whether or not he obliges is his choice. I don't think that us going back and forth like this will be a productive use of time. I disagree with your interpretation of what Flew said. Oh well.
DeleteYou claim that you and Ficino are in complete agreement, just like you claim that you didn't disagree with anything Dr. Bonnette had to say in his article on the Fifth Way. You were wrong before, and you're wrong again. Here was what Ficino said to me when I asked him, directly, if he agreed with you about the Fifth Way (that it is circular): "As for the Fifth as it stands in the ST, I think there are question-begging steps in it, but I would not say that the conclusion is contained in the first premise, so no, I'm not prepared to say the whole argument is circular. I think Aquinas first tries to establish that there is final causality in nature, and then at a subsequent stage of the arg he tries to establish that final causality entails an intelligent governor."
Then, later, he said, "Without repeating things, I'll just say I don't think the argument is one big circular argument. But I don't find it convincing."
So, clearly there's something you don't understand about Ficino's position here.
I will refrain from using appeal to authority again.
You claim that you and Ficino are in complete agreement, just like you claim that you didn't disagree with anything Dr. Bonnette had to say in his article on the Fifth Way.
DeleteI think you should take more care (and be a bit more charitable) in interpreting the things I say. As far as I can tell, Ficino and I are in agreement on the point that I discussed, but I wouldn't go so far as to claim that we are in complete agreement on everything regarding our analysis of the Fifth Way. And with regard to Bonnette, I NEVER said I didn't disagree with him. I said I was not taking issue (in that particular discussion) with what he said. I made that clear, and repeated it several times.
That said, Ficino does say that the Fifth way contains question-begging steps. "I identify three steps in the Fifth where work is done by a question-begging move: i) “attain that which is best;” ii) “not unless directed by something intelligent;” iii) a single “God.”" To be honest, I don't know the difference between an argument that contains a question-begging step and an argument that begs the question. I don't think there is a difference, but perhaps that is something we are not in complete agreement on.
I don't think that Aquinas' conclusion, "there exists something intelligent, by which all natural things are ordered toward an end," is contained in his first premise, sc. "if things lacking cognition operate always or for the most part in the same way, they operate for the sake of an end." But I think that this and other premises beg the question. So in my view we are under no logical compulsion to assent to Aquinas' conclusion.
ReplyDeleteThank you for commenting!
DeleteI disagree with it, but I'm much more fine with people taking this stance- since, from here, you can facilitate actual deep discussion on the Fifth Way. The only thing I really want people to reject is that Aquinas' conclusion is based in his first premise.
That Aquinas' conclusion is contained in his first premise was what I was talking about when I said that I had never seen another blogger or philosopher say it- I had seen people say the Fifth Way has question-begging steps, because I had read Ficino's article on the Fifth Way! Clearly, one can say the argument has question begging steps without saying, as im-skeptical has, that the first premise contains the conclusion. That is what Ficino says, and what I think Flew agrees on.
im-sceptical is correct.
DeleteAquinas is using the Aristotelian method of practical reasoning. Aquinas first premise does contain his conclusion.
Aquinas is saying if ends behave in the same way they operate for an end. Aquinas is stating that If P really implies Q and if P is known (to this person of perfect logical wisdom), then Q will all ready be known also; and no argument will have any effect, since its conclusion will all ready be known as soon as the premises are.
What you believe are question begging steps are simply manifestations of logical propositions being used as empirical propositions at the same time.
"if things lacking cognition operate always or for the most part in the same way, they operate for the sake of an end."
Delete- If that is what you see as the first premise, then I would agree that it is not question-begging in its own right. And of course it may be reasonable to see it that way. But I can't ignore the other part of that first sentence: "so as to obtain the best result." I regard this as part of the first premise, which changes the picture. It is no longer merely an argument to establish that things act for ends, but rather to establish that they act for meaningful goals (which are seen as the "best result"). And that assumes that the 'end' is something more than just any outcome that would result from the laws of physics.
I may be guilty of getting ahead of the argument by seeing the implication of a premise before it is addressed in the argument, just don't see how you can say that the first sentence of the argument is free of any assumption of cognition.
im-skeptical
DeleteAnd that assumes that the 'end' is something more than just any outcome that would result from the laws of physics.
A quantified outcome satisfies the laws of physics has meaning to you. All you are saying is that the meaning is zero-sum. So, you are in agreement with Aquinas.
Hello im-skeptical, re this of yours: " But I can't ignore the other part of that first sentence: "so as to obtain the best result." I regard this as part of the first premise, which changes the picture. It is no longer merely an argument to establish that things act for ends, but rather to establish that they act for meaningful goals (which are seen as the "best result")."
DeleteI think one of the problems is, how do we standardize Aquinas' argument in the Fifth. I take the "so as to obtain the best result" as part of another premise. I.e. If they operate in the same way, they operate so as to obtain the best." I suspect that there can be legitimate disagreements over how to standardize the Fifth - which is part of the difficulty it occasions.
There is no difficulty in standardising the Fifth.
Deletecommunicate = so as to obtain the best result
Objects communicate with each other, i.e. the universe is a participatory universe, objects interacting with each other, i.e. communicating creates theoretic knowledge.
This is what Aquinas is intimating in non-formal language.
It isn't really that difficult... I mean, come on... Aquinas is from the 12th century....
Ficino:
Deletethere can be legitimate disagreements over how to standardize the Fifth
- I think you're right.
Philip Rand:
A quantified outcome satisfies the laws of physics has meaning to you. All you are saying is that the meaning is zero-sum. So, you are in agreement with Aquinas.
- An outcome can have meaning to me if I think about it. An 'end', as discussed in this argument, can have meaning to someone as the designer of the action. If I intend to make a sandwich, I am thinking of that before I make it. It is my goal. The sandwich is the 'end', and it means I am going to have something good to eat. Making the sandwich is the action I take to fulfill that goal.
One can say that all outcomes are ends, as in "the end of a rock falling from a mountainside is to rest on the ground". But that definition seems problematic, because causes always cascade upon one another, and there is never a final outcome. In nature, there are only states of affairs that always change from one moment to the next.
But that definition seems problematic, because causes always cascade upon one another, and there is never a final outcome.
DeleteNo. The definition is not problematic; it is exact. What you have described above is zero-sum; and that is the final outcome... it is always the final outcome.
In nature, there are only states of affairs that always change from one moment to the next.
This state of affairs is always zero-sum.
"if things lacking cognition operate always or for the most part in the same way, they operate for the sake of an end."
ReplyDeleteThe above statement can be demonstrated to be empirically true.
A deterministic relationship between communicating objects does exist that is unvarying.
The conclusion does not beg the question.
Philip Rand: "Aquinas is saying if ends behave in the same way they operate for an end."
ReplyDeleteNegative. Ends do not behave in any way whatsoever.
Ficino
DeleteYour statement is a double-negative; you prove Aquinas.
You are either a troll or a person not grounded in Aristotle.
DeleteFicino
DeleteI know Aristotle better than you do... and I am not scientifically naive as you appear to be.
Ficino
DeleteFor example, in Aristotelian terms examine the possible ends:
1/ Voluntary
2/ Non-voluntary
3/ Involuntary
Now, what you look for is a consistent formal relationship that quantifies the above... if you can locate one you have a quantifiable end.
Aaron, if you are still following this thread... above you wrote:
Delete"it's impossible for things to be directed towards ends (final causes) unless those ends can be said to exist in some sense. But where do they exist? They cannot, as Aristotle seemed to believe, exist in material nature. A common criticism of Aristotle's theory was that it required ends or final causes to exist "in the future" somehow. Aquinas rejects this. Therefore they must exist outside of material nature."
I have seen this defense of the Fifth made by various Thomists over the last century, from Garrigou-Lagrange to Feser and Bonnette et al. I have not, however, come across a passage in Aquinas' works where the saint explicitly argues that the final cause or end "must exist in some way" before the operation begins (or even at the time when the operation begins) in order to have causal power.
Do you know of a passage in the corpus Thomisticum where Aquinas formulates the above premise/claim, sc. that the end or final cause "must exist in some way" before a natural body begins its operation?
Hi ficino4ml,
DeleteThanks for the question. Unfortunately, I don't know the corpus well enough to say whether Aquinas explicitly states this anywhere. I did some cursory searching, but didn't turn anything up.
However, I personally think that it is implied by at least three other considerations: (1) the fact that Aquinas held that final causes were the cause of all the other causes, (2) that in order for anything to be causally efficacious it must be in act with respect to whatever it effects and (3) the fact that the paradigmatic case of final causality is the one where a "voluntary" agent intends some end and, as such, the final cause exists in the intention or mind of the agent.
Given the above, I find it very, very difficult to believe that Aquinas would have denied that ends must (in some way) exist prior to (or at the very least contemporaneously with) the efficient cause that is directed to that end. So again, the question simply becomes "where do they exist if not in material nature?"
Again, I do not really see this as being an open question regarding the interpretation of Aquinas, and neither do any of the scholars who seem to know his work the best. I personally don't buy the argument that Aquinas scholars are just reading this onto him in order to make the argument stronger, as it seems to be directly implied from other things he wrote on the subject.
My understanding is that five ways were written in a very terse style and were only intended as brief summaries. The full logic behind them (unfortunately) has to be reconstructed from what Aquinas wrote regarding these topics in other places in his corpus. It's only right that the principle of charity be applied to his work as we proceed down that path.
Hello Aaron, thank you for your answer.
ReplyDeleteAs to this of yours: "Given the above, I find it very, very difficult to believe that Aquinas would have denied that ends must (in some way) exist prior to (or at the very least contemporaneously with) the efficient cause that is directed to that end."
Of course, Aquinas thought that the end does exist in the divine mind, and that God governs the operations of things that lack cognition, so that they attain the end that is in God's intellect. So yes, Aquinas would not have denied the "end preexists in a mind" thesis!
As I have written elsewhere, I don't think the argument as written in the Fifth is valid. In other writings, Aquinas gives an argument of improved logic, and With (what I think may be later) supplements like the "must preexist in some way" premise, the argument is much stronger. For all of that, though, I don't think it is successful, because some of its steps don't seem to be sufficiently supported.
This writing of Aquinas is what you want:
DeleteSOLUTIO. Respondeo dicendum, quod esse in aliquo diversimode convenit spiritualibus et corporalibus: quia corpus est in aliquo ut contentum, sicut vinum est in vase; sed spiritualis substantia est in aliquo ut continens et conservans. Cujus ratio est, quia corporale per essentiam suam, quae circumlimitata est quantitatis terminis, determinatum est ad locum, et per consequens virtus et operatio ejus in loco est; sed spiritualis substantia quae omnino absoluta a situ et quantitate est, habet essentiam non omnino circumlimitatam loco. Unde non est in loco nisi per operationem, et per consequens virtus et essentia ejus in loco est.
Dicendum est ergo, quod si esse in hoc loco sumatur secundum quod corpus in loco esse dicitur; sic non convenit Deo esse ubique nisi metaphorice; quia implet locum sicut corpus locatum, non quidem distantia dimensionum, sed causalitate effectuum. Si autem accipiatur esse in loco per modum quo substantia spiritualis in aliquo esse dicitur; sic propriissime Deo in loco esse convenit, et ubique et non quidem ut mensuratum loco, sed ut dans loco naturam locandi et continendi; sicut dicitur esse in homine inquantum dat homini naturam humanitatis: et in qualibet re esse dicitur inquantum dat rebus proprium esse et naturam.
Et per hoc patet responsio ad duo prima et ad auctoritatem Anselmi, et etiam ad quintum, quae procedunt secundum modum quo corpus in loco esse dicitur. Ad quartum dicendum, quod indivisibile secundum successionem dicitur dupliciter. Vel illud quod omnino absolutum est a successione, ut indivisibile negative sumatur, sicut aeternitas: et tale indivisibile potest esse in diversis temporibus, immo in omni tempore; quia "nunc" aeternitatis invariatum adest omnibus partibus temporis. Vel illud quod est successionis terminus, ut instans temporis, et quidquid per illud instans mensuratur; et hoc non potest esse in pluribus temporibus. Similiter indivisibile secundum dimensionem dicitur dupliciter. Vel illud quod omnino absolutum est a dimensione, sicut substantia spiritualis; et hoc non est inconveniens in omnibus vel pluribus locis esse. Vel quod est terminus dimensionis, ut punctus: et hoc, quia determinatum est ad situm, non potest in pluribus locis esse; et ideo, relicta imaginatione, indivisibilitas substantiae incorporeae, ut Dei, vel angeli, vel animae, vel etiam materiae, sicut indivisibilitas puncti non cogitetur: quia, ut dicit Boetius, lib. I De Trin., c. II, oportet in intellectualibus non deduci ad imaginationem.
Aquinas modifies Aristotle's concept of potency. Aquinas & Aristotle concept of potency are not the same.