Thursday, August 16, 2018

The Falsification Challenge


The philosopher Antony Flew adopted the scientific falsification principle in thinking about religious belief.  That principle asserts that for any hypothesis to have credence, it must be disprovable (or falsifiable), before it can become accepted as a scientific hypothesis or theory.  According to Flew, the same line of reasoning should apply to religious beliefs.  For any given statement of faith, one should not be expected to accept its truth unless that statement has a level of credence that is afforded by the ability to verify that it is consistent with observed reality.  Flew used a parable to illustrate his point:

Once upon a time two explorers came upon a clearing in the jungle. In the clearing were growing many flowers and many weeds. One explorer says, “Some gardener must tend this plot.” So they pitch their tents and set a watch. No gardener is ever seen. “But perhaps he is an invisible gardener.” So they set up a barbed-wire fence. They electrify it. They patrol with bloodhounds. (For they remember how H. G. Wells’ The Invisible Man could be both smelt and touched though he could not be seen.) But no shrieks ever suggest that some intruder has received a shock. No movements of the wire ever betray an invisible climber. The bloodhounds never give cry. Yet still the Believer is not convinced. “But there is a gardener, invisible, intangible, insensible to electric shocks, a gardener who has no scent and makes no sound, a gardener who comes secretly to look after the garden which he loves.” At last the Skeptic despairs, “But what remains of your original assertion? Just how does what you call an invisible, intangible, eternally elusive gardener differ from an imaginary gardener or even from no gardener at all?” - Antony Flew [Theology and Falsification]
Like the Believer in this parable, religionists refuse to be convinced of the futility of their faith by the lack of any meaningful way to verify those beliefs.  They even go so far as to turn the tables on skeptics, arguing that it is the skeptic who is stubbornly resistant to evidence.  We see this with Victor Reppert, who has made this accusation against scientist and professor Peter Atkins, who is renowned for his stance on the incompatibility of science and religion.  Reppert claims that he has failed Flew's falsification challenge in this post: Hey, whatever happened to the falsification challenge, which presents a short video clip wherein Atkins supposedly denies that any evidence could ever convince him that there is a God.  I urge readers to listen carefully to this video.  It is only about 3 minutes long.

At first glance, it might appear that Victor is correct.  But a more careful viewing reveals something different.  Atkins is being badgered by two religionists on the topic of what kind of evidence for God would he find convincing.  They insist on putting words in his mouth (to the effect that he could never be convinced by any evidence), and refuse to listen to what he's actually saying.  Atkins actually starts out by giving an example of a kind of evidence that might be persuasive to him - like a modern scientific equation appearing unequivocally in the bible - long before mankind had that kind of scientific knowledge.  But the interviewers ignore that example, and steer the discussion to what kind of evidence found in nature or in the universe would be convincing.  And since Atkins finds no convincing evidence in nature, they assert that he simply refuses to accept any evidence at all - even in principle.

The interviewers suggest a scenario where the stars change position in the sky to spell out "Peter, please believe in me".  And Atkins responds, "I'd put it down to madness."  This gives the interviewers the opening they're looking for.  They insist that he wouldn't accept any evidence of any kind, despite the fact that he already gave an example of evidence that he would accept.  At this point, they're talking about two different things.  Atkins is trying to respond to the question that was asked - about evidence found in nature, and the interviewers have shifted to the assertion that he would deny evidence at all, due to a supposed a-priori commitment in atheism.

It is important to understand just what Atkins is saying.  Why does he think the alignment of the stars would be chalked up to madness?  It's not because of an a-priori commitment to atheism.  Rather, it's because there could never be any such thing in a world where the laws of physics apply, and all the evidence he has ever seen tells him that those laws do apply.  It would turn his understanding of the natural world upside-down.  No such thing has ever happened before, and he has very good reason to predict that no such thing ever will happen, which is what he tells them, and they attempt to turn that into an unjustified ideological stance.  But that reason is based entirely on evidence.

The interviewers continue to insist that Atkins has this a-priori commitment, and that he would reject any and all evidence that might support belief in God.  But this is dishonest, particularly because he denies the position they are trying to pin on him - not once, but twice.  And all that comes after he already spoke about evidence that he would find convincing.  One must ask, why are they so keen on ignoring what he says, and putting their own words into his mouth?

It is also important to note that the scenario of stars aligning in the sky is purely hypothetical.  It has never happened before, and Atkins is on fairly solid ground in predicting that it never will.  The religionists can't point to any real evidence of that sort, because they don't have any.  All they can do is play a game of "but what if ..."  We shouldn't lose sight of the fact that the evidence that we can see in our world doesn't provide justification for a skeptic to believe in anything supernatural, and it is the religionists, not Atkins, who have an a-priori commitment.  They are the ones who deny the actual observed evidence.

As for the falsification challenge posed by Flew, Atkins has certainly not failed it, as Reppert asserts.  He hasn't been shown anything that actually falsifies naturalism.  A hypothetical scenario that goes against everything we know about nature certainly doesn't fit the bill.  Would it make more sense to forget about all the evidence we have ever seen, and drop our understanding of how things work in the world, or to think that this one-time vision (should we ever encounter such a thing) would more probably be a delusion?  The religionists completely miss the point that Atkins is making.  Not that they were ever interested in hearing it in the first place.  Because in their case at least, there really is nothing that would ever sway them from their own a-priori commitment.

7 comments:

  1. I continue to see another theistic reply to a falsification challenge. In this, the theist replies that it is a category mistake to treat metaphysical propositions as though they are scientific theories. The theist will say that metaphysics is the discipline to which belong questions about the existence of God, and they will say that metaphysical truths are necessary truths. But necessary truths in principle are not open to tests for falsification, because those truths must be premises already of any scientific system that would propose a test.

    I think a version of this reply is sketched by Edward Feser here, though I'm sure you've seen it made in many other places:

    "Physicists themselves, including Krauss and Hawking, do not treat the laws of physics as if they were either logically necessary or a brute fact. They regard such laws as empirically testable, which would make no sense if they were logically necessary (i.e., the sort of thing the denial of which would entail a contradiction). If they can in principle be falsified , then they are not necessary." ~ "Fifty Shades of Nothing," First Things July 24, 2013

    https://www.firstthings.com/web-exclusives/2013/07/fifty-shades-of-nothing

    When pushed, it seems to me that Feser and other "classical theists" rely on a conditional necessity argument of the kind, "if X is to be intelligible, then metaphysical principles A etc. are necessary truths." But how do we know that "X is intelligible"? If the theist replies, I just told you, X is intelligible because A etc are true, then the theist is affirming the consequent.

    So far I'm not seeing a way to falsify metaphysical propositions if we're not allowed to use observations in our evaluation. But what other courses remain other than 1) dismissing said metaphysical propositions; 2) poking around to try to find implications of one metaphysical proposition that generate a contradiction with another metaphysical proposition; 3) pick a metaphysics for its elegance or whatever.

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    1. The theist will say that metaphysics is the discipline to which belong questions about the existence of God, and they will say that metaphysical truths are necessary truths.
      - It is interesting to see how they use this branch of philosophy to provide justification for their belief in things that are not observable. In my own view, metaphysics is about what kind of things exist, which may or may not include things like gods, but also includes those aspects of reality that underly scientific understanding. So, for example, if science postulates the existence of various kinds of forces, particles, and other phenomena, those things become part of the scientist's metaphysical view of the world. This is equivalent to Aristotle's postulation of prime movers, forms, act and potency, or the Thomists' postulation of essences and God. The ongoing changes in metaphysical systems that accompany our evolving scientific understanding are discussed in Burtt's Metpahysical Foundations of Modern Science. The point is that metaphysical systems always follow what we observe and believe about the reality of our world. It is false to assert that metaphysics comes first, and everything else follows from it. It is equally false to say that Aquinas didn't believe in God until he derived it from his metaphysical understanding.

      But this belies any notion of the necessary truth of metaphysical principles. Metaphysics is a reflection of what we believe. And if we believe that God exists, and we define God as a necessary being, then it becomes possible to claim that metaphysics expresses necessary truths. And then one might claim that metaphysics holds an untouchable and privileged status in the hierarchy of knowledge. But it is worth noting that metaphysical views of reality can and do change when we allow observation to affect and modify our understanding of the world. Quantum physics has provided a perfect illustration of this, because it entails a whole new understanding of how things work at the base level. On the other hand, to assert any kind of unyielding permanence and unquestionable truth in metaphysics is to assert that one's own beliefs are built on a solid foundation that is beyond question and not subject to change. They bolster their position by asserting that logic itself is not just a reflection of physical reality, but is part of this necessary metaphysical truth, along with their unwavering stance that the Principal of Sufficient Reason is an undeniable and necessary metaphysical truth. And in so doing, they cement their assertions of the necessity of God, as we can clearly see in Feser's article.

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  2. Adding: another making a similar attack on attempts to falsify is Michael Hayes, "Aquinas' Fifth Way and the Possibility of Science," in Revisiting Aquinas' Proofs for the Existence of God, ed. R. Arp (Brill: 2016) p. 215:

    "... the very possibility of scientific knowledge that is often used in attempts to discredit Aquinas' argument and others like it is precisely what grounds Aquinas' 'Fifth Way' in the first place."

    And so on from many others.

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  3. I wrote what I wrote because I was imagining a contemporary follower of Feser saying, maybe some religious assertions can be falsified, but the metaphysical propositions that underlie classical theism cannot in principle be "falsified." That's because scientific hypotheses are prey to falsification in Flew's sense, but metaphysical principles are not. Metaphysical principles are epistemologically prior to scientific inquiries.

    I've read a good deal of Burtt's book, which you cite above. Even Burtt ends up lamenting the banishment of formal and final causes after Galileo. Didn't Burtt's student, Alexandre Koyre, promote a kind of theistic science cum metaphysics?

    I don't go along with a theistic science cum metaphysics. Defenses of final causality seem question-begging, as far as I can see now. But do you expand the targets of Flew's falsification project beyond particular religious beliefs to include metaphysical systems - A-T in particular? Try saying "quantum physics shows us that A-T is false" and you're immediately deluged with a flood of accusations of "scientism alert, category mistake!"

    I've only been on your blog a short time, so if you've gone into reasons to reject A-T, I'd appreciate reading such earlier posts.

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    1. I haven't made a comprehensive compendium of reasons to reject Thomism. But I have written a number of articles that discuss specific aspects of it. Type 'Thomism' into the search bar at top.

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  4. I just discovered your "Big Problem With Thomism." Settling down to read it.

    http://theskepticzone.blogspot.com/2015/08/the-big-problem-with-thomism-edward.html#more

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