Thursday, February 25, 2016

Hempel's Contrived Dilemma


I see that there is some discussion at Victor's blog about what a problem Hempel has identified for physicalists or materialists.  Of course, Victor, being one who presupposes the immaterial nature of mind, thinks that Hempel was on to something with his supposed dilemma for materialists in defining what is physical.  Hempel's Dilemma is commonly cited by philosophers of mind, especially those who reject materialism in favor of unscientific theories involving ghostly beings or deities.  They believe that it presents a real problem for the physicalist.  I believe that it presents a case of flawed philosophical thinking, and I'll explain why.

Hempel noted that physicalism is the ontological thesis that everything in nature is physical.  It is reasonable, then, to ask what constitutes the physical.  If it is defined in terms of physics, we could say that the physical is whatever is explained by physics.  And that leads us to the dilemma.  Current physics is incomplete, so it would be unreasonable to conclude that the physical is limited to our current understanding of physical law.  On the other hand, we could assume a complete understanding of physical law that might theoretically be achieved at some future time, and define the physical in terms of that.  But if we do so, we really don't know what it entails.  So the definition of physical is either incomplete or devoid of meaning.

This makes the purveyors of immaterial woo very happy, of course.  If a physicalist can't even provide a satisfactory definition of "physical", there is obviously something wrong with physicalism, they say.  Break out the champagne bottles.  But I would caution them to reconsider the issue.  First, an unsatisfactory definition of physical adds absolutely no support to their case for the immaterial.  Scientists and philosophers who adhere to physicalism have not exactly thrown in the towel on their belief.  More to the point, this definition of physical is unsatisfactory, not because it poses an absurd dilemma, but because it has been wrongly defined.

Let us first understand what we mean by "physical law".
A physical law or scientific law "is a theoretical statement inferred from particular facts, applicable to a defined group or class of phenomena, and expressible by the statement that a particular phenomenon always occurs if certain conditions be present." Physical laws are typically conclusions based on repeated scientific experiments and observations over many years and which have become accepted universally within the scientific community. - Wikipedia
This description of physical law states that it is based on observation and experimentation.  It goes without saying that the things we observe and what we conduct experiments upon are physical things.  They are things that can be observed, detected, or measured. 

We might choose to define physics as "the natural science that involves the study of that which is the subject of physics", but that definition would be unsatisfactory because it is circular and it doesn't describe what the subject of physics really is.  But there is some reality of nature that is the subject of physics, nevertheless.  And this points to the true problem at the heart of Hempel's Dilemma.  His definition of "physical" no less circular.  A better definition of physical might be "entities or phenomena that are detectable or observable to the senses".  If we use that in our definition of physics, it becomes "the natural science that involves the study of entities or phenomena that are detectable or observable to the senses".  This makes much more sense.

The truth of the matter is that physical reality exists independent of our study or understanding of it.  We don't have a complete understanding of physical reality, and we probably never will.  But regardless of any understanding we might eventually achieve, it has no effect on what that reality is.  If physical reality includes mental phenomena, as physicalists believe, that is true even if we don't have a complete understanding of it at present.  It also implies that mental phenomena are, or can be, subject to investigation by physical sciences. 

And so we see, if we think more clearly about it, that Hempel poses no dilemma and no problem at all for the physicalist.

6 comments:

  1. This is symptomatic of Orwellian atheism. the basic assumption of atheism is that it i8s "free thought." :Right so important to think for yourself. Of course if one doesn't[t toe the party line on materialism then he's a fool his ideas are "woo," that is Just a way of saying :anything that's not my view is shit and needs to be ridiculed,: You are riddling people for thinking for themselves.


    the thing is you can['t answer the issue. you can't what physical is. you just say "science says it zi believe it that settles it,:


    that's what religious fundies say. so your atheism is Orwellian and it's a religious fundamentalism.

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  2. The truth of the matter is that physical reality exists independent of our study or understanding of it.

    Doesn't tell us what it is and it doesn't prove the thesis of physicalism. I could say the same about mind/spirit as well.


    We don't have a complete understanding of physical reality, and we probably never will. But regardless of any understanding we might eventually achieve, it has no effect on what that reality is.


    that's just rationalization for not being able to answer the issue


    If physical reality includes mental phenomena, as physicalists believe, that is true even if we don't have a complete understanding of it at present. It also implies that mental phenomena are, or can be, subject to investigation by physical sciences.

    No one seriously denied the existence of physical things, even ideas like those Gaswami or even Berkeley did not deny the reality of physical things, They just placed that reality in a larger fram ework of mind.

    that the mental may be subject to investigation by the physical does not change the fact they are not the same thing.That does not prove the thesis of physicalism.

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    Replies
    1. Doesn't tell us what it is and it doesn't prove the thesis of physicalism. I could say the same about mind/spirit as well.

      Funny. I thought I DID supply a definition for physical. But I didn't make any claims about proving physicalism.

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  3. im-skeptical wrote:

    "A better definition of physical might be 'entities or phenomena that are detectable or observable to the senses' "

    That's confusing physicalism with empiricism - a much broader thesis about knowledge, and it doesn't entail the existence of a material world - see phenomenalism, a position embraced by some skeptics.

    Also, as far as I know, one does not detect or observe quarks with one's senses. One has to apply constructed theories to the data provided by physics colliders to reach the conclusion that such particle exists.

    I am not suggesting that one reject the existence of an independent existing world. I am suggesting that your definition of physicalism is too weak.

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  4. That's confusing physicalism with empiricism - a much broader thesis about knowledge, and it doesn't entail the existence of a material world - see phenomenalism, a position embraced by some skeptics.

    "Phenomenalism is the view in Epistemology and the Philosophy of Perception that physical objects do not exist as things in themselves but only as perceptual phenomena or bundles of sense-data situated in time and in space."

    That does not describe my own position, but I am an empiricist. I believe that our senses are stimulated by entities that exist in the physical world. If physical things had no existence apart from our perception, there would be nothing that stimulates the senses. In other words, the whole world would be an immaterial illusion, which I don't buy.


    Also, as far as I know, one does not detect or observe quarks with one's senses. One has to apply constructed theories to the data provided by physics colliders to reach the conclusion that such particle exists.

    When I say "detectable to the senses", I mean it in the sense that it is empirically detectable. True, the human sense organs can't detect quarks, but we can devise instruments that extend our senses, so to speak. We can detect electric fields, and wavelengths of light that the eyes can't see. We can detect tiny particles, etc. In all such cases, those things are detectable because they have some physical effect on the sensing device. And that's precisely what makes then "physical".

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