Thursday, October 29, 2015

On the Necessity of God


I read an interesting article by WL Craig regarding the necessity of God's existence.  Interesting, that is, because it makes what seems to be an obvious leap of logic to conclude that God exists necessarily.  Here is what he said:
So is it logically possible that God not exist? Not in the sense of metaphysical possibility! There is no strict logical contradiction in the statement "God does not exist," just as there is not a strict logical contradiction in saying "Jones is a married bachelor," but both are unactualizable states of affairs. Thus, it is metaphysically necessary that God exists.

We have here the germ of the ontological argument for God's existence. For if it is possible that God exists, there is a possible world in which God has necessary existence. But then He exists in every world, including this one. Thus, the atheist is thrust into the awkward position of having to say that God's existence is impossible. It is not enough to say that in fact God does not exist; the atheist must hold that it is impossible that God exists—a much more radical claim!
Let's break this down, shall we?

But first, we need to look at the implication of necessary existence.  To say that something exists necessarily implies that it must exist in all possible worlds, or all possible states of affairs, if you prefer that terminology.  If there is any possible world or state of affairs where God does not exist, then God's existence is not necessary.  This is not controversial, and I think Craig would agree with this, as his own words indicate.  So the necessity of God's existence applies to all possible worlds.  Either God exists necessarily, or God's existence is not necessary, and that applies in all possible worlds.  If God exists necessarily, there is no possible world in which he does not exist.  However, if God does not exist necessarily, there may be possible worlds where he exists and other possible worlds where he does not exist.  With this in mind, we can examine what Craig is saying more carefully.
There is no strict logical contradiction in the statement "God does not exist," just as there is not a strict logical contradiction in saying "Jones is a married bachelor,"
I agree with the first part - there is no logical contraction in the statement "God does not exist," but there is definitely a contradiction in the second part.  The terms 'married' and 'bachelor' are mutually exclusive by definition.  You can be one or the other, but you can't be both.  To assert that one can be both is equivalent to asserting both P and not P.  It is a logical contradiction.  So how can Craig say that it's not a "strict logical contradiction"?  That is absurd.  It is a logical contradiction.  Therefore, the two phrases he uses are not at all the same.  One is a logical contradiction, and the other one isn't.
but both are unactualizable states of affairs. Thus, it is metaphysically necessary that God exists.
Clearly, the one that is a logical contradiction cannot be actualized.  But as for the non-existence of God, we need further justification to assert that this state of affairs can't be actualized.
For if it is possible that God exists, there is a possible world in which God has necessary existence.
This statement does not follow logically from any premises that Craig has presented.  As per my discussion above, if God's existence is not necessary, there may be possible worlds where he exists and other possible worlds where he does not exist, but in no case would his existence be necessary.  So it is wrong to make the claim that Craig makes here.  He is leaping from 'possible' to 'necessary' without any justification, apparently in the hopes that the reader isn't astute enough to see what he is doing.
But then He exists in every world, including this one.
I agree completely with Craig that if God's existence is necessary in any possible world, then it is necessary in all possible worlds.  But he has not demonstrated, or even made an argument that it is necessary at all.
Thus, the atheist is thrust into the awkward position of having to say that God's existence is impossible. It is not enough to say that in fact God does not exist; the atheist must hold that it is impossible that God exists—a much more radical claim!
Wrong.  If the atheist shows that God is not necessary in some possible world, then God's existence is not necessary.  It would then follow that that in every possible world, God's existence may be merely possible, but not ever necessary.

Is there any possible world where God existence is not necessary?  It is trivial to think of one such possibility: the case where no contingent objects exist.  If such a state of affairs is possible, and it seems like a perfectly reasonable possibility, then there need not be any creator or any first cause.  So we can conclude on that basis that God is not necessary.  But I rather doubt that theists would allow us to get away with something as simple as that.  They would probably object that our world does contain contingent objects, and rule out the possibility of a possible world in which nothing exists at all, despite the fact that there is no contradiction involved in it. 

So let's concede that point for the sake of argument.  We are left with showing that it is not necessary for God to exist in some possible world that contains contingent objects.  But there's nothing wrong with that, either.  The cosmological argument asserts that all contingent objects must have a cause, and I will not take issue with that, although it is still a logical possibility that something may exist without a cause.  After all, if God can exist without a cause, it is possible for something to exist without a cause.  But for the sake of argument again, I will concede that all things that exist in our universe are contingent, have a beginning in time, and are caused by something.  However the thing that is the cause of the universe, whatever that thing is, must itself exist outside the universe, and therefore, it exists outside the realm of space-time.  That implies that it is eternal or transcendental.  So this thing has no beginning in time, and therefore does not need a cause.  So it could either be God, or something else that simply exists, as a brute fact.

Now I know that theists will object that nothing exists as a brute fact, but I will not concede this point to them, because they have absolutely no logical basis for making such an assertion.  The necessity of God rests on the assumption that nothing else can exist without a cause, because if anything exists without a cause, that thing could be what causes the universe.  And it is perfectly logical to assert that it is possible there could be such a thing (for example, some extra-dimensional quantum vacuum that spawns universes).  This involves no contradiction whatsoever.  And if it is possible, then there is a possible world or state of affairs where God does not exist.  Therefore, we can conclude that God's existence is not necessary.

I understand that theists will have a hard time with this.  They will insist that that the scenario I describe can't be, because ... because it just can't be.  But they can't explain cogently why it is not a logical possibility.  Their insistence that God must be the first cause of everything is nothing more than special pleading. 

Aside from that, Craig's explanation of God's necessity falls flat on its face, because it involves a blatant non sequitur.  But then, all theological arguments involve either some kind of logical fallacy, or an assumption that lacks sufficient support to be epistemologically justified.  This is the nature of theological arguments.

23 comments:

  1. I was initially thrown by the bachelor example too until I figured out what Craig was saying. Craig is saying that it's logically possible that the word bachelor could have been defined as a married man (although a married, un-married man is logically impossible), so in that sense it's not logically impossible that Jones is a married bachelor. However, since a bachelor is defined as an unmarried man, in our actual world, it is metaphysically impossible for Jones to be a married bachelor.

    It's important to know that God is being defined as a maximally great being who posses Aseity and who exists necessarily. Just as in the case with the word bachelor, it is logically possible that the word God could be defined as being who doesn't posses Aseity and who is a contingent being, but since God is defined as a necessary being it's not metaphysical possible for God not to exist because a non-existent thing is not God.

    It actually does logically follow that if God possibly exists then he necessarily exists in some possible world. There is nothing incoherent about a being that exists necessarily, so it seems clear to me that it's logically possible that God exists. Since a necessary being is logically possible, metaphysically speaking, a necessary being exists in some possible world--after all necessary beings can't not exist. If a necessary being exists is some possible world then it exists in all possible worlds, including this one. There is nothing to preclude God from existing in all possible worlds as he is a necessary, immaterial being that depends on nothing for his existence.

    Whether or not contingent objects exists is completely irrelevant to God's necessary existence, as God is a necessary being regardless of what else exists. In fact God is said to have existed necessarily metaphysically prior to the creation of the universe. You're confusing explanatory necessity with metaphysical necessity.

    It is logically possible that some eternal physical brute fact outside of the observable universe was the cause of the universe, but there are a few serious problems with this idea. The first is that there is absolutely no evidence of something that exists without an explanation of its existence. Everything that we can see, including ourselves has an explanation of its existence. So, even though the existence of a brute fact is not logically impossible, there is no good reason to think that such a thing exists.

    Another problem, is that physical objects depend on the existence of other things like space, time, and matter/energy (and possibly physical laws) in order to exist. Physical objects are also arranged and put together--they also eventually fall apart. So, in your quantum vacuum example it's not just the quantum vacuum itself that inexplicably exists but also space, matter/energy and physical laws that the quantum depends on for its existence that are brute facts as well. So, we now need a whole host of brute facts, even though there is no evidence that brute facts actually exist. Also, there are possible worlds such as worlds without matter/energy where physical objects can't exist.

    All that being said, even though I think that the ontological argument is true, it is not one of my favorite arguments for God's existence--personally I find that cosmological arguments and fine tuning argument to be much more persuasive.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. Keith,

      I'm happy to hear from you again.

      First, let me explain my own understanding of metaphysical necessity. It is something that is necessary in all possible worlds. This is independent of any physical constraints that may exist in one particular world, or any definitions used. Anything that is metaphysically necessary must be logically necessary, since we take the axioms and rules of logic to be valid in all possible worlds. Here is an article by Massimo Pigliucci that discusses metaphysical necessity.

      In the case of Craig's example of the married bachelor, we understand that it is logically necessary that something cannot be both P and not P (in this case, married and not married). However, if we define the word 'bachelor' to be something different, the phrase using that word might no longer be a logical absurdity only because of the definition involved, but that does not change the fact that being both P and not P is still a logical absurdity. Logical necessity is tied to the underlying (physical or conceptual) entities, not the words we use to name them or the way we define those entities.

      In other words, you can't change a logical truth simply by re-defining a word or using a different name for something. But the only way we can express a proposition is to use words. So we have to agree that the words we use represent something in particular, and that something is the the entity to which the logical truth of the proposition applies. If Craig was saying that the phrase "married bachelor" could represent something that is not logically absurd, it is only because it represents a different concept than the one we normally have in mind. For that reason, using that as an example really doesn't help to make his case.

      But the proposition "God does not exist" is genuinely a logical possibility, as I explained in my article. You have attempted to turn it into a logical impossibility by re-defining the term 'God'. What I mean by the term is the being that created the universe and that has the attributes of intelligence and intent. That is to say that God is the entity that created the universe, knowing what he was doing doing it on purpose. This is the minimal conception of God that is consistent with any monotheistic beliefs. You can add whatever additional attribute you like, but then you are narrowing the conception of God in such a way that it is no longer consistent with all monotheistic beliefs.

      But one thing you cannot do is to define something into existence. By adding aseity and necessary existence to the definition of God, you cannot cause the underlying entity to spring into existence. When we speak of unicorns, there is a conception we have in mind, and this thing is something that might exist in some possible worlds, but not our world. If we change the definition of the word 'unicorn' to include necessary existence, that does not change reality and cause unicorns to exist in our world, no matter how much we might wish it were true.

      Christians have devised all kinds of semantic tricks in their quest to prove God's existence. If you define god as having necessary existence, then you cannot invoke that definition in any proof of God's existence. This is nothing more than a case of circular reasoning.

      Delete
    2. im-skeptical wrote: "I'm happy to hear from you again."

      Thanks, I'm glad to be back.

      im-skeptical wrote: "In the case of Craig's example of the married bachelor, we understand that it is logically necessary that something cannot be both P and not P (in this case, married and not married). However, if we define the word 'bachelor' to be something different, the phrase using that word might no longer be a logical absurdity only because of the definition involved, but that does not change the fact that being both P and not P is still a logical absurdity."

      As Pigliucci said, "The remaining case (the impossibility of a married bachelor), of course, hinges on issues of definitions." If it's the case that a bachelor can only be an unmarried man then, yes, of course it is logically impossible that Jones is a married bachelor. However, it is logically possible that a bachelor could have been defined as a married man, and in that case Jones could be a married bachelor, although he can't be married and not married. Of course this is not the case, and there is reason to change the definition of a bachelor.

      im-skeptical wrote: "But the proposition "God does not exist" is genuinely a logical possibility, as I explained in my article. You have attempted to turn it into a logical impossibility by re-defining the term 'God'. What I mean by the term is the being that created the universe and that has the attributes of intelligence and intent. That is to say that God is the entity that created the universe, knowing what he was doing doing it on purpose. This is the minimal conception of God that is consistent with any monotheistic beliefs. You can add whatever additional attribute you like, but then you are narrowing the conception of God in such a way that it is no longer consistent with all monotheistic beliefs."

      Again, this hinges on definitions. If it can only be the case that God is a necessary being then the phrase "God does not exist" is not a logical or metaphysical possibility, as a necessary being can't not exist.

      I don't think that defining God as a necessary being is irregular or adding things to the concept of God. If it is really true that everything that exists has an explanation for its existence then God must exist necessarily in order to explain the existence of the universe. I certainly don't think that God can be defined as a contingent being, as something greater than god would be the God that created god!

      How is the notion of God's necessity inconsistent with monotheism? It's not inconsistent with Christianity, Judaism or Islam.

      Delete
    3. im-skeptical wrote: "But one thing you cannot do is to define something into existence."

      There's the rub with the ontological argument--it's true but God might not exist. As a stand alone argument, I don't find it terribly convincing.

      im-skeptical wrote: "When we speak of unicorns, there is a conception we have in mind, and this thing is something that might exist in some possible worlds, but not our world. If we change the definition of the word 'unicorn' to include necessary existence, that does not change reality and cause unicorns to exist in our world, no matter how much we might wish it were true."

      This is a poor analogy, as unicorns, as conventionally conceived, clearly can't exist in all possible worlds. Since they are material objects they couldn't possibly exist in worlds without matter.

      im-skeptical wrote: "Christians have devised all kinds of semantic tricks in their quest to prove God's existence. If you define god as having necessary existence, then you cannot invoke that definition in any proof of God's existence. This is nothing more than a case of circular reasoning."

      This is a bit of hyperbole. There is logic behind defining God as a necessary being. First of all, there is nothing precluding God from existing in any possible world, including a world without space and matter, because God depends on nothing for his existence. Secondly, if God is the explanation for the existence of everything then he must exist necessarily.

      Delete
    4. Well, this is going to be difficult, I suppose.

      As Pigliucci said, ...
      What he said was completely consistent with what I said. "he can't be married and not married." The point is that regardless of how you define words, that doesn't change the logical reality of the concept that underlies the phrase "married bachelor".

      Again, this hinges on definitions. If it can only be the case that God is a necessary being then the phrase "God does not exist" is not a logical or metaphysical possibility, as a necessary being can't not exist.
      This ignores what I said: you can't make something exist by defining it as something that exists necessarily. If you don't like the example of the unicorn, you should be aware that it has nothing to do with the contingency of the unicorn. Let's try a different example. Call it God-2, a non-contingent transcendent being that creates other universes. If we define this thing as existing necessarily, that doesn't mean that it exists. Nothing exists by definition. Things either exist in reality, or they don't, and reality is independent of any definitions you may wish to make.

      I don't think that defining God as a necessary being is irregular or adding things to the concept of God.
      It does add something to the conception of God. It defines god into existence, which you can't logically do.

      If it is really true that everything that exists has an explanation for its existence then God must exist necessarily in order to explain the existence of the universe.
      Who says God id the only explanation for contingent things? I already explained that there is another explanation that is logically possible. And as long as there is another possibility, God is not necessary.

      I certainly don't think that God can be defined as a contingent being, as something greater than god would be the God that created god!
      I said nothing about defining God as a contingent being.

      How is the notion of God's necessity inconsistent with monotheism? It's not inconsistent with Christianity, Judaism or Islam.
      I said two things about additional attributes of God. One is that your attributes (benevolence, etc.) may not apply to all forms of monotheism, and the other is that the attribute of necessary existence is seriously flawed from a logical perspective.

      This is a bit of hyperbole. There is logic behind defining God as a necessary being.
      Yes, it's faulty logic, otherwise known as circular reasoning.

      First of all, there is nothing precluding God from existing in any possible world, including a world without space and matter, because God depends on nothing for his existence.
      Nothing but reality. If God doesn't exist, he doesn't exist.

      if God is the explanation for the existence of everything then he must exist necessarily.
      But there is at least one other possible explanation, so God is not "the explanation".

      Delete
    5. im-skeptical wrote: "What he said was completely consistent with what I said. "he can't be married and not married." The point is that regardless of how you define words, that doesn't change the logical reality of the concept that underlies the phrase 'married bachelor'."

      It is logically impossible for someone to be married and un-married, however, if it was the case that the word bachelor was defined as a married man then it is logically possible that Jones is a married bachelor. There is no reason to think that it was impossible for the word bachelor to be defined as a married man. However, since we define the word bachelor as an un-married man, Jones can't be a married bachelor.

      im-skeptical wrote: "This ignores what I said: you can't make something exist by defining it as something that exists necessarily...Nothing exists by definition. Things either exist in reality, or they don't, and reality is independent of any definitions you may wish to make."

      I didn't ignore anything, I conceded that even though the ontological argument is true, that God may still not exist.

      im-skeptical wrote: "It does add something to the conception of God. It defines god into existence, which you can't logically do."

      The idea of God's necessity is hardly new--it's been around for thousands of years. The big three monotheistic religions all begin with the idea that the un-created God, who calls himself "I Am" created the world we live in.

      There is nothing incoherent about the notion of a necessary being. If we said that God is a square circle or a non-existent, existent thing then that would be another matter.

      im-skeptical wrote: "Who says God id the only explanation for contingent things? I already explained that there is another explanation that is logically possible. And as long as there is another possibility, God is not necessary. "

      First of all, notice that I said that if EVERYTHING that exists has an explanation for its existence then God must exist necessarily to cause everything else to exist. Everything includes all that exists everywhere, and would preclude a possible physical brute fact outside of the observable universe because the brute fact has no explanation for its existence. If brute facts don't exist then the only explanation for the world is that it was caused to exist by a necessarily existent object.

      Secondly, even if we do allow for brute facts this doesn't change God's metaphysical necessity, but it may change his causal necessity. We could imagine that both both God and, say, the quantum vacuum exist eternally. God exists necessarily and the quantum vacuum inexplicably exists un-caused. Even if the quantum vacuum was the cause of the universe this doesn't change the fact that God exists necessarily.

      im-skeptical wrote: "...and the other is that the attribute of necessary existence is seriously flawed from a logical perspective."

      How so? Asserting that one can't say something exists necessarily is not showing that defining God as existing necessarily is logically incoherent.

      im-skeptical wrote: "Nothing but reality. If God doesn't exist, he doesn't exist."

      Right, this is why theists developed a posteriori arguments.

      im-skeptical wrote: "But there is at least one other possible explanation, so God is not "the explanation".

      But that other possibility would have no explanation for its existence so there would be one thing that would not have an explanation for its existence.

      Delete
    6. It is logically impossible for someone to be married and un-married, however, if it was the case that the word bachelor was defined as a married man then it is logically possible that Jones is a married bachelor. There is no reason to think that it was impossible for the word bachelor to be defined as a married man. However, since we define the word bachelor as an un-married man, Jones can't be a married bachelor.
      I guess my point didn't come across, so I'll try again. Consider the proposition "Joe is a snuglefarc heisenpfuffer". If you don't know what the words refer to, it doesn't even make sense to ask whether they express a logical possibility or contradiction. The proposition isn't meaningful unless the words are defined. So if Craig is telling us that his expression does not contain a logical contradiction, he is implying that the words are defined, and with that definition that there is no contradiction between them, because the concept behind those words is a different concept from the one we usually have. This is nothing more than semantic trickery. If we agree that 'snuglefarc' refers to the concept of being married, and that 'heisenpfuffer' refers to the concept of being unmarried, then there is a contradiction. It's the underlying concept that matters, not the words used. Craig is denying this.

      I conceded that even though the ontological argument is true, that God may still not exist.
      If you concede that God may not exist, and you also insist that God's existence is necessary, you are contradicting yourself.

      The idea of God's necessity is hardly new--it's been around for thousands of years.
      I understand that. And you can make an argument that God's existence is necessary, but you can't prove it by defining God that way, because it is blatant, obvious circular reasoning. Craig is arguing for the necessity of God. Craig knows this, and at least he's smart enough not to state that God is necessary by definition. However, where I said he was making a leap of logic, you explain that the basis for that is that God is necessary by definition. If so, then Craig is simply making an unstated assumption, and his argument is circular because it concludes what it assumes.

      There is nothing incoherent about the notion of a necessary being. If we said that God is a square circle or a non-existent, existent thing then that would be another matter.
      I agree, but it is incoherent to hold that God is a necessary being and that God may not exist. You have already conceded that God may not exist, and so you must believe that God is not necessary. The idea that God is necessary is not logically consistent with the idea that God may not exist.

      continued ...

      Delete
    7. First of all, notice that I said that if EVERYTHING that exists has an explanation for its existence then God must exist necessarily to cause everything else to exist. Everything includes all that exists everywhere, and would preclude a possible physical brute fact outside of the observable universe because the brute fact has no explanation for its existence. If brute facts don't exist then the only explanation for the world is that it was caused to exist by a necessarily existent object.
      I don't accept that. I have conceded that contingent things have an explanation, but not that everything has an explanation. So a transcendental brute fact can exist without explanation. I already stated that you have no logical reason for excluding this as a possibility. If you think you do, please give me your reasoning.

      Secondly, even if we do allow for brute facts this doesn't change God's metaphysical necessity, but it may change his causal necessity. We could imagine that both both God and, say, the quantum vacuum exist eternally. God exists necessarily and the quantum vacuum inexplicably exists un-caused. Even if the quantum vacuum was the cause of the universe this doesn't change the fact that God exists necessarily.
      The reason you say God exists necessarily is not because God is logically necessary, but because you insist on defining God that way. Something can't be metaphysically necessary without being logically necessary. If you disagree, please explain how.

      Asserting that one can't say something exists necessarily is not showing that defining God as existing necessarily is logically incoherent.
      Defining god as existing necessarily is not logically sound, as I have explained. What is incoherent is your saying both that God might not exist and God exists necessarily.

      Right, this is why theists developed a posteriori arguments.
      The existence of God is independent of any argument or definition you can devise. The only thing it depends on is reality.

      But that other possibility would have no explanation for its existence so there would be one thing that would not have an explanation for its existence.
      So what? I don't care if something exists without an explanation. The only reason it matters to you is because you think it gives you reason to exclude brute fact as a possibility. This is special pleading. Please explain coherently why brute fact should be excluded as a possibility.

      Delete
    8. im-skeptical wrote: "I guess my point didn't come across, so I'll try again...This is nothing more than semantic trickery."

      I know what you're saying and I basically agree with you, I'm just making the subtle point that if-and-only-if the word bachelor, hypothetically, happened to be defined as something other than an un-married man then it would logically be possible for Jones to be a married bachelor. There is nothing sinister or tricky going on here--it's just acknowledging the fact that it is logically possible that the word bachelor could have been defined as something other than an un-married man.

      In much the same way, it is logically possible that the word God could have been defined as something other than a maximally great being that exists necessarily, and then in this case it wold be metaphysically possible for God not to exist.

      im-skeptical wrote: "If you concede that God may not exist, and you also insist that God's existence is necessary, you are contradicting yourself."

      No, I can see that I haven't explained things clearly, so I''l try again. There's a distinction between the concept of God and his properties and the actual state of the world. What I'm saying is that, given the concept of God as maximally great being who has the properties of necessary existence, simplicity, aseity etc, that being, if it actually exists, exists in all possible worlds including this one.

      Now we say that it is logically possible that God doesn't exist because even though it is logically possible that the maximally great being, God, does exist it still might be the case that there is no instantiated God in this world or any world.

      im-skeptical wrote: "And you can make an argument that God's existence is necessary, but you can't prove it by defining God that way, because it is blatant, obvious circular reasoning. Craig is arguing for the necessity of God. Craig knows this, and at least he's smart enough not to state that God is necessary by definition. However, where I said he was making a leap of logic, you explain that the basis for that is that God is necessary by definition. If so, then Craig is simply making an unstated assumption, and his argument is circular because it concludes what it assumes."

      Is is circular to that Jones can't be a married bachelor because bachelors aren't married? Given the properties of God, the maximally great being, God exists in this and all possible worlds, but to know whether there really is a maximally great being we must move beyond a priori arguments.

      im-skeptical wrote: "I agree, but it is incoherent to hold that God is a necessary being and that God may not exist. You have already conceded that God may not exist, and so you must believe that God is not necessary."

      No, I'm making a distinction between metaphysical necessity and logical necessity.

      Delete
    9. im-skeptical wrote: "I don't accept that. I have conceded that contingent things have an explanation, but not that everything has an explanation. So a transcendental brute fact can exist without explanation."

      I didn't expect that you would. It is logically possible that an eternal physical brute fact exists outside of the observable universe, but this is nothing more than a logical possibility. All the evidence that we have shows that things have explanations for their existence, so there is no good reason to think that there is an exception to this.

      im-skeptical wrote: "So what? I don't care if something exists without an explanation. The only reason it matters to you is because you think it gives you reason to exclude brute fact as a possibility. This is special pleading. Please explain coherently why brute fact should be excluded as a possibility."

      I never said that the brute fact was impossible. I doubt the existence of the physical brute fact because it violates the Principle of Sufficient Reason. To me, saying that there are explanations for the existence of gold atoms, people, lightning bolts, cars, stars, planets etc, but that there must be some mysterious physical thing, that exists outside of the observable universe which has no explanation for its existence, because it's the only way to keep naturalism afloat smacks of special pleading. There is no evidence that brute facts exist and no good reason to think that they do.

      Delete
    10. There is nothing sinister or tricky going on here--it's just acknowledging the fact that it is logically possible that the word bachelor could have been defined as something other than an un-married man.
      That's fine, as far as it goes, but I think Craig is doing more than that. He seems to be establishing the logical possibility of a married bachelor in order to distinguish it from the metaphysical impossibility. He's making a false comparison. If you use the definition consistently, then the logically possible is also metaphysically possible. If you don't use the definition consistently, you are equivocating.

      In much the same way, it is logically possible that the word God could have been defined as something other than a maximally great being that exists necessarily, and then in this case it wold be metaphysically possible for God not to exist.
      Quite right. And I have objected to defining God as having necessary existence in the first place. On what basis is that justified, especially given that the goal of this discussion is to determine whether God exists necessarily?

      What I'm saying is that, given the concept of God as maximally great being who has the properties of necessary existence, simplicity, aseity etc, that being, if it actually exists, exists in all possible worlds including this one.
      That being, if it fits the definition, must exist, by definition. But you can't define something into existence.

      it still might be the case that there is no instantiated God in this world or any world.
      Not if your definition of God includes necessary existence. What you are saying is equivalent to "God is married (by definition) but could possibly be a bachelor (if he isn't instantiated)." But the definition doesn't even allow the possibility that he isn't instantiated.

      Given the properties of God, the maximally great being, God exists in this and all possible worlds, but to know whether there really is a maximally great being we must move beyond a priori arguments
      To know whether there really is a maximally great being, you must drop necessary existence the definition, because the definition doesn't allow any other possibility.

      No, I'm making a distinction between metaphysical necessity and logical necessity.
      So apparently metaphysical necessity depends on equivocation and circular reasoning, because it sure isn't logical.

      All the evidence that we have shows that things have explanations for their existence, so there is no good reason to think that there is an exception to this.
      Let's talk about evidence. All the things we have evidence for are contingent objects - temporal and physical. By your reasoning, there is no good reason to think that there is an exception to this.

      To me, saying that there are explanations for the existence of gold atoms, people, lightning bolts, cars, stars, planets etc, but that there must be some mysterious physical thing, that exists outside of the observable universe which has no explanation for its existence, because it's the only way to keep naturalism afloat smacks of special pleading.
      And defining God as a necessary being that explains all things doesn't smack of special pleading to you?

      Delete
    11. im-skeptical wrote: "That's fine, as far as it goes, but I think Craig is doing more than that. He seems to be establishing the logical possibility of a married bachelor in order to distinguish it from the metaphysical impossibility...If you don't use the definition consistently, you are equivocating."

      I think what's causing the confusion here is that, although Craig alludes to the fact that he's dealing with modal logic and possible world semantics, he doesn't explicitly state this, which is unfortunate because it's imperative to know this in order to understand what he's saying. It's not strictly logically impossible that Jones is a married bachelor because there is no inherent contradiction like there would be with saying that "Jones is married and not married. However, it is broadly (or metaphysically) impossible for Jones to be a married bachelor because being un-maried is a necessity de re or necessary property of bachelors, and so there is no possible world where Jones could be a married bachelor regardless of whether or not people exist. In other words, the proposition "Jones is a married bachelor" can't be instantiated.

      im-skeptical wrote: "And I have objected to defining God as having necessary existence in the first place. On what basis is that justified, especially given that the goal of this discussion is to determine whether God exists necessarily?"

      God's necessity is a necessary property of God. If something does not exist necessarily then that thing is not and maximally great being and is not God.

      Necessary existence has been part of the standard definition of God, and has been the case for thousands of years, so you bear the burden of explaining why we should change the definition of God.

      Also, according to the Principle of Sufficient Reason, God must exist necessarily in order to cause the existence of our contingent observable universe.

      Finally, given God's other necessary properties, such as aseity and simplicity, God is capable of existing in all possible worlds.

      im-skeptical wrote: "That being, if it fits the definition, must exist, by definition. But you can't define something into existence."

      Since necessary existence is a necessary property of God, yes it is metaphysically impossible for God not to exist. However, strictly speaking there is no inherent contradiction in the proposition "God doesn't exist", although saying that, "God exists and doesn't exist" would violate the Law of Excluded Middle.

      What the ontological argument tells us is that, metaphysically speaking, the concept of God is such that he exists necessarily in all possible worlds including this one. Now the big question of whether God is more than a concept still remains, and to answer it we must move beyond a priori arguments.

      im-skeptical wrote: "So apparently metaphysical necessity depends on equivocation and circular reasoning, because it sure isn't logical."

      I hope that by now it's obvious that this is not the case.

      im-skeptical wrote: "Let's talk about evidence. All the things we have evidence for are contingent objects - temporal and physical. By your reasoning, there is no good reason to think that there is an exception to this."

      No, if all that exists are finite, contingent objects then we would have to conclude that our contingent universe popped into existence un-caused from literally nothing, which is metaphysically absurd. It seems obvious to me that there must be at least one thing that is either a brute fact or a necessary object. However, according to the Principle of Sufficient Reason we should reject the notion of the brute fact and conclude that there must be a necessary object.

      Delete
    12. It's not strictly logically impossible that Jones is a married bachelor because there is no inherent contradiction like there would be with saying that "Jones is married and not married.
      Yes, there is (if you refer to the de re reading of the term). Unless you want to play games with word definitions. And that's what Craig is doing. You still don't get what I was saying. We both agree that it is a metaphysical impossibility to be a married bachelor. But that is precisely because it's a logical impossibility. There's no difference. Can you name anything at all the is metaphysically possible but not logically possible? Or vice versa?

      God's necessity is a necessary property of God. If something does not exist necessarily then that thing is not and maximally great being and is not God. Necessary existence has been part of the standard definition of God, and has been the case for thousands of years, so you bear the burden of explaining why we should change the definition of God.
      Here are some basic rules logic for you: You start from stated promises, and work toward a conclusion by applying accepted logical rules. Premises must be supported, or the conclusion isn't valid. If the conclusion is contained in the premises, that's circular reasoning. If you're trying to argue that God's existence in necessary (the conclusion), then you can't argue from a premise that includes the definition of God as being necessary. That's circular reasoning. If you can't present a valid logical argument for the necessity of God, than there's no point in discussing it further. And it doesn't matter how long people have been committing this fallacy. It's not valid logic.

      Also, according to the Principle of Sufficient Reason, God must exist necessarily in order to cause the existence of our contingent observable universe.
      The PSR says things have a cause. It doesn't say the cause is God. I say the cause could be something else.

      Finally, given God's other necessary properties, such as aseity and simplicity, God is capable of existing in all possible worlds.
      "Aseity" is just special pleading.

      Since necessary existence is a necessary property of God, yes it is metaphysically impossible for God not to exist. However, strictly speaking there is no inherent contradiction in the proposition "God doesn't exist", although saying that, "God exists and doesn't exist" would violate the Law of Excluded Middle.
      You're playing Craig's game of equivocation. What is the de re understanding of "God"? If it does not include necessary existence, then if is logically and metaphysically possible that God does not exist. If it includes necessity by definition, then God's existence would be logically and metaphysically necessary, but that conclusion is based on circular reasoning.

      Admit it. You can't show independently that God's existence in necessary. The best you can do is to define it that way. It doesn't pass the smell test. It's not valid logic.

      No, if all that exists are finite, contingent objects ...
      I didn't say that. I did say that's all we have evidence for. You insist that everything we see has a cause, but ignore the fact that everything we see is contingent. Then, by special pleading, you conclude that god has a cause (because god is his own cause), and a brute fact must not exist (because nobody is special-pleading the case for that). The reality is that we don't see things that are non-contingent, and the evidence of our observation doesn't allow us to conclude that such things must have a cause.

      Delete
  2. "...since God is defined as a necessary being it's not metaphysical possible for God not to exist because a non-existent thing is not God. "

    When the term 'God' is defined it is the term that exists but not necessarily the thing that the term refers to. The question is does the thing refered by the definition exist in reality or is it just a fiction? The answer to that question can not be answered by any philosophical analysis of the definition. The question can only be answered by looking at reality.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. jdhuey, I do think that it's worth noting that there is no ontological argument for the physical brute fact, and that the ontological argument provides some a priori support for the cosmological arguments, but yes this is the flaw of a priori arguments. There's a sense that it's trivially true that God exists. This is why I prefer a posteriori arguments like the cosmological arguments over the ontological arguments.

      Delete
    2. Since when does a physical brute fact need an ontological argument?

      How can an argument that is unsound provide support for any other argument? It seems to me that if you need support from such dubious sources them your argument is already suspect.

      There's a sense that it's trivially true that God does not exist. So?

      No cosmological argument positively supports the existence on a diety. The only thing that is surported is that there are things we don't know. The only question is how do you respond to that admitted ignorance.

      Delete
    3. jdhuey wrote: "Since when does a physical brute fact need an ontological argument?"

      It doesn't need one per say, but if one lacks evidence and arguments for the existence of physical brute facts then why does one believe that they exist?

      jdhuey wrote: "How can an argument that is unsound provide support for any other argument? It seems to me that if you need support from such dubious sources them your argument is already suspect."

      (1) If God exists then he has necessary existence.
      (2) Either God has necessary existence, or he doesn‘t.
      (3) If God doesn‘t have necessary existence, then he necessarily doesn‘t.
      Therefore:
      (4) Either God has necessary existence, or he necessarily doesn‘t.
      (5) If God necessarily doesn‘t have necessary existence, then God necessarily doesn‘t exist.
      Therefore:
      (6) Either God has necessary existence, or he necessarily doesn‘t exist.
      (7) It is not the case that God necessarily doesn‘t exist.
      Therefore:
      (8) God has necessary existence.
      (9) If God has necessary existence, then God exists.
      Therefore:
      (10) God exists.

      How is the above argument unsound?

      jdhuey wrote: "There's a sense that it's trivially true that God does not exist. So?"

      How does this come from the ontological argument?

      jdhuey wrote: "No cosmological argument positively supports the existence on a diety. The only thing that is surported is that there are things we don't know. The only question is how do you respond to that admitted ignorance. "

      It's true that the cosmological arguments don't conclusively prove that God exists, but when the various arguments for God's existence are taken together I think that one can say that God is the best explanation for the existence of the universe and a whole host other things.

      Delete
    4. As I understand the concept of a Brute Physical Fact (BPF) is that it is a fact about or of something that lacks an explanation. Not that there is no evidence for the fact. As I see it there can be two types of BPFs one is where Mother Nature(tm) has hidden the process so that it can not be observed or explained. An example of this would be the decay of a free neutron into a proton and an electron. This happens a random and there is no explanation as to why one neutron will decay after a second and another identical one will last for an hour or more. Even if Einstein was correct that there has to be some hidden variables to explain this randomness, those variables do seem to be forever hidden.

      The other type of BPF is more prosaic, it is when the evidence that would explain the BPF has been destroyed. You might call this a pseudo BPF. Although the distinction doesn't really make a difference. An example of this could be the abiogenisus of life. There are currently many different theories that might be the explanation of how it happened by the evidence to pin the theories down may have been for ever lost due to geological processes.

      Now the grand daddy of all BPF is the existence of the Universe itself. This could be a BPF of either type. The process of the Big Bang is theorised to erase all the information of what came before, so the BB just sits there as a BPF that people can endlessly speculate about (and some will even convince themselves they know the answer) but there may never be any evidence to really explain what happened.

      Delete
    5. The very first premise in your argument is unfounded. Even if an entity exists that has the attrubutes that enable you to label it "God", there are miles to go before you can show that this entity is a necessary entity.

      If you pull up the wikipedia artical on the ontological argument there is a nice discussion of the philosophers that have countered the OA. Hume and Kant are the heavy hitters but you can also look up A. C. Grayling's book 'The God Argument" who does a very nice job of showing why the OA is unsound. But fundamentally it all boils down to the observatation that IMSkeptical mentioned: you can not define something into existence.

      Delete
    6. It seems to me that if an argument is unsound then it should have (at best) zero weight. Piling up unsound argument on unsound argument does not add up to a positive argument. Actually, I suspect that the total lack of any sound arguments is evidence against the propostion.

      Delete
  3. im-skeptical, I'm sorry that this is completely off-topic, but I have an idea that I wanted to bounce off of you. I have an idea for a point-counterpoint blog/website featuring an intelligent, well read Christian and an atheist/skeptic who would debate various philosophy of religion topics. This blog/website would be unique because it wouldn't be the one sided echo chamber that most theist and atheist blogs are. It would be a place where readers can see both sides of the God question and decide for themselves.

    Are you interested in being my partner in this? Would this site be worth our time and effort? If we do it, I want to monetize it. It could be a way to take our hobby to the next level. What are your thoughts?

    Thanks!

    Keith

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. Keith,

      I like the idea of having such a site where people could argue and discuss issues related to theism without being an echo chamber for one side or the other.

      However, I have concerns about trying to create a money-making enterprise out of it. As you can see, I do not attempt to derive any income from my own blog. It would involve considerable effort and time to do that. You would need to attract a large audience, and to do that, you need to have contributors that will have a considerable following. Aside from that, you would need to devote the effort to assure a steady stream of material that would keep the audience coming back.

      I don't have that ability myself, nor do I think I can oblige myself to make the effort that would be needed to establish an enterprise that would be competitive with the many other sites out there.

      I'm happy just having a place to air and discuss my opinions.

      Delete
    2. Thanks for your input. I totally understand your reservations and share many of them. I'm not sure that this project is worth all of the work that it would involve.

      Delete