Argumentum ad Argument
It never ceases to amaze me how Christians will jump through intellectual hoops to justify their religious beliefs. There is no end to the clever tricks and ploys they use in an effort to get around the simple truth that their belief isn't rational. Have you ever heard the claim "I don't have enough faith to be an atheist"? It's an obvious reversal of the truth - placing themselves in the position of the objective evaluator of facts, while the skeptical atheist supposedly abandons evidence in favor of some irrationally-motivated ideological position. Clever. But to a truly impartial judge, the tactic of the Christian in this ploy is obvious. This is not an honest argument, nor is it any kind of argument at all. It's an intellectual sham. It's quite typical of the games we observe Christians playing to make themselves appear more intellectually competent than the facts would justify.
There's a reason we see this kind of gamesmanship. It's not that Christians don't have the intellectual capacity to make a strong argument. Of course they do. But there is something they are lacking - and that is evidence. Evidence is a crucial factor in making an argument. But let's face it. The empirical evidence that would support their beliefs just isn't there. And they know that, but they don't want to admit it. So they make these ploys to cover up the weakness of their position. One such ploy is the reversal of truth I already mentioned. Another is to attack the most reliable source of evidence - scientific investigation. They tell us that the evidence they need to support their arguments isn't accessible to science. And yet another tactic they employ is to stretch the definition of evidence to include subjective, dubious, or unreliable sources, and even things that don't fit the definition of 'evidence' at all. For example, you often hear Christians claim that the evidence they have for their belief includes subjective inner feelings, or various logical "proofs" or arguments for the existence of God. In lieu of genuine empirical evidence, they tend to rely heavily on the claim that arguments for God actually constitute evidence for belief.
Just to be clear, arguments may provide reason to believe something, but they are not evidence, which is generally understood to be a body of objectively observable facts. Evidence describes a state of affairs that may provide clues to deduce what caused that state of affairs. Oxford Dictionaries gives this definition of 'evidence':
the available body of facts or information indicating whether a belief or proposition is true or valid. - Oxford DictionariesFor example, a Christian might observe a beautiful sunset as evidence for the existence of God. The sunset is the observable evidence, and God is the thing that supposedly caused it. Of course, another person can look at the same evidence and come up with an entirely different explanation for what produced it.
This is where arguments come into the picture. Arguments provide the logical linkage between evidence and the conclusion to be drawn from it. The Christian could make a logical argument, in this case, to the effect that only God is capable of producing such beauty. A scientist might make a completely different argument - that the beautiful red sky is the product of Reyleigh scattering of light due to particles in the atmosphere. Note that both of these arguments use the same piece of evidence to arrive at very different conclusions (although one of them might draw upon additional facts that are ignored by the other - note that the definition indicates a "body of facts", not an isolated individual fact). The evidence itself is factual and not subject to doubt, but arguments may be faulty. Clearly, one or both of the arguments in this example may not be correct. Arguments do not constitute evidence, and there is nothing in the definition of 'evidence' that would justify the Christian's claim that an argument is a form of evidence.
It would be problematic to say that an argument constitutes evidence for several reasons. For one thing, as I noted already, the chain of logic in an argument is very often faulty. The person making the argument may be convinced that his own logic is impeccable, while others can easily see flaws in it. We see this all the time. In the absence of an unbiased arbiter, it would be unwise to base one's belief on arguments in lieu of evidence. Another problem is the very notion that one could simply invent evidence in the form of an argument. It would be possible to justify belief in practically anything, simply on the basis that there's an argument for it, when in fact there is not a shred of observable factual evidence that supports such belief. One could claim that his argument for the existence of little green men on the moon is all the "evidence" he needs to justify belief.
The philosopher Stephen Toulmin created a generalized model of argumentation that includes these major elements:
1. A claim – the key point being made
2. Evidence to support the claim – Empirical data, published work, studies, etc.
3. The warrant – making the logical connections – the reasoning drawing out the evidence
4. Qualifications: conditions limiting main claim – This argument only works within these limits ... - Toulmin
The key thing to recognize here is that evidence is the basis of an argument. It is an essential element of any argument, but once again, there is no reason in this model to conclude that an argument itself is a form of evidence. If that were the case, then there may be an argument that is unsupported by anything but more arguments. This would result in an infinite regress. Obviously, there must be factual evidence as the basis for argumentation. If a Christian claims that arguments are the evidence in support of his belief, and those arguments are not supported by factual evidence, he is really admitting that he is lacking actual observable evidence. He calls his arguments 'evidence' to cover up that fact.
This is all part of the intellectual gamesmanship that Christians engage in to make their beliefs seem justified when they really aren't. I used to think they do this in an effort to fool others. Now, I understand that they are actually fooling themselves.
Well, a lot of philosophers with a rationalist bent would essentially disagree that "argument isn't evidence," and believe that without a lot of rationally-derived pre-evidence, ie much pre-sculpting of the grounds of evidence by reason, what you call evidence is at most just "raw data" and not very useful, and at worst, a conflicting blast of continuous and chaotic signals... Ie they'd argue (more or less) that reason "constructs" reality....
ReplyDeleteBut ultimately, let's face it, would an absolute lack of evidence and failure of all the stock arguments even prove finally that there isn't a God of any kind?
(Granted, it might disrupt some philosophical positions often associated with theism, but "God" in general isn't very easy to even define in the first place, much less disprove.)
I'd say neither theistic nor atheistic arguments should be overestimated, which is also easy to do. All an antheological proof could do, if entirely successful, and at best, is to prove there is no "necessity" for God, that God is not required to make sense out of the universe, so the atheologian can't be compelled to "convert" to any "religious" position against his or her wishes ... whatever "convert" would mean, since even the best theistic arguments don't specify which religions, sects, or parts thereof, if any, have "God" right in the first place, and the whole game plays out much more weakly than is often assumed, I think.
Suppose that it's a fact that there exists no evidence for theism, and suppose it's a fact that there are no sound arguments for theism accessible to humans.
DeleteWould the conjunction of the above statements be proof against theism, or at least evidence against theism?
In the first case, I don't know.
In the second case, I think yes. Perhaps it isn't evidence that makes theism improbable, but I think it would do that too. It would seem extremely unlikely given theism that the statements above be true, but we know such statements would be implied by atheism, so would certainly be evidence for it.
I think a successful atheological argument could do more than prove God is not necessary; some arguments, if sound, would prove God necessarily doesn't exist!
Yeh, I guess was overlooking some of the arguments that assert God, or at least some concepts of God are contradictory, like the PoE. Thanks, Ryan.
DeleteBut does that argument not only rule out a certain "God"? And still leave possible others like a nonomnipotent process concept of God?
Are there other arguments that are more far-ranging?
There really is no argument against supernaturalism that would cover ever concept of God. Consider, supposing it makes sense, a God concept where God is omnipotent, omniscient, but morally neutral. Is such a God ruled out on the basis of ordinary arguments against theism? No, probably not. Or consider other intelligent design hypotheses, such as this universe being created by some being in another universe. These beings would mostly be unaffected by the average argument against theism.
DeleteSome philosophers, such as Eric Steinhart, think studying alternate concepts of God is worthwhile and would bring new life to the philosophy of religion.
I mentioned process theology's nonomnipotent God as an alternative in particular because I think a lot of people - both informal theists and churchgoing people in the pews both - quietly and maybe informally harbour beliefs or suspicion along those lines: "God can't help everything that happens"
DeletePhilosophers have long since forgotten the original conceptions of God that sparked religious belief on the first place. In their zeal to make God comply with their own conceptions of perfection, they have turned God into something unfathomable and inaccessible.
DeleteThere's some evidence for God's existence....it's just shitty evidence.
ReplyDeleteI was careful not to say "no evidence". The testimony of the bible is some kind of evidence, but it is in that category of "shitty". I do say the evidence is "lacking".
DeleteI think the following is what people mean by saying an argument is evidence for a proposition:
ReplyDeleteDef 1 - An argument X is evidence for some proposition Y when; 1. the argument is sound, 2. Y is either proven by the conclusion of X or the probability of Y is raised given the truth of the conclusion of X.
Def 2 - An argument X is evidence for some proposition Y when; 1. The argument is valid, 2. The premises are probable, 3. Y the conclusion of X.
Let's look at Def 2 first. Suppose we had some argument like this:
1. If P, then Q.
2. P.
3. Therefore, Q.
The argument uses standard modus ponens, so we know it's valid. Now let's say we know 1 is true, and we know 2 is probable. By definition 2, the the argument is evidence for Q. This is often what some theists mean by an argument being evidence for God.
Now let's look at Def 1.
1. If P, then R.
2. If Q, then R.
3. Either P or Q.
4. Therefore, R.
The argument is valid, so let us suppose two things; 1. the argument is sound or likely sound, 2. Some proposition, call it "S", is a logical implication of R, or the probability of S given R is high.
In any scenario, we have evidence for S by Def 1. This is often what some theists mean by saying an argument is evidence for God. For example, when Bill Craig says the Kalam is evidence for theism, he means to say that the argument is sound, and the truth of the conclusion is more probable given theism than atheism, so the argument ends up providing evidence for theism.
I really doubt you'll find theists advocating that some argument is evidence for some proposition regardless of the truth of the premises in the argument. When Joe says his arguments are evidence for some particular claim, he is obviously presupposing the truth of the premises (hence him citing studies).
M post could be shortened by saying that it is a mistake to think Christians say "Argument X, as a chain of reasoning, is evidence for Y", but rather they are making a point that some fact about X is evidence for Y.
ReplyDeleteFor example, suppose some argument X is sound, and the conclusion of X is Y. A fact about X, that X is sound, is evidence for Y since the soundness of X confirms the truth of Y. Or, if X proves Y, and Y implies Z, then the fact that X is sound is evidence for Z (Confirmatory in fact).
Yes, some fact about X is evidence for Y, and thus we may be able to say that argument X is evidence for Y. I alluded to that in my discussion. But there has to be a fact at the basis of it.
DeleteAn a priori argument for God doesn't fit the bill. It's not based on evidence.
An a posteriori argument for God typically ignores the larger body of facts (scientific knowledge) to focus on one particular fact. So it isn't really evidence-based.
An a priori argument is certainly not based on empirical evidence, so probably not based on evidence. However, to some people, an a priori argument might be based on the truth of propositions they believe stand independently of empirical evidence. e.g., a moral argument for God might work from the fact that atheism allegedly implies moral realism is false, then say that moral realism is true, and conclude theism then must be true, all without appealing to empirical evidence.
DeleteThe problem with a priori arguments is that they depend on standards which we would usually reject outside of theistic arguments. The burden is on the theist to show that a priori arguments are not using bad standards, but probably they'd need to appeal to empiricist standards at some point.
With respect to inventing evidence, this is obviously not a worry.
ReplyDeleteConsider the following:
Universe of discourse: Bambi, Franklin the turtle.
1. For all x, x is a mammal.
2. Therefore, Franklin the turtle is mammal.
This argument fails since there is an interpretation, naming one where x = Franklin the turtle, where the conclusion is false but the premise is true. But suppose the universe of discourse ONLY included Bambi. In that case, we could validly conclude that Bambi is a mammal from 1.
What's the relation here? Well, you take issue with what can be derived about arguments by having the universe of discourse contain all types of arguments. When you narrow the universe of discourse of arguments to "sound", or "cogent", or something sufficiently close to those, then you don't get the same worry about the green aliens. Could an argument for green aliens be evidence for green aliens when the universe of discourse is limited in this way? No since invalid arguments, or unsound arguments cannot by definition provide support for propositions (they cannot raise the probability of a proposition nor confirm the truth of a proposition unless you ignore the principle of explosion or perhaps use to paraconsistent logic).
This point covers your point about people failing to see the logic in an argument or lack thereof. The scope would obviously be limited to arguments we know are either sound, cogent, or whatever, just as we would limit our scope in data to be data that is known to be true/probable.
The scope would obviously be limited to arguments we know are either sound, cogent, or whatever, just as we would limit our scope in data to be data that is known to be true/probable.
Delete- There's the rub. Would everyone agree that Chalmers' zombie argument is not sound?
Nope, and this is a problem with not having universal standards, not just for what counts as evidence, but what counts as epistemic justification.
DeleteParticularly an issue with POR, as I see it. In science, there is peer review (which isn't perfect) that helps to filter out stuff that doesn't measure up to standards. It does seem there could be a better way of evaluating philosophical works. But it would have to be free of any ideology.
DeleteIt depends on whether or not you buy his supporting argument that conceivability in the case of consciousness is sufficient to justify metaphysical possibility. I frankly don't know enough about logic or 2-D Semantics to say. My problem with the idea of a global p-zombie is the likely consequence: epiphenomenalism.
ReplyDeleteThe argument might turn on the relationship between conceivability and metaphysical possibility (as Ryan pointed out), or it might turn on whether p-zombies are actually conceivable (which was my objection to it). I agree that p-zombies, as defined, would entail epiphenominalism, but I also think that epiphenomenalism is demonstrably false. Therefore, p-zombies are not logically conceivable.
DeleteHow do you figure that p-zombies are not even conceivable? They're not a priori ruled out due to the meanings of the words involved.
ReplyDeleteI thought I explained that. The concept of a p-zombie is logically incoherent. That makes them inconceivable in a philosophical sense.
DeleteNo one knows enough about consciousness and its place in nature to say what is or isn't logically incoherent. All the relevant facts would have to be available and we're very from from that. Consciousness could be a dangler or a spandrel that does no work. Unlikely seeming perhaps but not logically incoherent.
ReplyDeleteNo one knows enough about consciousness and its place in nature to say what is or isn't logically incoherent. All the relevant facts would have to be available and we're very from from that. Consciousness could be a dangler or a spandrel that does no work. Unlikely seeming perhaps but not logically incoherent.
Delete- What you are describing is epiphenomenalism. But despite the incompleteness of our knowledge, there are things we can say for sure. Epiphenomenalism is demonstrably false. We can say with certainty that it's not the case. We know for a fact that a conscious thought can be encoded in memory, and enter into the causal chain to have an impact on subsequent thoughts. And therefore, p-zombies (which imply epiphenomenalism) are incoherent.
The point though is that there's nothing in the concept of consciousness that rules out epiph'm. There's no way that either intuition/introspection or empirical data can determine at present whether the causal work is going on at the conscious level or not. If consciousness is a spandrel, then of course it's going to accompany any causation associated with it. But mere association or correlation doesn't necessarily mean causation.
ReplyDeleteThere's no way that either intuition/introspection or empirical data can determine at present whether the causal work is going on at the conscious level or not.
Delete- You listen too much to the philosophers and not enough to the scientists. Epiphenomenalism is DEMONSTRABLY FALSE.