Why Modern Physics Refutes Thomism
Thomist philosopher Dr. Dennis Bonnette has written an article called Why Modern Physics Does Not Refute Thomistic Philosophy that attempts to defend his religious philosophy against charges that it's obsolete Medieval thinking that is inconsistent with modern science. I have made claims of this nature before. Obviously, Thomists are feeling the heat of these objections to their philosophy, and they insist that all such objections are wrong. Thomism is fully in keeping with modern science, according to Bonnette and other Thomist proponents like Ed Feser. But the real problem is that atheist scientists have a mistaken or ignorant view of philosophical (and especially metaphysical) principles at the heart of Thomism. On the basic truths about the world, scientists and Thomists believe the same thing.
That statement about agreement on basic truths is patently false. Perhaps the most basic aspect of reality concerns the notion of whether there is a God. Obviously, there is disagreement on that. But that's only the beginning. On most questions of metaphysical reality, the views of scientists and Thomists are fundamentally different. How does Bonnette reconcile this fact with his claim that they basically agree? It seems that he's not talking about metaphysics at all. He's only referring to science itself, but not metaphysical philosophy. When talking about scientific knowledge, he sees agreement, but when it comes to metaphysics, the scientists have it all wrong. Science has nothing to say about God, which is a metaphysical claim, so there is no disagreement there. But metaphysics goes far beyond the question of God's existence. It is concerned with the reality of all kinds of things. In Thomism, movement is explained in terms of the metaphysical paradigm of act and potency. In science, it is explained in terms of the paradigm of mass, force, and energy, which is no less a metaphysical concept. But Thomists disagree with that, because they see metaphysics as being separate and distinct from physical reality. To them mass, force, and energy are science, but act and potency are metaphysics.
Bonnette attempts to illustrate his thesis of basic agreement by way of an example involving sensation and cognition. It is epistemological realism - the philosophical notion that the object of our perception has external reality. But his example goes off the rails with regard to agreement agreement between science and Thomism. The scientific view is that sensation of an external object creates a neural pattern in the brain, and subsequent cognitive references to the object actually occur by means of neural activity and connections involving that set of neurons. And Bonnette calls this an epistemological nightmare. He insists that knowledge of an external object is "direct":
While an entire epistemology is not possible here, note that we cannot doubt external reality when it is directly confronted. Doubt arises only when we shift our attention to a judgment about the external object in which what we know is not the object itself. For example, if I close my eyes and wonder whether the lion confronting me is really about to attack me, I am no longer looking at the lion, but at some internal image of it.Just to get this straight, as I understand it, the point of agreement here is on an issue of epistemology - namely epistemological realism - not on the science of cognition, which Bonnette apparently holds in disdain. We don't "directly confront" external reality at all, but the only image we have is an internal image that exists entirely in the brain. And to the extent that our senses can be fooled, it is possible for a false image to be formed, and we certainly can doubt that external reality. How this supports his thesis is a mystery to me.
The next area of agreement that he discusses is "metaphysical first principles", such as the principal of non-contradiction and the principal of sufficient reason. Again, he gives examples that don't seem to support his own thesis. On non-contradiction, he says:
Even the smallest phenomena must be read as what it is and not as its contradictory – otherwise, the reading would be useless. Claims of contradictory phenomena, such as wave-particle duality, rely on such observations. If a subatomic entity appears as a wave, that same exact reading cannot say it is a particle.He evades the real issue here. Yes, it's true that observations of particles only measure one of these properties at a time, but the more fundamental issue is not that these properties are contradictory, but that the subatomic particle is something that exhibits both characteristics. So rather than clinging to concepts of physical substance that are contradicted by observation, we need a metaphysical concept of substance that agrees with what we observe.
Likewise, on the principal of sufficient reason, he reverts to a theistic definition of causation:
Causes are merely reasons for things that do not explain themselves.Which is just another way to say that everything has a cause except for God. And he insists that scientists always have to find causes for everything. But that's not really true. At a macro level, things can be said to have causes (in terms of objects interacting with one another according to Newtonian or relativistic physical laws), but at the quantum level, things happen on a stochastic basis, and there is no notion of causality in quantum physics. As it happens, this is a major point of disagreement between science and Thomism, despite Bonnette's denial.
He also takes care to separate the metaphysical principles at the heart of Thomism from science.
Potency and act, matter and form, finality, essence and existence: Most other Thomist principles are so clearly philosophical that natural science properly says little about them. The exceptions would be materialist denials that substantial forms and final causes exist in nature. Still, those are clearly philosophical, not scientific, claims.He has no choice but to make this separation, because these metaphysical principles are in direct contradiction to modern science. Act and potency do not explain how things move. They provide a teleological account of movement that was incorporated into the physics of Aristotle, which was the science of the day, but no longer have any explanatory value. Essentialism and forms are a reflection of man's propensity to classify things, but they are purely conceptual, and don't even stand up to philosophical scrutiny, let alone scientific. (As modern philosophers note, how many grains of sand can you remove from a dune before it is no longer a dune? As scientists note, at what point in evolutionary history does an ape give birth to a man?)
And here we see the greatest conflict between science and Thomism. It is in their metaphysical views of reality. Thomists give primacy to metaphysics, and science is not only subordinate to that, but it can have nothing to say about what is real and what isn't in metaphysics. Science, on the other hand, makes observations about reality, and any scientific view of metaphysics would hold that the two must remain in agreement with each other to form a coherent whole. In other words, metaphysics must evolve along with scientific understanding of reality. But to the Thomist, metaphysics is static and unchanging. How can these views be so fundamentally different?
There is only one reason Thomists hold metaphysics above and separate from science. Metaphysics is the thing that stands between science and theism. In Aristotle's time, there was no such separation. Physics and metaphysics were in complete harmony. And that's the way it should be. In fact, there are modern philosophers of science who build a metaphysical understanding of reality based on science. There is no conflict when metaphysics is informed by science. In the Thomistic view, on the other hand, metaphysics deals with a completely separate realm of existence. It is a ream where God exists, as do essences, and act and potency, and teleological motivations. And it isn't informed by modern science at all. Whenever a Thomist tells you that there is no conflict between Thomism and science, what he means is that they are dealing with different things. And when their metaphysical views come into conflict, it is because the scientific community isn't doing it right.
All these peculiar “B theory” claims about time, together with its “eternalism,” are philosophical interpretations of special relativity, which are not empirically verifiable. ... Physicists loathe being told that they are doing metaphysics – even more so, that they are doing metaphysics badly.Wrong on both counts. Relativistic effects on time have been empirically verified, and it isn't that scientists do metaphysics badly - but rather that Thomists do it badly.
Science, on the other hand, makes observations about reality, and any scientific view of metaphysics would hold that the two must remain in agreement with each other to form a coherent whole. In other words, metaphysics must evolve along with scientific understanding of reality.
ReplyDeleteIf science is exclusively concerned with the physical, how can it ever reflect on "metaphysical" (ie literally "beyond the physical") concepts)?
What do you mean? You hope to infer from the physical to the metaphysical?
Metaphysics does not mean "beyond the physical". Metaphysics is concerned with what exists, whether that happens to be physical or not. At least some part of metaphysics must relate to physical reality. And that encompasses everything that is within the scope of science. If any metaphysical view of reality is inconsistent with science (such as the Thomistic understanding of movement, causation, essentialism, etc.), then one or the other must be wrong. They are not separate, as Thomists would have you believe. They go hand-in-hand.
DeleteThis comment has been removed by the author.
DeleteMetaphysics must, of necessity, inextricably supervene on physics. It is a symbiotic, mutually beneficial relationship. When metaphysics is unhinged from physics, wandering off into the blue beyond, it becomes theology, a creative exercise, an interplay of superstition and mythology. When metaphysics is uncoupled from physics, it becomes an epistemological- and ontological-free zone of little substantive merit as any form of bona fide explanatory system.
DeleteThe apologists' [Feser, Bonnette, Moreland et al] miserable attempts at cleaving the metaphysics from the physics, is simply a self-serving exercise, little more than a charade in the guise of philosophy peddling superstitious bunkum to the gullible and the needy. While this strategy might have worked in earlier times among the illiterati, not so much today and becoming even less convincing as our quantum of scientific truths, facts and understanding grows, challenging theology making the very same claims, exposing them for the superstitious and illusory dross they are. It is important to note the minimal impact and equally waning influence of Thomism in contemporary philosophy: " Thomistic scholasticism in the English speaking world went into decline in the 1970s when the Thomistic revival that had been spearheaded by Jacques Maritain, Étienne Gilson, and others, diminished in influence. Partly, this was because this branch of Thomism had become a quest to understand the historical Aquinas after the Second Vatican Council. Still, those who had learned Scholastic philosophy continued to have unresolved questions about how the insights of the medieval synthesis could be applied to contemporary problems. This conversation departed from the academic environment and entered internet discussion groups such as Aquinas,[26] Christian Philosophy,[27] and Thomism,[28] and websites such as Open Philosophy,[29] where it continues today." [READ HERE
Bonnette and Feser represent the rear-guard of the contemporary Thomist folly, attempting a last ditch effort at breathing life into a moribund idea.
But they keep trying. It is their way of convincing themselves that their theistic beliefs have some kind of philosophical justification. How much different would Thomism look if Aquinas was a modern physicist who understands that our observations of reality depart so radically from Aristotelian metaphysics?
DeleteHERE is Bonnette attempting to prove the existence of a literal Adam and Eve. Tells you something of the level of psychological compartmentalisation Bonnette must practice to overcome cognitive dissonance. His arguments have the aura of logic and reason, just enough to sway the rust-on woo believers; until, that is, one starts to properly examine the 'evidence' he assembles, only to discover they are assertions at best, post hoc rationalisation founded on an initial premise that there was indeed a literal Adam and Eve. What a crock of unhinged metaphysics.
ReplyDeleteA reprise, HERE IT IS
DeleteHmmm. It seems Bonnette is quite outspoken in his belief in Adam and Eve. Jerry Coyne had something to say about another similar article of his.
DeleteOn the Secular Outpost, Bradley Bowen is doing a review of Feser's book arguing for the existence of God. If anyone has anything to contribute to the discussion, it would be helpful to Bradley and the readers.
ReplyDeleteThanks. I'm not sure what I can add, but I'll check it out.
DeleteFor being a skeptic you don't provide much refutation here, except quoting bits and pieces (probably out of context).
ReplyDeleteI invite you to first read Bonnette's article, then read MY article and tell me what I didn't represent accurately, and finally provide a meaningful refutation of what I said instead of just whining about it.
DeleteThanks for this interesting article, although I think that you have misunderstood a few things. I have written a response here
ReplyDeletehttp://www.quantum-thomist.co.uk/my-cgi/blog.cgi?name=ThomismModernScience1
I have seen your article, and would like to respond with some comments. But It will be a few days before I have a chance.
DeleteMy comment was not immediately accepted at your site, so I'll post it here:
DeleteIn my article, I said that Thomistic metaphysics was static and unchanging, whereas modern science demands a metaphysical view that keeps pace with our evolving scientific understanding of the reality of the world. Nothing in Bonnette's article gave me reason to think otherwise. As you alluded, his stance (as well as that of many Thimists') doesn't seem to be in complete agreement your own. But now I have to step back and re-assess what I said. Despite what I think I have heard from so many Thomists, perhaps there is room for change in Thomistic metaphysics.
But this brings up another issue. How much can Thomism be adapted to modern science before it can no longer be considered to be Thomism - the philosophy of Aquinas? Would he have agreed with you that a down-quark is the efficient cause of the W boson and the up-quark? It seems to me that this is something of a stretch. It still happens spontaneously, with no apparent triggering mechanism, which is what most of us would regard as an efficient cause.
And it seems to me that you are stretching more than just causality. In dismissing my criticism of essentialism, you side-step the main issue (dare I say the essential issue?). The point I raised is that there is not always clear distinction between the essence of one form and another. Your example is of a case where it is clearly defined, but my examples show that the distinction isn't always so sharp. I asked when an ape gives birth to a man. In evolution (didn't figure into Aquinas' calculus) there is no such distinction. Any dividing line you may wish to draw between one form and the other is arbitrary, and obviously subject to disagreement. But that casts doubt on one of the pillars of Thomistic philosophy.
And of course, there is still the matter of act and potency. You claim that this metaphysical concept is presupposed in all modern physics. Really? It's strange that I never heard any such thing (and I am not altogether uneducated in physics). It's not an underlying concept upon which other metaphysical concepts are based. There are no such dependencies, whether stated or otherwise. It's not something that can be quantified. It adds nothing to our understanding of any modern system of mechanics. And if you want to claim that it does, then you have to water it down so severely that it wouldn't be recognized by Aquinas.
If I'm not mistaken, his system of metaphysics was teleological. God was presumed, and things were purpose-driven, which is antithetical to any modern scientific metaphysical view. God was said to be pure act. Potency was the ability or tendency to move toward the the final end, which was seen as God's purpose for something in nature. This is what we understood as final causation. Now, you are telling us that these concepts are still presumed in modern science? I think you are mistaken. Or you have changed Thomistic philosophy so drastically that it wouldn't be recognized by Aquinas himself.
Thanks for your reply. I'll try to post a response in a few days.
DeleteIn the meantime, do you mind if I post your comment on my blog (or at least link to it in a comment) -- so my readers won't miss it?
It showed up after a while.
DeleteJust to interrupt your discussion, I have once again posted my reply as an article on my blog. It was also far too long to go into a comment. And thanks for your continued contributions on my site.
DeleteHere is my response to your second post (in two parts, due to size constraints).
DeleteRegarding the efficient cause: I agree that what I said earlier was not strictly correct in the sense that Aristotle meant. The efficient cause is more properly regarded as the agent that causes movement. I should amend my statement from "some kind of triggering mechanism" to "some kind of mover that is not the thing itself". Now it does appear that while Aristotle allows for certain spontaneous actions, it also appears that Aquinas does not. I note that his argument from motion specifically says that things that are moved are moved by something else. And indeed, this is his basis for asserting a first mover. In fact, if he allowed for something to move itself, the argument from motion doesn't stand. So with that in mind, (and considering that the topic of discussion is Thomism as it relates to modern science), I must ask once again, what would Aquinas have to say about your theory that the particle that spontaneously decays is the mover that is itself not moved by another thing? And would he then be able to conclude that there must be a first mover?
Regarding teleology and final cause: You say that "Aquinas took his teleology from Aristotle pretty much unchanged". But I think this is one case where there is a distinct difference. Because while Aristotle discusses intelligent actions and natural actions as different in kind, Aquinas specifically says all final ends are intelligently conceived. That is the basis of his fifth way - the teleological argument. You say "The existence of God was not an assumption of Aquinas' teleology, but a conclusion which Aquinas ... drew from it." But I say that without his presumption of intelligent design in nature, he wouldn't be able to draw that conclusion. Furthermore, modern science is certainly not built on any such notion. Evolution specifically rejects it.
Regarding act and potency: You say "Both the actual and the potential refer to physical objects." I can't quite see it that way. It would make more sense to regard act and potency as properties of things, and when viewed in conjunction, they provide the impetus for change. But the way the terms "actual" and "potential" are used by Thomists seems to be inappropriate as a description of that concept. If act and potency are a properties of things that provide impetus for change, then it serves little purpose to describe a state of affairs as being "actually one thing and potentially something else". Yes, we can all agree that a statement like that could apply to virtually anything at all (including the states of objects modern physics), but it does not convey the meaning of the concept that act and potency provide the impetus for change. Also, act and potency do not provide any meaningful description of the means by which things change. As a metaphysical concept they are essentially useless in physics. They are not measurable properties. They can't be used in any calculation to determine what the future state will be. Even in Schroedinger's wave equation, where we can't precisely predict a future state, we at least have a useful probability distribution which is calculated without any reference to act and potency. But especially outside the realm of quantum mechanics, we do have precise physical descriptions of the mechanisms of change (involving the metaphysical concepts of force, mass, and energy), act and potency are nothing more than vague, hand-waving concepts by comparison that play no role at all in physics. And when connected with Aquinas' ideas of divine causality, they are antithetical to modern science.
DeleteRegarding essentialism: It is interesting that you want to define essence only in discrete differences between species. This leads to serious problems in your theory, as well as an unscientific outlook. For example, you claim that due to a DNA mutation, a non-rational animal gave birth at some point to a rational animal, and that was the genesis of mankind. And then you tell us that this is consistent with evolution. The problem is that no anthropologist or evolutionary scientist thinks that's what happened. Rationality is not a binary thing. What we observe among animals with brains is whole range of cognitive abilities. Various animals exhibit what you might consider to be a surprising level of logical thinking and even abstract thinking. This is not unique to mankind. And it is not something that suddenly appeared. It evolved gradually, like most anatomical features do. The point I made about an ape giving birth to a man is that such an event never happened. Rather, there was a gradual transition. From an evolutionary perspective, the idea of distinct species is not realistic. And that has implications for your essentialism. What is the essence of the half-way-between creature? What about its immediate ancestor or offspring? One way to solve your problem is to say that each generation defines a unique species with its own form and essence. And you could take that idea one step further to say that each unique individual has its own unique essence. But, as I hope you can see, Thomistic essentialism simply doesn't comport with scientific reality.
Thanks once again for your reply. I'll be briefer this time [A little].
Delete1) Your question concerning the first way is an interesting one. I think that Aquinas' argument can be extended without too many problems to allow for a thing in one state to be the mover that preceded that same thing in another state. I discuss this a bit in my book.
Aquinas himself, I think, took a different route to resolve this problem. The first way is a summary of Aristotle's argument from Physics VII and Physics VIII. In Physics VIII.4, Aristotle discusses this very question (obviously in the context of his own physics). In Aquinas' commentary on the Physics, he concludes his discussion of Physics VIII.4 by saying (referring back to the preceding text, which I haven't quoted since it is a bit longer),
while others, such as heavy and light things are moved according to nature not by themselves but by some mover) as has been explained -- for they are moved either per se by the generator which makes them be heavy and light, or they are moved per accidens by whatever removes what impedes or removes their natural motion -- it is accordingly clear that all things which are moved are moved by something, i.e., either by an intrinsic or an extrinsic mover; which is to be moved by something other.
I'll focus on the per accidens solution. If you have a heavy object high up, it naturally falls, apparently moving itself according to its natural tendencies (you'll have to excuse the out of date physics -- we are trying to extract the principle behind it). The thing that moved it, in Aquinas' terms, would then be whatever lifted it up and held it there in the first place. This solution can be transferred to at least some quantum physics problems. If an electron in an excited state around the atom spontaneously decays into a ground state, then its mover would be whatever excited it in the first place. I think this argument would also work in QFT, although its a bit harder. Something can only decay or emit a particle if it has sufficient energy (in all inertial frames). Since the thing has a minimum energy (its mass in classical physics and relativistic quantum mechanics, zero in QFT); either it stayed in an unnaturally high energy state forever (which other aspects of the cosmological argument would address), or something excited it into that state. So that thing which elevated it into the excited state would be its mover. That, at least, based on his comments in his commentary, is how I would imagine Aquinas would answer the question. [I think that the solution I mentioned works a bit better in the context of QFT, which is why I prefer it.]
So I diverge from Aquinas a bit here. But whether you take my solution or his, it would still work in the first way.
If an electron in an excited state around the atom spontaneously decays into a ground state, then its mover would be whatever excited it in the first place.
Delete- Well, OK. That's one way of looking at it. Things have a "natural tendency" to fall after they are lifted (by the efficient cause). In the case of the electron, there's no telling how long it will take, but I suppose that's within the framework of Aristotelian metaphysics. I will note, however, that this answer seems to disagree with the one you gave earlier (the particle is the efficient cause of its decay products).
2) Teleology. Firstly, I dispute the phrasing "intelligent design" here, because of the way that it is used by modern creationists. They have a very different (mechanistic) natural philosophy to Aquinas, and since it is wrong to compare modern arguments from design with Aquinas' fifth way (once again I discuss this in my book; I spend one chapter showing how modern criticisms of the first and fifth way miss the point, before developing my own, slightly different, arguments), I tend to have a reaction against language that might mislead people into thinking they are the same thing.
ReplyDeleteIn my post, I gave a couple of quotes from Aristotle suggesting that my interpretation of telos is in agreement with at least one sense of what he meant by the term. The question is then whether Aquinas would have accepted Aristotle's definition more or less as it stood (and thus God enters as a consequence of his teleology) -- as I claim, or added a notion of God's purpose to it (so that the God becomes a premise of his Teleology) -- as you claim. I think the only way to settle this is to look at what he wrote elsewhere. Aristotle introduced the causes in Physics II, and as part of his discussion of that section of Aristotle, Aquinas wrote,
The second point is that some things are causes of each other in respect to different species of cause. Thus work is an efficient cause of a good habit, yet a good habit is a final cause of work. For nothing prevents a thing from being prior and posterior to another according to different aspects. The end is prior according to reason, but posterior in existence; the converse is true of the agent.
So in this passage, he firstly treats the end (or final cause) as the opposite of the efficient cause (albeit, and unfortunately, not in an example taken from physics). Two sentences later, he states that the end comes after the being in order of existence. It can hardly refer to God or his purposes in that case. I didn't find anything in Aquinas' commentaries which he didn't follow Aristotle pretty closely in this matter. But I'm not an expert, so I could be mistaken. Do you have any counterexamples (excluding the fifth way, whose interpretation we are disputing) to suggest that Aquinas did intend final cause to mean purpose?
Do you have any counterexamples (excluding the fifth way, whose interpretation we are disputing) to suggest that Aquinas did intend final cause to mean purpose?
Delete- I think final cause is generally understood as the intent of the agent that acts. This is necessarily conceived by a mind of some kind, since simple objects like rocks do not have any intent. And Aquinas does tell us that natural things (as opposed to things that are moved by men) act in accordance with God's purpose. Aquinas uses the phrase "the intention of an end" when discussing final cause:
Matter does not acquire form, except according as it is moved by an acting cause (agent); for nothing reduces itself from potency to act. But the acting cause does not move, except by reason of the intention of an end. For if the acting cause were not determined to some effect, it would not act to produce one rather than another. In order, therefore, that it should produce a determined effect, it is necessary that it should be determined to something certain as end. (Summa theol. I-II:1:2).
3) With regards to act and potency, we seem to be in agreement that my interpretation of the concept of act and potency is consistent with modern physics. The question is whether it is consistent with how Aristotle and Aquinas defined it. [And, actually, I would agree that I have developed their position a little -- but I would say it is a legitimate development, while you seem to regard it as a distortion.] Admittedly, this is a tricky task, because in my reading neither Aristotle nor Aquinas are as clear as I would like when discussing this subject. But I referred to an illustration from Aristotle and a couple of citations from Aquinas supporting my idea that their understanding of potency is something that points to what we would now call different states of being. Do you dispute my interpretation of those passages, or have any passages which can back up your claim that they interpreted it as "properties of things which provide an impetus for change?" (To my mind, the natural powers or tendencies of things towards certain ends provides the impetus for change in their physics and philosophy.)
ReplyDeleteNow it is certainly true that my interpretation of act and potency doesn't explain the mechanism for change. But it is not intended to. As I said, I regard the notion of potency (properly translated into mathematical notion) as a necessary axiom of any physical theory. Act and potency describes what changes are possible. The theory you build on top of that (whether expressed in terms of natural powers, or forces and energy, or the creation and annihilation of particles) is what describes the mechanism. I discussed how the concepts of force, mass and energy aren't relevant to this point (or, in the case of force, to contemporary physics) in my first post.
4) Now, as is obvious, I'm not a biologist, and I am usually reluctant to get into arguments over biology. I've seen how badly non-physicists fare in discussions of physics, (or indeed non-classical philosophers when it comes to classical philosophy), and I have always felt that there is no reason to suppose that I would be any better if I ventured into a discussion on biology or some other subject in which I am not expert. So I try to avoid it as much as I can. It looks like I should have heeded my own advice. I'll leave it to a biologist or anthropologist to answer you here. [And, actually, I personally depart from Aquinas in another way here; I do regard each individual to have their own essence, in part to avoid the issues you have discussed. I regard this issue in the same way as I regard the unification between QFT and GR -- I haven't yet seen a good answer, but I trust that there is one (in part because non-essentialist theories have even bigger problems), though it will take a brainer man than me to find it.]
But there was another point I made. Why is biology even relevant to this discussion? The contact between metaphysics and science occurs first and foremost in fundamental or quantum physics. Biological processes (I am assuming) ultimately reduce to chemical and physical processes. Chemical processes reduce to physical processes. So if a Thomist can explain physics in terms of his metaphysical principles, then he gets chemistry and biology thrown in as well. Even if the essences are only at the level of chemicals, or perhaps individual animals, rather than species, that still means that essences have a fundamental role in the philosophy of science. I have argued that it makes sense to describe the essence of fundamental particles (related to the various states generated by the different types of creation operators in renormalised and effective field theories), and that the exclusion principle shows that these essences are not merely a human construction but inherent within nature. Do you have any arguments to dispute the case for essentialism in fundamental physics?
With regards to act and potency, we seem to be in agreement that my interpretation of the concept of act and potency is consistent with modern physics.
Delete- The point I made is that the concept of act and potency, though it may be construed as being consistent, is useless in modern physics. It offers nothing more than a vague notion of the behavior things, that can be applied to anything and everything. It plays no role in calculating or predicting motion.
Do you have any arguments to dispute the case for essentialism in fundamental physics?
- My argument is of a more general nature. If we can show that doesn't apply to biological species (and I think I have done that), or in innumerable other circumstances where things do not fall into discrete categories, then why should we think that it is a valid metaphysical concept under any circumstances?
This is a very good discussion, thanks, gents. And I appreciate its spirit, one that is not always found in combox discussions.
ReplyDelete1. I have trouble understanding why Aristotle, and Aquinas after him, thought that the simple bodies (earth, air, fire and water, which have potencies of being heavy and/or light) are moved 'per se' by the generator when they change location according to their natural locomotion: "heavy and light things are moved according to nature not by themselves but by some mover) as has been explained -- for they are moved either per se by the generator which makes them be heavy and light, or they are moved per accidens by whatever removes what impedes or removes their natural motion..."
The generator is that which produces fire out of air, or whatever, correct? Once fire is produced out of air, fire moves by natural motion as far from the absolute center, the earth, as it can. During that rise, it's not being pushed or pulled upwards by the same substance that generated it from air (or from earth or what have you). This scenario does not seem to be to represent a hierarchical series of movers ordered per se in the way that Thomists describe such series. Once generated from earth or air, the fire's generator doesn't even need to exist any more--- or if it is generated by the action of a higher heavenly body, say, the sun, the sun does not pull the air upwards. The fire rises upwards by natural motion. I don't see how this is a hierarchical series of movers ordered per se on the lines of Thomas' man-hand-stick-rock.
2. People who work on Aristotle usually say that teleology in nature in Aristotle is mostly described without reference to the plan of a divine mind, since Aristotle denies that the universe was fashioned in time by a demiurge. I think in fact that Aquinas' decision in the Fifth Way to exemplify the intentional movement of inanimate bodies with the archer/arrow example is not apt for arguing that all natural movement of inanimate bodies is intentional. The natural movement of the arrow in A-T would be toward earth, not toward any target.
3. Boring Bloke, I may not have understood your points about particle motion or particle decay. In all the Thomistic commentary I've read, a thing that moves itself is reduced to the prior causal power of an unmoved mover, on the ground that if one part of the thing is moved by another part, the thing is not pure Act, so that the causal chain would not have a starting point - since no causal chain ordered per se can have a starting point independent of an unmoved mover.
Many thanks, F
Thanks for your comment. I do have sympathy for your point 1) -- this strikes me as the main (and only real) weak-point of the Aristotelian argument from motion, and I wish that the main expositors of that argument would go into more detail in describing why we can be sure that such a series of movers is a per se series. One counter argument might be that examples of the hand, stick, stone type are sufficient to show the unmoveable mover. Another might be to say that in a per se series, the key aspects are that the effect in some way depends on the cause, and that there is a clear direction in that dependence (i.e. A moves B which moves C and there is no chance of A and B moving each other -- Newton's third law of motion doesn't violate this, since A would be the first object before the collision and B the second object after the collision). In this way, the fire is generated by something from air, but that generation depends on the activity of the agent. The fire that has risen a little bit depends on the fire that had not quite risen so much (albeit Aquinas' interpretation would be that the mover of the fire would be whatever changed its nature). This sense of dependency might be enough to argue that it is a per se series. But I would also need to check whether Aristotle or Aquinas directly answered this objection, which I can't do now.
DeleteObviously this example in practice needs to have its physics updated.
2) I agree that the example used by Aquinas isn't the best. However, I think that the point that he was trying to illustrate, that observation of such a natural tendency can't be explained without an external will still stands even without the example.
3) I don't think that I am saying that one part of the particle moves another part of the particle. Rather that its natural motion includes the possibility of emitting another particle. [So rather than earth moving downwards, I have electrons naturally emitting photons and moving into a lower energy state.]
"Wrong on both counts. Relativistic effects on time have been empirically verified, and it isn't that scientists do metaphysics badly - but rather that Thomists do it badly."
ReplyDeleteThe idea that the B-theory is correct is certainly a respectable one, but to conflate the relativistic effects of time with the B-theory is false; since these effects are predicted by the other interpretations. This will be quite long, but the original statement is quite wrong and thus needs correcting.
So here is the difference in standard SR the Lorentz Transformations apply to Time, Space and Mass. While on a Lorentzian theory it applies to Clocks, Meter Sticks (i.e., measuring instruments) and Momentum.
"It is the dimensions of the material instruments for measuring space and time that change, not space and time that are distorted…" H. E. Ives (who, along with G. R. Stilwell, performed the first experimental confirmation of time dilation).
Time dilation, from the perspective of a single reference frame, means that physical processes slow down for systems that are moving compared to systems at rest. Muons have been experimentally confirmed to have longer half lives when at high speed compared to when at rest. This doesn't mean that time dilation has to be interpreted as actually changing the flow of time - it can be interpreted as changing the rate of physical processes as I said - but it means that time dilation is a real, physical effect. - time dilation is better understood (from a perspective on time that maintains absolute simultaneity) as a slowing of physical processes rather than as some kind of weird spacetime warping - just as length contraction is a real effect causing physical systems to get shorter in the direction of their motion. The point is these are real physical effects, not artifacts of a particular coordinate system (with the caveat that if you choose a coordinate system different from the one privileged by the real passage of time, you'll see these effects differently, and that could be said to be an artifact of the choice of coordinates).
Moreover even if there are relativistic effects that doesn't mean the A-theory of time is incompatible with modern physics and the B-theory is forced on us. For example, Shape Dynamics (http://filozofiaiszemle.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/Thomas-M.-Crisp-Temporal-Passage-A-Shape-Dynamic-Accountpdf.pdf - https://arxiv.org/abs/1409.0105 ) and Horava Gravity (https://arxiv.org/abs/1701.06087 ) are both cutting edge examples of A-theory physics. Not to mention simple reinterpretations of GR like Ellis's EBU - https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1407/1407.7243.pdf Or even the simple suggestions of atheistic philosopher Tim Maudlin when discussing the objection to Bohmian mechanics from SR:
"In the non-Relativistic version you just postulate some point particles, and a single universal quantum state (represented by a mathematical wavefunction) and two simple dynamical equations: the Schrödinger equation for the wavefunction and the so-called guidance equation for the particle motions. You could have guessed both equations easily, and you get out all of the iconic quantum behavior: two-slit interference effects, violations of Bell’s inequality, decoherence due to observation or more generally due to coupling to the environment in the right way, etc., etc. What’s not to like? The only sticking point is the Relativistic version, but there I hold a minority view and would happily violate fundamental Lorentz invariance, explaining observational Lorentz invariance by appeal to what is called quantum equilibrium. There is a lot you just can’t do in complete thermal equilibrium, such as extract useful work from heat and send signals. Something you can’t do in quantum equilibrium is experimentally access a preferred “frame of reference”. C’est la vie."
even if there are relativistic effects that doesn't mean the A-theory of time is incompatible with modern physics
Delete- Unlike Bonnette, I am not ridiculing the theory that doesn't fit my ideological beliefs. As with all matters in science, there is never a final answer to the question, but we rely on evidence justify our qualified beliefs.
ReplyDeleteThe most that can be said right now against theories like Horava gravity is that it is unproven or faces challenges, but so do virtually all theories in theoretical physics. It is also important to note that both projects I mention command less than a 1/10th of what String Theory does in terms of resources and have existed for less than half the time, so naturally they are still works in progress. They do however, even in their current state, put to rest the idea that there is no physically respectable way to deny the B-theory within physics.
Most devastatingly, it is an axiom of the system (SR) that there is no privileged frame. This claim however, tacitly assumes naturalism. For if God exists then there is a universal, non-point-like frame that permeates the whole cosmos which is metaphysically privileged in the strongest possible sense. Consider the quote of H.A. Lorentz for whom the mathematical heart of SR is named after,
"A 'world spirit' who, not being bound to a specific place, permeated the entire system under consideration or 'in whom' this system existed and who could 'feel' immediately all events would naturally distinguish at once one of the systems, U, U' etc above the others". - HA Lorentz writing to Einstein 1915 original; cited in, "Hendrik Antoon Lorentz, the Ether, and the General Theory of Relativity, A. J. Kox, Archive for History of Exact Sciences, Vol. 38, No. 1 (1988), pp. 67-78
The point being here that in Lorentzian relativity the privileged frame need not be occupied by a substantial aether (like what classical physics originally thought) but instead simply be any global reference frame. The idea of SR with a privileged frame isn't foreign to non-philosophers either - https://arxiv.org/abs/1805.10995
So, if a theist makes an argument in favor of God (argument from change for example) it is no good for the naturalist to use the standard interpretation of SR or GR against the argument for God, since these interpretations presuppose naturalism. You can't fault an argument FOR super-naturalism by appealing to a theory in which the falsity of super-naturalism is taken as a postulate. Especially given that the mathematics doesn't change simply because there is a privileged frame. The Lorenztian aether theory contained one and the problem it faced was that aether was physically undetectable and should have some interaction with particles that is noticeable. While the Lorentz contractions were created to explain the null result of things like the michelson morley experiment, we should still expect some kind of physical interaction that is detectable. This however, is not a problem if the privileged frame were God for instance, since I have no reason to believe that God is a field and thus no reason to expect him to show up in particle interactions. It should be noted that while I believe in God, even if I didn't, I still wouldn't use standard SR against theistic arguments simply because I don't want to be guilty of the fallacy of begging the question. Also, I have no emotional commitment to the argument from change, I am happy to admit there are flawed theistic arguments (I don't affirm Anselm's ontological argument for instance). So, the Thomistic arguments might fail, but not because of the alleged self-evidently obvious truth of the B-theory of time. If it still isn't clear, consider more examples below -
So, if a theist makes an argument in favor of God (argument from change for example) it is no good for the naturalist to use the standard interpretation of SR or GR against the argument for God, since these interpretations presuppose naturalism. You can't fault an argument FOR super-naturalism by appealing to a theory in which the falsity of super-naturalism is taken as a postulate.
Delete- Anyone who presupposes God should not make a statement like this. Incidentally, my own position presupposes only one thing: it is reasonable to rely on the evidence of the senses. This does not assume naturalism, nor does it assume theism. The evidence leads me to my beliefs.
The philosopher of science Jeff Koperski says:
ReplyDelete"When we left STR in favor of GTR in the last section, the reason had to do with scientific realism. GTR is the more fundamental and realistic theory; STR is merely an idealized special case of GTR. This move toward the more fundamental does not stop with GTR, however. Monton believes that this line of thinking should be pushed one step further. Since GTR is not consistent with quantum mechanics, he argues that we should look to even more fundamental theories that attempt to reconcile the two.
…One approach to quantum gravity seems to be exactly what the presentist was hoping to find. Standard GTR takes spacetime to be a manifold with a metric that changes over time. The incorporation of quantum mechanics means, at the very least, that something in spacetime undergoes quantum fluctuations. On the canonical (or Hamiltonian) approach, it is the metric that fluctuates. The mathematics of quantum mechanics – operators on a Hilbert space- applies to the metric rather than the manifold. That doesn’t mean that the manifold is left untouched. In fact, the 4d manifold must be split back into the classical division of space and time. Space is considered the fundamental entity, not spacetime. More importantly, space evolves according to a 3+1 structure rather than 4d. Although canonical quantization is a large research program (with many branches) in quantum gravity, it isn’t necessary to bring quantum mechanics into the picture. The Hamiltonian version of GTR without a quantized metric has been used by physicists for decades. As Brian Pitts shows, this Hamiltonian version of GTR is a common and perfectly legitimate mathematical form of GTR, even thought it is a fundamentally 3+1 approach. “How can this be?” one might ask. “The same laws cast in a different form completely changes the metaphysics? Surely some experiment must favor the 4d view?” Actually, no. The two versions are empirically equivalent. (4) " - "The Physics of Theism" -2014
Should be noted that Koperski is building upon the work of James Brian Pitts - http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2760/1/ReaTimePTS.pdf - Unfortunately I can only find the pre-print online not the full article that Koperski is citing.
A final empirical consideration would be Richard Muller's (Berkeley physics professor and mentor to Nobel prize winner Saul Perlmutter) view that while there are relativistic effects observed within the spacetime that "currently" exists, there is an objective flow of global time understood as the creation of new time. This is not to deny SR but simply to affirm that there is a global (non-theistic) frame in which the whole universe expands and from here we interpret the Hubble expansion 4-dimensionally. This isn't just philosophical either, it can be empirically confirmed once we have better equipment. Consider the following quote:
"The progression of time can be understood by assuming that the Hubble expansion takes place in 4 dimensions rather than in 3. The flow of time consists of the continuous creation of new moments, new nows, that accompany the creation of new space. This model suggests a modification to the metric tensor of the vacuum that leads to testable consequences. Two cosmological tests are proposed, but that present both experimental and theoretical problems. A more practical and immediate test is based on a predicted lag in the mergence of gravitational radiation when two black holes merge. In such mergers (as recently observed by the LIGO team), a macroscopic view volume (millions of cubic kilometers) of space is created in the region in which the gravitational wave is generated; this one-time creation of new space should be accompanied by the creation of detectable level of new time; resulting in a time delay that could be observed as a growing lag in the emission of the wave as the merger takes place. " - https://arxiv.org/abs/1606.07975
To conclude, the mathematical heart of relativity is compatible with multiple different interpretations of time and even more importantly, there isn't even certainty about the fundamental nature of time in the first place. There are A-theory accounts of quantum gravity that supersede anything put forward by simple SR. I could go on (Faw Dowker anyone), but that would be beating a dead-horse. Unless there is significant scholarly refutation available for the many differing accounts of A-theory physics that I put forward (work that appears in secular academic journals) then there really isn't much to debate here. P.S. - Comment posted in three parts due to length
ReplyDeleteUnless there is significant scholarly refutation available for the many differing accounts of A-theory physics that I put forward (work that appears in secular academic journals) then there really isn't much to debate here.
Delete- It seems to me that you are grasping at straws. You can claim that A-theory hasn't been disproved, but I never claimed that it was. I take issue with Bonnette's arrogant dismissal of those who don't buy his system of metaphysics, as well as his separation of science and metaphysics. And I still say there is much in modern science that is at odds with Thomism, even if one might continue to cling to a thin hope that it still has merit.
"- Unlike Bonnette, I am not ridiculing the theory that doesn't fit my ideological beliefs. As with all matters in science, there is never a final answer to the question, but we rely on evidence justify our qualified beliefs."
ReplyDeleteI agree totally, which is why I supported my belief that the A-theory is alive with multiple lines of evidence from theists and atheists alike.
"Anyone who presupposes God should not make a statement like this. Incidentally, my own position presupposes only one thing: it is reasonable to rely on the evidence of the senses. This does not assume naturalism, nor does it assume theism. The evidence leads me to my beliefs."
I don't presuppose God, so that doesn't apply to me. I literally just stated that the mathematics of theistic relativity (one in which there is a preferred frame) is equal to the one of the standard theory. Thus neither side can claim that relativity proves nor disproves their view of time. If the theist presumed that God exists and is the preferred frame then they would have a question begging argument against naturalist. However, it is manifestly obvious that assuming there is no preferred global frame entails there is no omnipresent God, which would do exactly what I said, take naturalism to be true when formulating relativity. The whole point is that given the mathematical equivalence of the interpretations, there would be in principle no sense-perception distinction between the theories. If both views use the Lorentz transformations they make the same predictions about what we will see with our senses. So, I agree that when making our arguments we should neither presume that God exists nor presume that naturalism is true. Thus, the naturalist can't formulate a theory in which one of the postulates is that there is no preferred frame. That was an axiom of the system, not something proven of it. Moreover, the empirical tests that were attempted would in principle not detect God or any non-interactive rest frame at all. Second, many of the empirical tests were conducted by people who held to my interpretation (Ives). I don't make any claims about you or what you personally presuppose; I only claim that anybody who appeals to SR in the context of religious philosophy must not presuppose the conclusion of the debate as an axiom. If this doesn't apply to you personally then no reason to debate it. Literally all I demonstrated was that IF someone takes the no privledged reference frame as an axiom then the argument it appears in has no dialectical force against a theistic argument, even if the objection were true.
"- It seems to me that you are grasping at straws. You can claim that A-theory hasn't been disproved, but I never claimed that it was. I take issue with Bonnette's arrogant dismissal of those who don't buy his system of metaphysics, as well as his separation of science and metaphysics. And I still say there is much in modern science that is at odds with Thomism, even if one might continue to cling to a thin hope that it still has merit."
If grasping at straws equals sharing a number of peer reviewed academic journal articles displaying numerous paths to an A-theory of time then Ill keep on grasping :) Finally, I am not a Thomist (though I do take very seriously the work of people like Dr. Cundy and recommend you get his book before further engaging his case in the physics; beware though, it may be way above your head mathematically) - https://www.amazon.com/What-physics-defence-classical-theism/dp/1974401650. I am actually just a philosopher of time that wanted to contribute to the discussion for anyone who wants to do the hard-work of sifting through the scholarly articles and examining what views of time are viable. I shall leave the further debate to you and people who actually defend Thomism. My point has been made, the empirical verification of apparent relativistic effects are not incompatible with the A-theory.
Thus, the naturalist can't formulate a theory in which one of the postulates is that there is no preferred frame
ReplyDelete- On the other hand, there is no reason to suppose that there is a preferred frame. This is why I say you're grasping at straws. What I see is Thomists insisting that their own theories have relevance (like act and potency), when in fact there is no reason to accept those theories accept those theories other than a presupposition of theism.
Finally, I am not a Thomist (though I do take very seriously the work of people like Dr. Cundy and recommend you get his book before further engaging his case in the physics ...
- Reading the overview, I see that Cundy seems to take a dim view of everything in science that isn't quantum field theory, and everything in philosophy that isn't Thomism. The scientific community should be shaking in its boots, yet somehow they are not. I think his claims are vastly overblown, and his focus too narrow. Those of us who actually work in scientific endeavors still rely heavily on the scientific knowledge that Cundy says is wrong.
Boring Bloke: "So in this passage, he firstly treats the end (or final cause) as the opposite of the efficient cause (albeit, and unfortunately, not in an example taken from physics). Two sentences later, he states that the end comes after the being in order of existence. It can hardly refer to God or his purposes in that case."
ReplyDeleteBB, Edward Feser writes that Aquinas' conception of the final cause differs from Aristotle's, because Aquinas located the final cause in the divine mind, and Aristotle did not (or at least, didn't make it clear, if he did). For example, of the end/goal/final cause of a natural object, Feser says "But it obviously does not exist in the natural object itself; if the form of an oak were already in the acorn itself, it would be an oak, and it is not ... The only possibility
remaining, then, is the last one: Final causation in the natural world is intelligible because there is an intelligence altogether outside the natural order that directs natural objects to their ends... the final cause of a natural object must exist already as an idea or form in an intellect existing altogether outside the natural order” ("Teleology: A Shopper's Guide," Philosophia Christi 12.1 [2010] 142-159 at 158). Thanks to Scott Lynch for putting this reference over on your blog.
So are you disagreeing with Feser about final causes in nature, or am I just misinterpreting?
In our discussion of final cause as it applies to natural objects, both he and Scott told me that I shouldn't confuse the "end" with "purpose". While I would agree that Aristotle isn't so explicit about it, I think Aquinas is quite clear that it is a rational being's will that defines the end. And this agrees with what I have heard from most Thomists.
DeleteThere are almost certainly some minor differences between Feser's views on scholastic teleology and mine, but I believe, based in part on that article and in part on his other writings, that we are in agreement in all the important details.
DeleteI'll illustrate this with a couple more quotes from that article:
On this [Scholastic] view, represented most prominently by Aquinas's fifth way, final causes are indeed immanent within or intrinsic to natural substances, just as the Aristotelian claims they are. The acorn can be known to be "directed at" the oak entirely independently of the question of God's existence, and theism can be "bracketed off" from the study of final causes as such.
But inanimate phenomena are nevertheless capable of exhibiting a more basic kind of teleology. Indeed, for the scholastics, even the simplest causal regularity in the order of efficient causes presupposes final causality. If some cause A regularly generates some effect or range of effects B -- rather than C, D, or no effect at all -- then that can only be because A of its nature is "directed at" or "points to" the generation of B specifically as its inherent end or goal. To oversimplify somewhat, we might say that if A is an efficient cause of B, then B is the final cause of A.
[He also discusses different forms of teleology, such as as applied to biology, but this is the type of teleology pertinent to the systems I have been writing about.] Both of these quotes are, I believe, fully consistent with what I have been writing. I paraphrased the second of these two quotes several times. Thus far, the scholastics and Aristotle are in close to complete agreement. Elsewhere Feser distinguishes between this type of teleology and that caused by an intelligence.
Now, as you say, there are differences between the two, based on where the scholastics took the idea. Following on from my first quote, Feser writes
DeleteAll the same, for the Scholastic teleological realist, the existence of final causes must ultimately be explained in terms of the divine intellect. The difference from the Platonic approach is that the Scholastic view does not take the existence of a divine ordering intelligence to follow directly from the existence of teleology in nature. An intermediate step in argumentation is required, for the link between teleology and an ordering intelligence is (with a nod to Aristotle) not taken to be obvious.
The passage you cited is towards the end of the essay, after Feser's brief exposition of the fifth way, and is expanding on this point: to explain the origins of Aristotelian final causes, one needs to invoke a (divine) intelligence. However, one does not need to presuppose an intelligence to observe it or study teleology. It is possible (though not, ultimately rational) to accept final causes without accepting any intelligence -- as Aristotle did.
To summarise, Feser's description of the scholastic view of teleology is:
1) It is something inherent or intrinsic to beings (in contrast to post-scholastic philosophy which describes physical law as something external to the being).
2) It is (perhaps a little crudely) the opposite of efficient causality.
3) It can be observed and understood without reference to God or another intelligence.
4) It's existence does not obviously imply an intelligence.
5) Nonetheless, more detailed arguments show that the ultimate explanation for teleology has to be found in a divine intelligence.
The only significant difference between Aristotle and the scholastics is that fifth point, which certainly goes further than Aristotle. If nothing else, we could say (although I and I think Feser as well would regard this as a bit too simplistic) that intrinsic final causality is created by God alongside all the other attributes of the being. One can study the being and all its attributes (including the final causes) without reference to God, but one cannot ultimately explain why it has that nature without including God as part of the explanation [at least, that's what theists believe].
While I have emphasised more on steps 1-4 in my responses here, I have not denied step 5, and I have mentioned it in a few of my replies. So I think you have taken that quote from Feser out of the wider context of the article, and applied it to my discussion of the steps that lead up to that conclusion. Our disagreement (and I think I have stated that more than once) has been that our host here believes that Aquinas takes as a premise or definition that final causality is related to an intelligent will, while I believe that it is the conclusion of Aquinas' arguments. I don't see anything in Feser's writing which contradicts that.
I take issue with statement 3 and 4. First, we don't observe teleology at all. At best, we can say that we observe an apparent directedness in the behavior or growth of things. Teleology is an assumption that explains what we observe. But it is not the only way to explain things. Note that naturalism makes the same observations, but explains them in a different way. It doesn't assume any directedness in nature. So to say that we observe teleology isn't true.
DeleteMore importantly, I think it is impossible to understand teleology without reference to some kind of intelligence. To quote Aquinas: "all natural bodies directly arrive at their fitting ends through their activities and motions, which could not happen unless they were directed by something intelligent." I have been trying to tell you that this intelligence is built into the very idea of teleology, and without it, there would be no concept of teleology. Consequently, statement 4 is an overstatement. You say it's not obvious, but as I have explained (with the help of Thomas Aquinas), the implication is quite clear.
BB, thank you for clarifying at greater length.
ReplyDeleteAn assessment of the premises and steps in the Fifth Way and similar arguments in Aquinas obviously would call for further discussion.
Cheers, F
Great site. I've written about the failures of Thomism on my site as well, Atheism & The City. You should consider installing disqus on your site for comments. It makes them much nicer looking and easier and you get to keep your existing comments:
ReplyDeletehttps://disqus.com
Thank you. I have seen a number of good articles on your site, but not the ones on Thomism yet. I'll check them out.
DeleteAs someone who lurks on The Thinker's blog as well, I wholeheartedly agree that you should install disqus on your site.
DeleteThe activity level here has dropped. But I'll think about it.
DeleteI tried to post this on Quantum Skeptic, after a more carefully worded response was eaten by the internet. So I'll post it here.
ReplyDeleteNigel wrote:
"The only thing I have added to this is the idea of indeterminacy (and I'm not sure that it is an addition to Thomistic thought): that a single object can have many possible ends. If the end marks the end effects of a possible physical process, then clearly the ends or final causes of a down quark include the up quark, electron and anti-neutrino."
This sounds hard to fit into an A-T conception of identity of substantial form and end. If the end is indeterminate, it's hard to see how the thing can have a substantial form and an essence, at least at the quantum level. But such indeterminacy on the micro level would seem to problematize the entire project of fitting A-T and quantum stuff together.
Very poor refutation, one that doesn't deal with the obvious fact that physicalism is a metaphysical postulate in itself, and that physics has been unable to answer convincingly on anything that deals with the problematic of Being. For starters, you should probably Heidegger. The thing is, philosophy is indispensable for Physics, since the most fundamental postulates of Modern Science are not reducible to physical measurements and properties, but are in themselves ontological foundations that are true or not strictly on their validity as ontological and not physical postulates. Thus logical positivism, as physicalism, is one of these viewpoints that is very easily refutable once we start to question it at more than a basic level.
ReplyDelete... doesn't deal with the obvious fact that physicalism is a metaphysical postulate
Delete- Of course physicalism is a metaphysical postulate. As you say, that's obvious. Do you imagine that I don't think I'm dealing with a question of metaphysics, or do you just think that Thomistic metaphysics is the only legitimate form of metaphysics, as Bonnette apparently does?
physics has been unable to answer convincingly on anything that deals with the problematic of Being. For starters, you should probably Heidegger.
- On the question of being, Heidegger is totally wrapped around the axle, in my humble opinion. In order to turn 'being' into something more than existence, you have to make certain presumptions that are not justified by observable information. (For example, he assumes that mind is a kind of substance distinguished from physical matter.) As an empiricist, I'm not prepared to make any such assumptions.
The thing is, philosophy is indispensable for Physics, since the most fundamental postulates of Modern Science are not reducible to physical measurements and properties, but are in themselves ontological foundations that are true or not strictly on their validity as ontological and not physical postulates.
- There are philosophers of science who address metaphysical and ontological issues. But science itself is founded on empiricism. If you think science itself can't proceed without first addressing the ontological issue of Heidegger's "problematic of Being", you are sadly mistaken.
Thus logical positivism, as physicalism, is one of these viewpoints that is very easily refutable once we start to question it at more than a basic level.
- Hmm. Physicalism is a metaphysical stance, and logical positivism is an epistemological stance. They are not the same, and yet you are drawing an equivalence between them. I understand that positivism is a favorite whipping boy for theists who take an overly restrictive view of the assumptions it actually makes. The thing is, we all must make some foundational assumptions. And I don't call myself a logical positivist, nor do I call myself a physicalist. My own metaphysical view is naturalism, and my epistemological stance is empiricism. My epistemology is based on one simple assumption: that it is reasonable to base one's beliefs on the evidence of the senses. Nothing more than that.
Nice thread. I appreciate that there is some real thought presented in the post as well as the comments, even if it is still littered with bashing and dismissive statements. The topic is difficult. One of the comments asserts naturalism as a metaphysical grounding place. Not a bad place for a common playing field since no one will accept another's "faith" as common ground. Of the human aspect is to squabble over everything, even with those we profess to agree with.
ReplyDeleteI'm in with those believing in revealed faith. But the squabbling is unrelenting there as well, let alone finding common ground with those that share no such notions. Yet we have to live in the same world. Naturalism seems to offer that necessary broader common ground. Then we can argue interminably about nature.
Thanks for your comment. I haven't made any new posts lately, and I'm not sure if I will in the future. But I do miss the discussions.
Delete