Feser Evades the Issue

Asking a theist to give a cogent explanation for anything is typically an exercise in frustration.  Most of the time, the best answer you can get is something that boils down to "God did it".  Of course, they don't put it in those words specifically.  There is always a certain amount of hand-waving and dissembling when you try to press them for details.  This rule of thumb applies regardless of what you may be seeking an explanation for.  If God is presumed to have any role in it, the theist will be hard-pressed to provide any technical details on exactly what kind of manipulations occur at the interface between the physical world and the divine.  And there's a reason for that.  Explanations of a detailed technical nature that involve God simply don't exist.  The best they can do is to use vague language or divert to another topic to cover up the lack of any specific details in their answers.

The Ghost In The Machine

David Chalmers has attained a degree of celebrity and earned the adoration of theists, with his philosophical argument against physicalism.  The argument is based on the conceivability of philosophical zombies (or p-zombies).  Before I get into the argument itself, I should explain what a p-zombie is.  This is not the fictional creature of movies that has returned from the dead, but rather a philosophical concept of something that is physically and behaviorally identical in every respect to a person, but that nevertheless lacks any conscious experience.  A p-zombie can't be distinguished from an ordinary person, because it behaves the same, reacts the same, and gives the same answers to any questions.  It would recoil from pain and say "ouch", for example, but not actually experience the feeling pain.  Another way of saying this is that the p-zombie has no subjective or first-person experience.

For The Glory of God

I found a somewhat interesting article by apologist Timothy McCabe that made me do a double-take when I read it.  McCabe takes a stance on free will that sounds strikingly different from what the vast majority of Christians hold.  The way I read it, he flatly denies that there is free will.  The title of his post, and the question that is purports to answer is: If God has a "divine plan" for everyone, then does that mean he controls humans and animals to meet his plan?  McCabe wastes no time in answering that question.  He says, "Definitely."  So he says that God determines our actions and choices, but he's not a determinist in the same sense that I am.  While I believe that our actions play out according to physical laws, McCabe believes that God decides what will happen, and everything that happens is for the glory of God.

On the Timelessness of God

With his theory of Relativity, Einstein threw a monkey-wrench into our understanding of time.  We always used to assume that there are three distinct divisions of time: past, present, and future.  The present is the only thing that has existence, because what is in the past is gone, and what is in the future has not yet come to be.  Time is viewed as a progression of existence.  Indeed, if you look at the Google definition of time (definition:time) you will see that it agrees with this intuitive understanding: the indefinite continued progress of existence and events in the past, present, and future regarded as a whole.  But there are other definitions.  Merriam-Webster defines it as measured by change: a nonspatial continuum that is measured in terms of events which succeed one another from past through present to future.  In fact, without the notion of a changing state of affairs, the concept of time is essentially meaningless, since there is no way to distinguish one moment in time from another.  But Relativity theory confuses this intuitive notion of past, present, and future, because it removes our ability to say that event A precedes event B in time.  Therefore, there is no "present", and no way to definitively categorize all events as belonging either past, present, or future.

Does Evil Disprove Atheism?

Frank Turek presents a response to the Problem of Evil that attempts to turn the issue around, and make it an argument against atheism rather than an argument against God.  As you know, the Problem of Evil (POE) argues that the existence of evil in our world is logically inconsistent with the properties of omniscience, omnipotence, and omni-benevolence that are usually attributed to God.  Therefore God (if he exists) cannot have all three of those attributes, given the existence of evil.  The POE does not prove the non-existence of God, but it does present a strong logical argument that God cannot be what most Christians claim he is.  Most atheists find this argument quite compelling.  Theists, on the other hand, tend to explain away evil as something that God has no control over, not because he isn't omnipotent, but for other reasons that typically involve the free will of man.  I don't think Plantinga or any other religious philosopher has made a rebuttal of the argument that truly addresses the issue in a satisfying way.  That's why it is generally considered to be one of the most formidable arguments against God.  And that's why some theists, like Turek, prefer to duck the problem altogether.

Jesus: Just a Regular Guy

I've always heard that Jesus died as redemption for our sins.  We grew up being told that we were born sinners, and Jesus took our sins upon himself.  In so doing, he bore the punishment for those sins so that we could be saved and find our way to heaven.  Indeed this has been one of the central tenets of Christianity from the earliest days of the faith.  Unlike the concept of the Trinity, which wasn't established until centuries after the life of Jesus, the notion of redemption has direct support in the bible.

For Christ also hath once suffered for sins, the just for the unjust, that he might bring us to God, being put to death in the flesh, but quickened by the Spirit - 1 Peter 3:18 

But God commendeth his love toward us, in that, while we were yet sinners, Christ died for us. - Romans 5:8

Of course, this whole idea violates my own innate sense of fairness.  If Adam and Eve were sinners, why should that guilt be passed on to me?  And the idea that my own sins could be redeemed by someone else paying for them has never seemed right to me.  From the time I was a young child listening to these stories in Catechism class, it bothered me.  It didn't make sense.  This was the very first inkling of doubt that eventually led to my rejection of Christianity.

The Dark Side of Irrational Discourse

Over at Shadow To Light, Mikey is at it again.  In his never-ending crusade against "New Atheists" and all things that he can construe as being an affront to his religionism, Mikey has shown once again that there is no room for rational debate of issues that touch on any topic where he holds religious-based beliefs.  This time, his decidedly emotional rant is about a TEDx Talk by Gregg Caruso on The dark side of free will.  Now, this talk isn't about religion, and it doesn't directly attack religious beliefs in any way, but it does make a comparison between beliefs associated with free will and those associated with determinism.  In particular, it contains a chart that shows the results of empirical studies making a correlation between free will belief and other associated ways of thinking that may have negative social consequences for society.  Those correlations are religiosity, punitiveness, "Just World" belief, and right wing authoritarianism.  Even though the talk didn't include any discussion religiosity or right wing authoritarianism - it was focused entirely on punitiveness and "Just World" belief - the mere fact that they were included in that list of correlations was enough to set Mikey off, accusing Caruso of being a "New Atheist":

Whoa! “Religiosity” is the “Dark Side.” It looks like the professor is peddling the “Religion is Evil” talking point of the New Atheist movement. As for “Right Wing Authoritarianism,” does this mean Left Wing Authoritarianism is correlated with a lack of belief in free will? Or maybe for the professor, there is no such thing as Left Wing Authoritarianism.

Who Follows the Evidence, And Who Doesn't?

Victor Reppert thinks that if materialism is true, there can be no logic and no "laws of evidence".  And therefore, the claims of materialistic atheists - that they base their beliefs on logic and evidence - are self-refuting.

In my previous post, I agreed with John Loftus that people like Victor Reppert are ignorant of the arguments or philosophical stances of naturalists.  Victor is fond of pointing out what he thinks are logical inconsistencies in the beliefs of atheists and naturalists.  His argument typically takes this form:

1. Naturalists believe A, and they believe B.
2. But A is logically incompatible with B.
3. Therefore, naturalists belief in both A and B is illogical or incoherent.

Reppert on Culpable Ignorance

In a recent piece at his blog, Victor Reppert takes issue with John Loftus for saying that he was ignorant regarding the question of what it takes to convince atheists of God's existence.  This is a topic that I have already commented about here.  A few days later, Loftus also responded to Reppert in a somewhat different manner.  The thrust of his argument was that he had already answered the question in detail, but Reppert refuses to read it.  So, like other defenders of the faith, Victor is arguing from a position of ignorance.  If only they understood atheists' claims about evidence and skepticism, they would surely realize that their complaints about atheists' unwillingness to accept evidence for belief in God are unfounded.  And I must say, I agree with Loftus on this.  Victor simply doesn't listen to what we have to say.

The Soteriological Drama

It is interesting to see the stories people make up about why their supposedly maximally good and loving God would allow so much evil, pain, and suffering in the world.  These stories, known as "theodicies", are an attempt to explain away our observations of the world in the face of apparently contradictory assumptions about the qualities of God.  Most of them try to make the case that it's all for our own good - that we need all these bad things in our lives in order to build or prove our character, so that God can know we are worthy of spending eternity basking in his presence.  But every theodicy I have ever heard sounds like a just-so story   It provides an unlikely explanation that might be fascinating to a child, but doesn't stand up to any serious scrutiny, either from an evidential or logical perspective.

Hard Determinism is Immaterialist Woo

Back on the topic of free will again.  As you may be aware, I call myself a determinist who also believes that we are responsible for our own actions.  The idea of free will, as conceived by religionists, is logically incoherent under theistic assumptions about God as the "unmoved mover".  This is a topic I have discussed previously.  But my compatibilist view also doesn't sit well with many materialists.  It is the view of many "hard determinists" that we can be no more responsible for our actions than a billiard ball is for its failure to fall into the pocket after being struck incorrectly.  Human actions are purely the result of a brain that acts in a deterministic manner, subject to the laws of physics, they say, and to think that we can do otherwise is just nonsense.  I explored the topic of compatibilism versus hard determinism in this article.

Why God Allows Pain

I have seen so many answers to the problem of evil (POE) or the problem of suffering in God's creation that I can't enumerate them.  One thing that seems clear from the very existence of all these theodicies is the fact that Christians recognize that they have a real problem that merits a serious answer, even if they try to minimize that problem or even deny that it exists.  But the simple fact that this problem has been addressed by many Christian philosophers, such as Plantinga, is an acknowledgment that it can't be overlooked.  The problem of evil is often cited as one of the most serious challenges to the logical coherency of Christian belief.

Dennett's Compatibilism

This is a follow-up on my earlier post on Determinism and Responsibility, where I presented my own views on responsibility in a deterministic world.  This view is not shared by all materialists.  In one of my recent discussions, there was disagreement over the notion of compatibilism being a "cop-out", as stated by John Searle.  Many materialists agree with Searle.  But others, including Daniel Dennett, take a compatibilist stance.  The compatibilist stance says that because we consider the consequences of our actions, we have responsibility for what we do.  The incompatibilists, on the other hand, hold to the line that because our actions are fully determined, the actor cannot be held responsible for what he does.

Determinism and Responsibility

Many Christians are confused about determinism as it relates to morality.  They seem to think that if determinism is true, then people are at the mercy of the winds.  There is no moral responsibility and no point in even trying to decide what you should do.  After all, everything is just molecules in motion.  People have no choice about what they do, and no way to change the course of events, which is all determined beforehand.  They confuse determinism with fatalism, which is the incoherent notion that our deliberative processes play no causal role in the outcome of events.

According to Christians, the correct way to view it is that God gives us free will, which is the ability to choose what we will do, and the moral responsibility to do the right thing, which is determined by God.  But this Christian view of free will and morality is hopelessly incoherent, as I shall demonstrate.  And furthermore, the Christian view of determinism is hopelessly naive.  They simply don't account for reality.

Confusion Over Compatibilism and Determinism

In a recent post, I discussed the logical incoherency of libertarian free will.  Some of the commentary that followed included discussion of scientific findings that provide strong evidence for the deterministic nature of human decision-making.  Papalinton cited some articles that discuss neurological evidence of the illusory nature of libertarian free will.  Keith Rozumalski dismisses the neurological evidence and counters that many materialists are compatibilists, apparently without realizing that the neurological evidence for determinism is entirely consistent with compatibilism, which is, after all, a form of determinism.  Compatibilism is the philosophical position that despite the deterministic nature of our decision-making processes, we are still responsible for our own choices, as long as those choices are not coerced.

On Free Will and God's Will

What is the problem with positing both that there is human free will and that God directs or guides the course of events to achieve a desired outcome?  Theists argue for both.  But their argument is incoherent, as I hope to show here.

Determinism, Fatalism, and Libertarian Free Will

Victor Reppert says:

Soft determinism is still determinism. And it's really not a different type of determinism. It is, rather, drawing different conclusions from determinism, or rather, not drawing the conclusion that we are not free and not morally responsible for our actions.

Despite the awkward wording, Victor is quite correct. Determinism (regardless of whether you call it soft determinism) does not imply either a lack of freedom or a lack of moral responsibility.